LIFE OF MARLBOROUGH CHAPTER VII. PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN OTHER QUARTERS IN 1708.-CONFERENCE OF THE HAGUE.-SIEGE OF TOURNAY.—BATTLE OF MALPLAQUET.— VII. 1709. 1. Progress of the war in terranean Rhine. ALTHOUGH the campaign in Flanders was the principal CHAP. one in 1708, and from its vast importance and thrilling interest absorbed the greater part of the forces of the contending parties, and nearly the whole interest of the struggle, yet it was by no means the only theatre of the Mediimportant operations. In other quarters considerable and on the successes had been gained, which contributed to enhance the difficulties and augment the dangers of the French monarch. In the Mediterranean, Admiral Drake had conquered Sardinia, almost without striking a blow. Minorca, with its noble harbour and powerful fortress of Port Mahon, had yielded to a combined naval and military force under the able direction of General Stanhope, and, with Gibraltar, promised to secure to the English the command of that inland sea. On the VOL. II. A VII. CHAP. Upper Rhine, the Electors of Bavaria and Hanover, at the head of their respective armies, had cautiously 1709. abstained from serious hostilities, and spent the cam1 Hist. Mil. paign in mutual observation, without achieving anything 272. Hist. worthy of being recorded. Everything had been drawn to the campaign in Flanders: nothing had occurred elsewhere to counterbalance its advantages.1 viii. 225 de Marlb. iii. 1, 2. 2. Ruinous divisions which pre vailed in Spain. The war in Spain, at the outset, promised more important operations, but they had not terminated in any considerable results. The effects of the disaster of Almanza were still deeply felt. The same jealousies between Lord Galway and the Spanish generals and Government, prevented any considerable operation either from being undertaken or being brought to a successful issue. Although the cabinet of Vienna, at the urgent entreaty of Marlborough, at length sent 7300 men to reinforce the army in Catalonia; yet, even with the aid of this considerable reinforcement, it was weak and disjointed, without either money, magazines, or clothing-alike incompetent to commence offensive operations, or to defend its own frontier from the invasion of the enemy. The jealousy shown of the Portuguese troops, who had been despatched to succour Catalonia, after the disaster of Almanza exposed it to the danger of immediate conquest, was such that a British squadron was despatched to bring them round to their own country. Even after this source of irritation was removed, the jealousy of foreigners, which seems so inherent in the Spaniards that not even the greatest disasters can eradicate it, produced such continued disputes, that so far from gaining the Allies lost ground in every part of the Peninsula. Lord Galway, who had been removed to Portugal after his ill success at Almanza, was deprived CHAP. VII. of his military command, and retained only at Lisbon in his character of ambassador at that Court. Dos Minas was discarded as a general of too enterprising a 1709. character, and the direction of the army conferred on 1 Coxe, iv. the Marquis of Fronteira, who was regarded as more Hist. de likely to prove subservient to the narrow views and 1,2. petty jealousies of his Court.1 299-301. Marlb. iii. Tortosa and At length Count Staremberg reached Barcelona ; 3. and the German and Dutch reinforcements having Fall of arrived, an army of 22,000 men was formed, which in Denia. the end of June ventured to take the field, and advanced to endeavour to relieve Tortosa, which was besieged by the Bourbon forces. Although this fortress had always been regarded as the key of Catalonia, on the side of Valencia, yet its fortifications had been left in so dilapidated a state that it surrendered, after a feeble defence of a month, before the allied troops could advance to its relief. By the capitulation, the garrison were to be couducted to the allied headquarters in the camp at Constantine, yet great part of them deserted to the enemy before they reached that destination. After this Staremberg took post at Cervera-a position so well chosen that it prevented a design which the French commanders had formed of uniting their forces in Roussillon and Aragon, and shutting up the Allies within the walls of Barcelona. But this was only effected by such a concentration of forces as compelled him to abandon Denia to its fate, which was reduced by the Chevalier D'Asfeld Coxe, iv. in November, and to witness with impotent grief the Hist. Mil. investment of Alicante, the last remnant of the Austrian 549. conquests in Valencia.2 In Italy the divisions of the Allies appeared with equally unfavourable effects on the military operations. 306, 307. viii, 547 CHAP. VII. The convention concluded for the neutrality of Italy did not extend to the south of France; but the quarrels of Victor Amadeus and the Austrians were such that they rendered any joint operations hopeless. In the spring the Italian of 1708, the former positively refused to allow his troops 1709. 4. Nugatory campaign on frontier. to march, unless the Emperor would confer on him the investiture of part of the Montferrat, which had been promised him by the treaty of 1703; and when, by the earnest entreaties of Marlborough, this point was conceded, he availed himself of the usual delays of the German princes in furnishing their contingents to postpone sending his troops into the field till the middle of July. The contingents, however, having at length arrived, General Daun, who commanded the combined forces, crossed the Little St Bernard and Mont Cenis, as if with the design of invading Savoy; and having by this skilful feint drawn the attention of his opponent, Marshal Villars, to the side of Fort Barreaux, he suddenly invested the forts of Exilles and Perugia, which only held out a few days. Following up this advantage, he besieged the important fortress of Fenestrelles, commanding the great pass of Mont Cenis, which, after an obstinate defence, was reduced in the end of August. The fall of snow in the higher Alps, after this, caused both parties to return to their cantonments on either side of the Alps; and this terminated the campaign in Savoy, with no advantage to the Allies, except thatMarlb. iii. which, however, was by no means inconsiderable-of having gained the command of the passes leading from Piedmont into Dauphiny.1 1 Hist. de 7. Coxe, iv. 305-307. Although the success of this invasion was by no means considerable, and certainly nothing to what might have been expected from the magnitude of the forces em CHAP. VII. 1709. 5. of Turin and Berlin ployed, yet it led the Duke of Savoy to form the most extravagant hopes from the project of an invasion of France on the side both of Lyons and Franche-Comté ; and for this purpose he demanded a large subsidy in Projects of money, and the aid of fifty thousand men under Prince the courts Eugene, to operate on the Upper Rhine. Marlborough for the next was well aware, from past experience, of the little re- campaign. liance to be placed on any military operations in which the Emperor and the Italian powers were to be placed in co-operation. He was therefore far from sanguine of the success of their design; but as it was material to keep the court of Turin in good-humour, he gave the proposal the most respectful attention, and sent General Palmer on a special mission to the Duke of Savoy, to arrange the plan of the proposed irruption into the Lyonnois. With the cabinet of Berlin the case was just the reverse. The difficulties there were greater than ever, and, in fact, had become so urgent that nothing but the presence of the English general, or an immediate agent from him, could prevent Prussia from seceding altogether from the Alliance. General Grumbkow was sent there accordingly in March, and found the king in such ill-humour at the repeated disappointments 1 King of he had experienced from the Emperor and the Dutch, Marlbothat he declared he could only spare three battalions for March 9, the approaching campaign.1* By great exertions, how- iv. 346. ever, and the aid of Marlborough's letters and influence, **Can I do more than I do now?' said the king. 'I make treaties, but the Emperor breaks his word with me, as well as Holland, every moment. Besides, it is impossible, without great inconvenience, to give more than three battalions; and he is a wretch who would advise me otherwise.' I said he was a wretch who should advise him not to do it. He replied, 'You speak very boldly, and may perhaps repent it, if your arguments are not conclusive.'"-General Grumbkow to Marlborough, March 9, 1709; CoXE, iv. 341. Prussia to rough, 1709. Coxe, |