CHAP. VIII. 1709. court to defend the lines of Lauterburg, and cover that province. Want of money, and the usual jealousies of the northern states of Germany, long delayed the march of the contingents of Hanover and other powers. But at length they arrived in the end of July, and sanguine hopes were entertained of success; for while the Elector of Hanover occupied the attention of Marshal d'Harcourt by a feigned attack on his lines of Lauterburg, Count Merci led a chosen body of six thousand men, by forced and secret marches, by Basle into Alsace, where he intrenched himself near Neuburg, on the Rhine, directly in their rear. But, the latter officer having detached seven thousand to watch them, Count Merci imprudently left his intrenchments, and met his antagonist in the open plain. The result was, that, after a sharp action, he was totally defeated, and driven across the Rhine with the loss of half his army. This disaster put an end to all thoughts of the invasion of FrancheComté, and rendered abortive the operations in Pied- ix. 227-235. mont by the discord it produced between the cabinet 83, 84. of Vienna and that of Turin.1 1 Hist. Mil. Coxe, v. 19. in Pied their abor In conformity with the concerted plan of operations, Victor Amadeus made active preparations for commencing Operations hostilities on the side of the Maritime Alps, and a con- mont, and siderable Austrian force, under Marshal Daun, was tive result. assembled to co-operate with it. But here again the discord between the two courts intervened with fatal effect to mar the operations of the armies. The Duke of Savoy refused to move his troops till he had received the investiture of the Vigenavaisin, stipulated for him by the treaty of 1703; which the Emperor declined granting, on the plea that he included in it nine villages which did not belong to it, but were fiefs of the Empire! CHAP. VIII. 1709. which was to These repre the Duke of On such miserable disputes did events hinge in the south of Europe, on which the issue of the war was in a great degree dependent. Louis XIV. took advantage of this schism to make overtures to the Duke of Savoy through his daughter, the Queen of Spain, offering him the most advantageous terms if he would consent to a separate accommodation, and representing the impolicy of his continuing in an alliance the object of expel his own daughter from her throne. sentations produced a considerable effect Savoy remained at Turin in a state of such anxiety and discontent that it preyed upon his health, and brought on an alarming fever. In consequence of these causes the campaign was not opened till the middle of August; and Marshal Daun, who commanded the invaders, then found the Duke of Berwick so strongly posted, in a position covering Briançon, that he could not force the passage into Dauphiné; and soon after, having heard of the defeat of Count Merci, he retired into Piedmont, having obtained no other advantage, in a campaign from Mem. 156- which such mighty results were expected, but the capture of the trifling post of Anneci, garrisoned by sixty men, in the entrance of the Alps!1 1 Coxe, v. 86, 87. Berwick's 159-edit. Petitot. 20. The war in Spain assumed a new and much more alarming aspect this year, in consequence of the contest 1709. In having become a national one, and of the ardour Affairs of Spain in creasing attachment displayed by the Castilians in behalf of the Bourbon tilians to dynasty. A great change had occurred in the feelings of the Cas Philip. of the Spaniards towards that family. They had come to regard the war as a national one on their part-the Austrians as intruders; and the national independence as wound up with the support of the throne of Philip. The English were disliked as haughty heretics; the The CHAP. VIII. 1709. Germans as rapacious and insulting foreigners. Duke of Anjou increased these favourable dispositions. by the magnanimous spirit which he displayed in the misfortunes of his house, and the courage with which he threw himself on the loyalty of his subjects to preserve the national independence. He declared he would tinge the soil of his beloved Castile with his own blood rather than resign his crown at the dictation of insulting foes, or even the command of his own grandfather. At the same time he promised to dismiss his French counsellors, and be directed entirely by native Spaniards. The effect of these judicious measures was immense. A national spirit was roused; the generous flame pervaded every breast. In a grand assembly of the Castilian and Andalusian nobles it was unanimously resolved that they would not permit their monarchy to be parcelled out by England and Holland; and that if France could no longer furnish the requisite assistance, they would rise as one man, and shed the last drop of their blood in its defence. Nor did their actions belie these magnanimous resolutions. Levies of men were ordered, and obeyed 1 Coxewith alacrity; contributions of plate and jewels poured Bourbon in in; the priests and nobles vied with each other in rousing St Philippe, the national spirit; and it soon became evident that, Coxe's without the aid of an overwhelming foreign force, it would 90, 91. be impossible to dispossess Philip of the crown of Spain.1 House of Spain, c. 16. iii. 263-309. Marlb. v. dent and tone as Encouraged by these powerful demonstrations of na- 21. tional support, Philip assumed a new and more indepen- Independent position at the conferences in Holland. No longer dignified sheltering himself under the tutelage of his grandfather, sumed by he appointed the Duke of Alva his plenipotentiary at the negotiathe Hague, and publicly protested against the dismem- Hague. berment of the Spanish monarchy. As a further proof Philip in tions at the СНАР. VIII. of his independence, he addressed a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, which the latter received while engaged 1709. in the siege of Tournay, professing his willingness to enter into any reasonable terms of accommodation, consistent with the independence of Spain. These independent and vigorous steps gave Louis a colour for representing that he was inadequate to the dethronement 1St Philip. of his grandson, and that all he could do was to withCoxe- draw his garrisons, which was only partially done. At Bourbon, c. the same time he privately conveyed to Philip his admiration of his spirited conduct in determining to defend his crown to the last extremity, and promised never to desert him.1 iii. 274-309. House of 16 and 17. Coxe's Marlb. v. 89, 90. 22. in Aragon and on the Catalonian frontier. The effect of these measures speedily appeared in the Operations military operations in the Peninsula, which were reduced almost to a nullity during this year. In Catalonia the allied forces were inferior to the enemy, so that they were compelled to remain on the defensive-the only operation of importance being an attack on Balaguer, which Stahremberg took with three battalions in presence of the French and Spanish commanders. Philip was consoled for this check by the fall of Figueras, and the surprise of an Austrian camp under the walls of Gerona, which were effected with equal skill and success by an irruption of the Duke de Noailles into the northern provinces of Catalonia, with a small French force from Roussillon. 2 2 Coxe, v. 90-93. 23. On the side of Portugal the campaign opened with Operations the most brilliant prospects of success, by the advance of on the Por- the United British and Portuguese forces, under Lord frontier. Galway and the Marquis de Frontera, across the tuguese Alentejo, towards the Caya river, with a view to undertaking the siege of Badajoz. But the troops whom they VIII. 1709. led were not the same as those which a century after, CHAP. under Wellington in the same country, achieved such glorious triumphs. In an action which took place on the banks of the Caya, the Portuguese horse, as at the battle of Almanza, took to flight, and left the infantry on their left flank wholly uncovered. The result was, that, although the foot-soldiers made the most gallant defence, yet they were compelled to retreat; and two British battalions, whom Lord Galway brought up to stem the flood of disaster, were, after a heroic resistance, surrounded and made prisoners. This check, though not serious, had the effect of disorganising the whole campaign, which was converted into one of a merely defen- 91-94. sive character on the part of the Allies.1 1 Hist. Mil. ix, 392, 393. Coxe, v. 24. rough's opi Spanish These repeated defeats of the Portuguese, and their almost uniform bad conduct in action, inspired Marlbo- Marlborough with the most desponding views as to any further nion on the use which could be made of these auxiliaries in the war. Peninsula. He accordingly repeatedly and earnestly represented to the British government the impolicy of raising any additional levies in the Peninsula, and the necessity for relying entirely on the operations of veteran German or English troops. * "With their aid," said he, "I do not see how the war could last six months, considering the troops we already have in Spain, and that the remainder of the French must be recalled." For future hostilities he deemed an entire change of system necessary. He considered it a waste of blood and treasure to limit the operations to a few frontier provinces "The scheme of raising six additional regiments," says he, can never be depended upon, nor be of any use, but for the subsisting of a few French officers; nor I believe was it ever heard of before, to be at the expense of raising new troops at the end of a war.”—Marlborough to Godolphin, July 1, 1709; CoXE, v. 93. |