and VIII. 1710. 29. sons of the rupture of the confer ences. made to including Spain in the treaty. Louis constantly CHAP. affirmed that he could not compel his grandson to evacuate his throne; that if he were inclined to do so, the Castilian nobles would not permit it; and that all he Real reacould do was to withdraw his troops and garrisons, furnish the Allies with pecuniary subsidies to enable them to carry on the contest in the Peninsula, which he offered to do. The allied plenipotentiaries, on the other hand, alleged that to prevent the succession of a Bourbon prince to the throne of Spain was the main object of the war, and to leave it undone would be to lose the fruit of all its advantages; that it was incredible that the French king, who had put his grandson on the throne of Spain, should not have influence enough to make him descend from it; but that, if he had not, the only course left for them was to continue the war on the frontier of Flanders, and dictate the evacuation of Madrid under the walls of Paris. The spirit evinced by the Castilian nobles, and the symptoms of the war assuming a national character in Spain, only rendered it the more necessary to follow this course; for it was easy to foresee that, in the event of hostilities ceasing elsewhere, and being continued only in the Peninsula by the Allies, the whole burden of the contest would fall on the maritime powers, by whom alone troops could be conveyed thither. The 37th article of the propositions of the Allies, on which the negotiation ultimately broke off, bore reference expressly to this point.* Marlborough, * The 37th article was in these terms :-" En cas que le Roi très-Chrétien éxécute tout ce que a été dit ci-dessus, et que la monarchie d'Espagne soit rendue et cédée au Roi Charles III., comme il est accordé par ces articles, dans le temps stipulé, on a accordé que la cessation d'armes, entre les armées des hautes parties en guerre, continuera jusqu'à la conclusion et la ratification des traités de paix à faire.”—Histoire de Marlborough, iii. 178. CHAP. VIII. 1710. who was well aware of the difficulties and hazards of a Peninsular contest, which afterwards made shipwreck of the fortunes of Napoleon, was strenuous in his advice to Government to close with the offer of Sicily and Sardinia as an appanage to the Duke of Anjou, and conclude peace on the terms proposed by Louis, provided Philip would evacuate the throne of Spain. But Zinzendorf, on the part of Austria, strenuously opposed any partition of the Spanish monarchy; and the Whig ministry, deeming themselves secure of success, and hoping, in the 1710. Coxe, next campaign, to conquer Madrid in Paris, supported Des. iv. 701. him, contrary to the opinion of their general, in his pretensions, and broke off the negotiation.1* 1 Marlborough to King of Prussia, March 24, v. 171. 30. General plan of the of 1710. The plan of the campaign of 1710 was concerted by Marlborough and Eugene on a greater and more decisive campaign scale than any which had preceded it since the commencement of the war. In the Netherlands, it was proposed to commence with the siege of Douai, a large and important fortress on the Scheldt, which was connected by water-communication even with Amsterdam, and admirably calculated on that account, as well as its great strength, to form a base for operations, and place d'armes for the invasion of France. When it was subdued, the Allies were to direct their arms to Arras, the last in the triple line of fortresses which covered the French frontier on the north, and which would lay open * “During the remaining transactions of the intended peace, which was laid in all its steps before the whole Cabinet, Lord-Treasurer, Lord-President Somers, and all other lords, did ever seem confident of a peace. My own distrust was so remarkable that I was once perfectly chid by the Lord-Treasurer for saying, such orders would be proper if the French king signed the preliminary treaty. He resented my making any question of it, and said there could be no doubt, &c. For my part, nothing but seeing so great men believe it could ever incline me to think France reduced so low as to accept such conditions."-CowPER's Diary. COXE, v. 171, 172. СНАР. VIII. 1710. the direct road to Paris. From thence the Allies were to advance to Calais and Abbeville, which was to be aided by an attack from the coast, and which would open the way for supplies from Great Britain. The possession of these fortresses, giving the Allies a secure base for operations connected both with Holland and England, would, it was thought, enable them to threaten Paris in the next campaign; or, if their terms were not acceded to, to advance at once and dictate peace under its walls. To aid this grand effort, subordinate expeditions were to be undertaken in the south of France by Coxe, v. an invasion from Piedmont, in concert with a descent of Hist. de English troops on the coast of Languedoc-in connection 190-192. with which, communications had been opened with the 288, 289. disaffected in the Cevennes Mountains.1 1 177-179. Marlb. iii. Rousset, ii. 31. rough's de the Conti arrival at The secret camarilla which directed the Queen's councils, dreading the influence of Marlborough in Eng- Marlboland, were anxious for an opportunity of getting rid of parture for him, and for this purpose took the earliest opportunity nent, and of sending him to Holland to superintend the negotia- the Hague. tions in person. In answer to an address from the Commons, the Queen observed, "I am very well pleased with this declaration of your just sense of the Duke of Marlborough's eminent services, which I am so fully convinced of that I shall always esteem him as God Almighty's chief instrument of my glory, and my people's happiness, and I will give the necessary orders for sending him immediately into Holland." When the Duke, in pursuance of these orders, commenced his journey to the place of embarkation, in passing through the streets of the capital his carriage was surrounded by multitudes, who expressed their regret for his departure; and many even presented petitions, requesting him not to leave the VOL. II. H VIII. 1710. CHAP. country during the tumult and agitation which had taken place, in consequence of the preparations for Sacheverell's trial. The Duke, however, deemed his public duty paramount to every other consideration, and proceeded without delay to the place of his destination-though well aware that, in his absence, nothing would be left undone which could lead to his overthrow, and, with it, 150, 151. that of the whole objects for which the war had been prosecuted.1 1 Coxe, v. 32. ment of the agreed on Eugene and Marlborough. War being resolved on, Marlborough and Eugene Commence- met at Tournay on the 28th April, and commenced the campaign campaign by besieging the fort of Mortagne, which between capitulated on the same day. Their force already amounted to sixty thousand men, and as the troops were daily coming up from their cantonments, it was expected soon to amount to double that number. The plan of operations was soon settled between these two great men. They determined to commence serious operations by attacking Douai-a strong fortress, and one of the last of the first order which, in that quarter, guarded the French territory. To succeed in this, however, it was necessary to pass the French lines, which were of great strength, and were guarded by Marshal Montesquieu at the head of forty battalions and twenty squadrons. Douai itself was also strongly protected both by nature and art. On the one side lay the Haine Marlbo- and the Scarpe; in the centre was the canal of Douai; Godolphin, on the other side were the lines of La Bassée, which had April 20, 1710. Coxe, been strengthened with additional works since the close of the campaign. Marlborough was very sanguine of success, as the French force was not yet collected, and he was considerably superior in number; and he wrote to Godolphin on the same night,2-"The orders are rough to v. 182. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 190, 191. Rousset, ii. 289. given for marching this night, so that I hope my next will give you an account of our being in Artois." CHAP. VIII. 1710. 33. the lines of The Duke operated at once by both wings. On the one wing he detached the Prince of Würtemberg, with Passage of fifteen thousand men, by Pont-à-Tessin to Pont-à-Ven- the Scarpe, April 28. din, where the French lines met the Dyle and the canal of Douai; while on the other Prince Eugene moved forward Count Fels, with a considerable corps, towards Pont Auby on the same canal. The whole army followed in two columns, the left commanded by Eugene and the right by Marlborough. The English general secured the passage at Pont-à-Vendin without resistance; and Eugene, though baffled at Pont Auby, succeeded in getting over the canal at Sant and Courières without serious loss. The first defences were thus forced; and that night the two wings, having formed a junction, lay on their arms in the plain of Lens, while Montesquieu precipitately retired behind the Scarpe, in the neighbourhood of Vitry. Next morning the troops, overjoyed at their success, continued their advance. Montesquieu fell back behind the Senyet. Marlborough sent forward General Cadogan, at the head of the English troops, to Pont-à-Rache, to circumscribe the garrison of Douai, on the canal of Marchiennes, on the north; while Eugene, encamping on the other side of the Scarpe, completed the investment on the west. The Marlboperfect success of this enterprise without any loss, was Duchess, matter of equal surprise and joy to the Duke, who wrote 1710. Coxe, to the Duchess in the highest strain of satisfaction at his to Mr Stanbloodless triumph. It was entirely owing to the sudden- 25, 1710. ness and secresy of his movements, which took the enemy Hist. de completely unawares; for, had the enterprise been de- 191. layed four days longer, its issue would have been ex rough to the April 21, v. 184; and hope, April Des. v. 7. Marlb. iii. |