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CHAP.

IX.

1710. 8.

the extraordinary gleam of good fortune which the change of policy in the British cabinet had opened upon them. The expedition of Cette having been frustrated Vigorous by the vigilance of Noailles, and the want of support of the French, the troops on the Italian side of the Alps, the French of Charles forces, thus set at liberty in Languedoc, joined by strong dria, No reinforcements from Berwick's army, were poured into vember 11. Catalonia. He invested Gerona, the key of that pro

measures of

and retreat

from Ma

vince on the north, with twenty thousand men, and extended their detachments so as to form a communication with the army of Philip at Valladolid. The situation of Charles at Madrid was now extremely hazardous; for while Vendôme's army, twenty-five thousand strong, and which was hourly receiving accessions of force from the two Castiles, threatened him on the north, the pro1St Philip. vince of Catalonia, hitherto his stronghold, was endanCoxe's gered by the French invasion. Influenced by these

ii. 400, 401.

House of

314, 315.

Coxe's

Marlb. v.

Bourbon, i. accumulating dangers, he took the resolution of evacuating the capital, and on the 11th November set out from 381, 382. Madrid, accompanied by two thousand horse, and arrived in safety at Barcelona on the 15th of December.1

9.

Meanwhile having, by incredible exertions, succeeded Advance of in six weeks in forming an army of twenty-five thousand wards Ma- men, Philip took the most active steps to improve these

Philip to

drid and

Almarez.

favourable circumstances. His first care was to take post at the bridge of Almarez, on the Tagus-a stratagetical point of great importance, as commanding the communication between Upper and Lower Estremadura, the scene of Lord Hill's brilliant exploit in after times. The Portuguese took advantage of this circumstance to excuse themselves from any co-operation with the Allies at Madrid, who, being abandoned to their own resources, and deserted by their sovereign, had no alternative but

IX.

to retreat towards Catalonia; and, with this view, they CHAP. retired in three columns through the mountainous region which separates Old Castile from the adjoining province 1710. of Aragon. But Vendôme was too able and active a general to allow them to make their retreat without molestation. He pursued them with all his forces; and being greatly superior to the enemy in cavalry, in consequence of the detachment of so large a part of that arm as an escort to the king towards Barcelona, and the non-arrival of any succour from the side of Portugal, he soon obtained decisive advantages. The Allies were dreadfully harassed also in their retreat by the peasantry, who, as in every national war from the days of Sertorius to those of Wellington, formed themselves into guerilla bands, which assailed the flanks and rear of the retiring columns without intermission. Thus assailed and ex- 1 St Philip. hausted, the third column, composed of six thousand Coxe, British troops under Stanhope in person, arrived, on the House of evening of the 6th December, at Brihuerga, where they i. 315-317. sought a few hours' rest within its ruined walls.1

ii. 401, 402.

383. Coxe's

Bourbon,

10.

Stanhope's

Brihuerga,

forced to

A dreadful disaster here awaited this division of the British troops, which in its ultimate effects proved Attack on decisive of the fate of the war in the Peninsula. The division at Allies retreated not only in three columns, but with a which is day's march between each-the British, as those on whom capitulate. most reliance could be placed, being the last one. Upon this state of matters Vendôme formed, and with great ability executed, a plan for cutting off entirely this detached rearguard. Carefully concealing his movements from the enemy, which the favourable disposition of the peasantry gave him every means of doing, he, unknown to them, followed closely the British column; and no sooner had they taken post at Brihuerga, than he ap

VOL. II.

M

IX.

1710.

ii. 402-409,

to Marlbo

CHAP. peared on the heights which environ it with twenty thousand men, and not only entirely surrounded the town, but cut off all communication between it and the other allied divisions in advance. So completely was Stanhope taken by surprise that there were no guards put on the look-out, to give notice of the approach of an enemy; and so active were the movements of Vendôme 1St Philip that with twenty thousand men he had marched fortyGen. Pippes five leagues in eight days, being on an average of five leagues and a half, or fourteen miles a-day-an astonishing effort in a mountainous country, and over very bad roads. The result was what might have been expected from such remissness on the one side and such energy on the other. Stanhope was assailed on all sides by a force triple his own; and after defending himself bravely for two days he was forced to surrender with all his troops, now reduced by sickness and the sword to four thousand five hundred men !1

rough, March 29,

1711. Coxe's

House of

Bourbon,

i. 317-319.

Coxe's Marlb. v. 383, 384.

Gen. Stan

hope to

Lord Dart

mouth, Dec. 17, 1710.

11.

Battle of Villa Viciosa, in

This was a mortal blow to the allied cause in the Peninsula. Stahremberg, who received on the second day only intelligence of the danger of his lieutenant, dôme is re- made all imaginable haste back with the German and subsequent Dutch troops; but he arrived on the heights near Bri

which Ven

pulsed, and

disasters of

the Allies, huerga only to find the whole French and Spanish

Dec. 8.

army, now twenty-two thousand strong, drawn up in battle array, on strong ground between him and that town, while the melancholy silence which prevailed within its walls told but too clearly the sad fate of his companions in arms. Nothing remained but to make the best of his way with his army, now diminished by a full third of its numbers, towards Barcelona. But Vendôme was not a general to halt midway in the career of success. Stahremberg retreated leisurely,

taking up, wherever he halted, as strong a position as possible, to impose upon the enemy, and afford time for his artillery and baggage to defile in the rear. With this view he took up a strong position at VILLA VICIOSA, where he offered battle, hoping that he would be able to keep his ground till nightfall, when he might resume his retreat. Vendôme, however, having all his forces in hand, immediately commenced a vigorous assault upon the Allies. The latter fought with great resolution, being old German troops, and not only succeeded in maintaining their ground, but even in repulsing the enemy at all points-a result which clearly proved what might have been expected if the disaster at Brihuerga had not deprived them of a third, and that the best part, of their troops.

CHAP.

IX.

1710.

12.

asters in the

But being inferior, by fully ten thousand men, to the enemy, and still more so in horse, Stahremberg did not Great disdeem it advisable to await a renewed attack on the fol- retreat. lowing day from an enemy now double his numbers, and flushed with success. He therefore spiked all his artillery on the field of battle, as there was no possibility of drawing them off through the execrable roads by which alone his retreat could be conducted, and continued to retire, on the following day, by roads scarcely passable for a victorious army, encumbered with artillery. But, as usual in Spain, the effects of this forced retreat equalled the losses of the most disastrous battle. Stahremberg reached Barcelona on the 6th January with only seven thousand men, without guns, and in the most deplorable condition-the poor remains of twenty-five thousand, which set out from thence in the beginning of House of summer, to achieve the conquest of the Peninsula.1 The .317-319. immediate consequence of these disasters was the loss of

St Philip.

ii. 405-407.

Coxe, v.

383-385.

Bourbon,

CHAP.

IX.

1711.

13.

these disasters on

Marlbo

lands in

Holland,
March 4,

1711.

all the Austrian conquests in Spain, whose possessions, by the end of February, were limited to the fortresses of Barcelona, Tarragona, and Balaguer.

These calamities, which seemed to extinguish all hope Effects of of a successful issue of a war in the Peninsula, at least for a very long period, at once demonstrated how entirely rough, who the success of the war had come to depend on the single arm, and be chained to the standards, of Marlborough, and proved to him that it was only by a vigorous effort in the Netherlands, where the Allies were superior, and the defences of France were so nearly broken through, that the objects of the war could be attained. He left England, accordingly, deeply impressed with the necessity of making the most of the brief period allotted to him, from the change of ministry, to bring the war to a successful conclusion. He landed at the Hague on the 4th March; and, although no longer possessing the confidence of Government, or intrusted with any control over diplomatic measures, he immediately set himself with the utmost vigour to prepare for military operations. Great efforts had been made by both parties, during the winter, for the resumption of hostilities, on even a more extended scale than in any preceding campaign. Marlborough found the army in the Low Countries extremely efficient and powerful; diversions were promised on the side both of Spain and Piedmont; and a treaty had been concluded with the Spanish government, in consequence of which a large part of the Imperial forces was rendered disposable, and Prince Eugene was preparing to lead them into the Low Marlb. iii. Countries.1 But, in the midst of these flattering prospects, an event occurred which suddenly deranged them all, postponed for above a month the opening of the

1 Hist. de

285. Coxe,

vi. 4-10.

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