СНАР. IX. 1711. 1 Villars' Mem. ii. 174, 175. Hist. de Marlb. iii. to have the credit of saying that they had strengthened both sides, and with gloomy while Marlborough's whole remaining force moved to the 292, 293. right, across the Scarpe into the plain of Lens, in six divisions.1 19. Villars avoids a battle by orders of Louis. Though Villars was relieved, by the departure of Eugene, from a considerable part of the force opposed to him, and naturally felt desirous of now measuring his strength with his great antagonist in a decisive affair, yet he was restrained from hazarding a general engagement. Louis, trusting to the progress of the Tory intrigues in England, and daily expecting to see Marlborough and the war party overthrown, sent him positive orders not to fight; and soon after, the detachment of twenty-five battalions and forty squadrons, in two divisions, to the Upper Rhine, to watch the movements of Eugene, rendered it a matter of necessity for him to remain on the defensive. Marlborough, therefore, in vain offered battle, and drew up his army in the plain of Lens for that purpose. Though Villars threw eighteen bridges over the Scarpe, and made a show of intending to fight, he cautiously abstained from any steps which might bring on a general battle. It was not without good reason that Louis thus enjoined his lieutenant to avoid compromising his army. The progress of the negotiations with Corresp. England gave him the fairest ground for believing that he would obtain nearly all he desired, from the favour 292, 293. with which he was regarded by the British cabinet, without running any risk.2 He had commenced a separate 2 Villars' Mem. ii. 174, 177. Boling broke's i. 172. Hist. de Marlb. iii. negotiation with the court of St James's, which had been favourably received; and Mr Secretary St John had already transmitted to Lord Raby, the new plenipotentiary at the Hague, a sketch of six preliminary articles proposed by the French king, which were to be the basis of a general peace. CHAP. IX. 1711. 20. begun a se secret nego The high tone of these proposals proved how largely Louis counted upon the altered dispositions of the British Who had cabinet. The Spanish succession, the real object of the parate and war, was evaded. Everything was directed to British tiation with England. objects, and regulated by the desire to tempt the commercial cupidity of England to the abandonment of the great objects of her national policy. Real security was promised to the British commerce with Spain, the Indies, and the Mediterranean; the barrier the Dutch had so long contended for was agreed to; a reasonable satisfaction was tendered to the allies of England and Holland; and as to the Spanish succession, it was to be left to "new expedients to the satisfaction of all parties interested." These proposals were favourably received by the British ministry; they were in secret communicated to the Pensionary Heinsius, but concealed from the Austrian and Piedmontese plenipotentiaries; and they were not communicated to Marlborough—a decisive proof both of the altered feeling of the cabinet towards that general, and of the consciousness on their part of the tortuous path on which they were now entering.* After much deliberation, and a due consideration of what could be effected by the diminished force still at his disposal, which, by the successive drafts to Eugene's "The Duke of Marlborough has no communication from home on this affair; I suppose he will have none from the Hague."—Mr Secretary St John to Lord Raby, 27th April 1711; BOLINGBROKE's Corresp., i. 175. CHAP. 1711. army, was now reduced to 119 battalions and 256 squadrons, not mustering above 75,000 combatants, Marlborough determined to break through the enemy's boasted lines, and, after doing so, undertake the siege termines to of Bouchain, the possession of which would give him 21. Marlborough de pass the euemy's lines. a solid footing within the French frontier. With this view, he had long and minutely studied the lines of Villars; and he hoped that, even with the force at his disposal, they might be broken through. To accomplish this, however, required an extraordinary combination of stratagem and force; and the manner in which 1 Coxe, vi. Marlborough contrived to unite them, and bring the Rousset, ii. ardent mind and lively imagination of his adversary to play into his hands, to the defeat of all the objects he had most at heart, is perhaps the most wonderful part of his whole military achievements.1 52-54. 227, 228. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 295, 296. 22. for achieving this. During his encampment at Lewarde, opposite Villars, His project the English general had observed that a triangular piece of ground in front of the French position, between Cambray, Aubanchoeil-au-Bac, and the junction of the Sanzet and Scheldt, offered a position so strong that a small body of men might defend it against a very considerable force. He resolved to make the occupation of this inconsiderable piece of ground the pivot on which the whole passage of the lines should be effected. A redoubt at Aubigny, which commanded the approach by Aubanchoeil-au-Bac to this position, was first carried without difficulty. Arleux, which was also fortified, and which covered the bridge of Pallue over the Sanzet, was next attacked by seven hundred men, who issued from Douai in the night. That post also was taken, with one hundred and twenty prisoners. Marlborough instantly used all imaginable expedition in strengthening it, and IX. 1711. to support it formed a camp of reserve on the glacis CHAP. of Douai. Villars, having reconnoitred this latter post, made an attempt to surprise it by a combined movement from the side of Bouchain and from that of his own camp. The attack took place on the night of the 9th July; and, though he failed in taking the work, he surprised the Allies at that point, and captured two hundred men and four hundred horses. Though much chagrined at the success of this nocturnal attack, the English general now saw his designs advancing to maturity. He therefore left Arleux to its own resources, and marched towards Bethune. The former was immediately attacked by Marshal Montesquieu, and, after a stout resistance, carried by the French, who made the garrison, five hundred strong, prisoners. Montesquieu immediately garrisoned it with eight hundred men, and Kane's stationed six battalions at Pallue to support them; Des. v. while Marlborough, who was in hopes the lure of these Coxe, vi. successes would induce Villars to hazard a general en- Rousset, ii. gagement, shut himself up in his tent, and appeared be overwhelmed with mortification at the checks he had 297-299. received. 1 Mem. 89. 421-428. 53-55. 228, 229. to Hist. de Marlb. iii. 23. tions for it, and de enemy, Villars was so much elated with these successes, and with the accounts he received of Marlborough's chagrin, Preparathat he wrote to the King of France a vainglorious executing letter, in which he boasted that he had at length ceiving the brought his antagonist to a ne plus ultra. Meanwhile Aug. 4. Marlborough sent off his heavy baggage to Douai; despatched his artillery, under a proper guard, to the rear; and with all imaginable secrecy obtained supplies of bread for the whole troops for six days. Thus disencumbered and prepared, he broke up at four in the morning on the 1st of August, and marched in eight CHAP. IX. 1711. columns towards the front. During the three following days, the troops were kept collected, and menacing sometimes one part of the French lines and sometimes another, so as to leave the real point of attack in a state of uncertainty. Seriously alarmed, Villars concentrated his whole force opposite the Allies, in the portion of his lines lying between the Scarpe and the Canche, and drew in all his detachments, evacuating even Arleux, after having razed its fortifications to the ground, the object of so much eager contention some days before, and Aubanchoeil-au-Bac and Pallue. On the evening of the 4th, Marlborough, affecting great chagrin at the check he had received, spoke openly to those around him of his intention of avenging them by a general action, and pointed to the direction the attacking columns were to take. He then returned to the camp, and gave orders to prepare for battle. Gloom hung on every countenance: it appeared nothing short of an act of madness to attack an enemy superior in number, and strongly posted in a camp surrounded with intrenchments, and bristling with cannon. They ascribed it to desperation, produced by the mortifications received from the Government, and feared that, by one rash act, he would lose the fruit of all his victories. Proportionally great was the joy in the French camp, to Mr Se when the men, never doubting they were on the eve of John, Aug. a glorious victory, spent the night in the exultation Des. v. 428. which, in that excitable people, has so often been the prelude to disaster. 1 1 Kane's Mem. 92, 93. Mari borough cretary St 6, 1711. 24. Having brought the feeling of both armies to this He passes point, and produced a concentration of Villars' army with entire directly in his front, Marlborough, at dusk on the 4th, ordered the drums to beat; and before the roll had the lines success, Aug. 4. |