IX. 1711. CHAP. garrison, including a reinforcement of eleven hundred men thrown in by Villars, amounted to nearly six thousand men. Notwithstanding all the diligence with which Villars laboured to strengthen his men on this important position, he could not equal the activity with which the English general strove to supplant them. During the night of the 13th three redoubts, on the left bank of the Senzet, were marked out, which would have completed the French marshal's communication with the town. But on the morning of the 14th they were all stormed by a large body of the allied troops before the works could be armed. That same day the Allies carried their zigzag down to the very edge of the morasses, caused by the inundation between the Senzet and the Scheldt, which adjoined Bouchain on the south, so as to command a causeway through the marshes from that town to Cambray, which the French still held, communicating with the besieged town. But, to complete the investment, it was necessary to win this causeway; and this last object was gained by Marlborough with equal daring and success. A battery, commanding part of the road, had been erected by Villars at Etrun; and a redoubt garrisoned by six hundred men had been constructed in the middle of the causeway, and they were supported by three thousand more close in their rear. Marlborough, with incredible labour and diligence, constructed two 1 Marlbo- roads, made of fascines, one from the side of the Senzet, and one from that of the Scheldt, through part of the Aug. 14 marsh, so as to render it passable to foot-soldiers; and, 1711. Des. on the night of the 16th, six hundred chosen grenadiers 453. Hist. were sent across them to attack the redoubt.1 rough to Mr Secretary 17, and 20, v. 445, 450, de Marlb. They iii. 307,309. rapidly advanced in the dark till the fascine paths ended, and then, boldly plunging into the marsh, struggled on, IX. 1711. with the water often up to their arm-pits, till they CHAP. reached the foot of the intrenchment, into which they rushed, without firing a shot, with fixed bayonets. So complete was the surprise that the enemy were driven from their parapets with the loss only of six men: the work was carried; and with such diligence were its defences strengthened that before morning it was in a condition to bid defiance to any attack. 30. chain, Sept. Villars was now effectually cut off from Bouchain, and the operations of the siege were conducted with the Fall of Bouutmost vigour. On the night of the 21st, the trenches 12. were opened; three separate attacks were pushed at the same time against the eastern, western, and southern faces of the town, and a huge train of heavy guns and mortars thundered upon the works without intermission. The progress of the operations, notwithstanding a vigorous defence by the besieged, was unusually rapid. As fast as the outworks were breached they were stormed; and repeated attempts on the part of Villars to raise the siege were baffled by the skilful disposition and strong ground taken by Marlborough with the covering army. At length, on the 12th September, as the counterscarp was blown down, the rampart breached, and an assault of the fortress in preparation, the chamade was heard, "the sad signal," says the French annalist of the siege, "which terminated the last, as it had done all the other sieges of Marlborough." The governor agreed to capitulate; and the garrison, still three thousand strong, marched out upon the glacis, laid down their arms, and were conducted prisoners to Tournay. There was some difference as to the terms of the capitulation, the besieged insisting that they had surrendered on the same conditions as the garrison of Tournay; but the English 1 CHAP. general insisted on their being prisoners of war. iii. 22. The IX. two armies then remained in their respective positions, 1711. the French under the cannon of Cambray, the allied in Victories the middle of their lines, resting on Bouchain. Marlborough here gave proof of the courtesy of his disposiMr Secre- tion, as well as of his respect for exalted learning and John, Sept. piety, by planting a detachment of his troops to protect Marlborough to tary St 14, 1711. Coxe, vi. 78-88. Des. v. 490, the estates of Fénélon, archbishop of Cambray, and to conduct the grain from thence to the dwelling of the Marlb. iii. illustrious prelate in the town, which now began to be straitened for provisions.1 Hist. de 316-318. 31. on this siege by a Hanoverian officer en gaged in it. The following letter, from a Hanoverian officer emReflections ployed in the siege, conveys a clear idea of the merit of this, the last and not the least memorable of Marlborough's exploits: "At last we are masters of Bouchain the siege was short but vigorous; every day was signalised by some action of éclat. The garrison was numerous and amply provided with everything; they were made prisoners of war in presence of a hundred thousand men, who made the utmost efforts to succour them. If you reflect on the position of the armies, the situation of the town, the intrenched position of the French in the environs of Warneckin; the communication across the marsh, which gave reason to fear that the siege would come to resemble that of Verue or Kaiserwörth; the works constructed to cut off that communication worthy of those of Julius Cæsar or Alexander Farnese; the trenches opened between the intrenchments of the enemy and the town ;-it must be admitted that this siege must be regarded as one of the prodigies of war. Those of Alexia by Cæsar and of Ostend may have been longer, but they were less glorious. You could not fire a cannon-shot from the trenches without CHAP. IX. 1711. Villars seeing its smoke he omitted nothing which could interrupt or suspend our works; if he forgot himself at one passage of his lines, he resumed his whole vigour and courage to make us repent of the attempt. Vain hope! Our general, invincible on all sides, has foreseen and penetrated all his enterprises; and while everything was on fire around him, he alone appeared 1 Hist. de calm and collected, solely occupied with the good of the 319, 320. army and the interests of Europe." 1 1 Marlb. iii. prepara war, and negotiations the minis 27. After the reduction of Bouchain, Marlborough was 32. anxious to commence without delay the siege of Ques- Ostensible noy, the capture of which would, in that quarter, have tions for entirely broken through the French barrier. He vigor- real secret ously stimulated his own government accordingly, as for peace by well as that at the Hague, to prepare the necessary try, Sept. supplies and magazines, and expressed a sanguine hope that the capture of this last stronghold would be the means of bringing about the grand object of his ambition-a general peace. The ministry, to appearance, went with alacrity into his projects, and everything seemed to promise another great success, closing the campaign with honour, and probably leading to a glorious and lasting peace. Mr Secretary St John, in particular, wrote in the warmest style of cordiality, approving the project in his own name as well as in that of the Queen, and reiterating the assurances that the strongest representations had been made to the Dutch, * * "The siege, so far as it depends on me, shall be pushed with all possible vigour, and I do not altogether despair, but that, from the success of this campaign, we may hear of some advances made towards that which we so much desire. And I shall esteem it much the happiest part of my life, if I can be instrumental in putting a good end to the war, which grows so burdensome to our country, as well as to our allies.”—Marlborough to Lord Oxford, Aug. 20, 1711; Coxe, vi. 92. CHAP. IX. 1711. 1 Coxe, vi. 92, 93. 33. of the pre which were agreed to. with a view to their hearty concurrence. But all this was a mere cover to conceal what the Tories had really been doing to overturn Marlborough, and abandon the main objects of the war. Unknown to him the secret negotiation with the French cabinet, through Torcy and agency of Mesnager, had No representations about the British ministers, by the The conditions of these preliminaries, which were Conditions afterwards embodied in the Treaty of Utrecht, were the liminaries acknowledgment of the Queen's title to the throne, and of the Protestant succession, by Louis; an engagement to take all just and reasonable measures that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united on the same head; the providing a sufficient barrier to the Dutch, the Empire, and the house of Austria; and the demolition of Dunkirk, on a proper equivalent. But the crown of Spain was left to the Duke of Anjou, and no provision whatever was made to exclude a Bourbon prince from succeeding to it. Thus the main object of the contest-the exclusion of the Bourbon family from the throne of Spain-was abandoned: and at the close of the most important, successful, and glorious war ever waged by England, terms were agreed to which left to France advantages such as could scarcely have been hoped for by the Cabinet of Versailles as the fruit of a long series of victories.2 2 Coxe, vi. 175-180. |