Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

as well as in their power, to ruin France, although the few wise people who have not the power are persuaded, like himself, that the time had now arrived when it was proper to conclude an advantageous peace." Marlborough, continued De Torcy, "falsely protested that he wished for peace, and would do all in his power to bring it about. He constantly alleged that France was in the wrong, in not agreeing to it; that its interest. required that it should be concluded, and that they should accede without delay to the conditions proposed. Pettekurn answered on our side, that the king would Mém.186-probably break off the negotiation, rather than admit them. So much the worse for France,' answered Marlborough; for if once the campaign is commenced, matters will go farther than the king imagines.'

1 De Torcy's

edit. Petit.

Hist. de

Marlb. iii. 27, 28.

17.

of the Al

[ocr errors]

"1

By the ultimatum of the Allies, Charles was to be Ultimatum acknowledged King of Spain and the Indies, and the lies, which whole Spanish monarchy was to be ceded by France. is rejected by France. All the conquests of Louis in the Low Countries were to be given up; the Duke of Anjou was to surrender Spain and Sicily in two months, and if these kingdoms were not then delivered, Louis was to concur with the Allies for his expulsion. The barrier towns, so eagerly coveted by the Dutch, were to be given up to them. Namur, Menin, Charleroi, Luxembourg, Condé, Tournay, Maubeuge, Nieuport, Fismes, and Ypres, were to be put into the possession of the Allies. De Torcy objected to the articles regarding the cession of the whole Spanish monarchy in two months; though he declared his willingness to go to Paris in order to persuade the French monarch to comply with them, and actually set off for that purpose. On the way to the French capital he traversed crowds who, with almost menacing supplica

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

tions, entreated him to conclude peace. When he arrived at Versailles, however, a cabinet council was summoned, at which the Dauphin assisted, and by it the proposals were unanimously refused. "If I must continue the war," said Louis, with a spirit worthy of his race, "it is better to contend with my enemies than my own family." So firmly had it been believed both at the Hague and in London, that an accommodation was not only probable, but actually concluded, that letters of congratulation poured in on the Duke from all quarters, celebrating his dexterity and address in negotiation not less than his prowess in arms. So confident, indeed, was Marlborough that peace would be concluded, that he was grievously disappointed by the rupture of the Coxe, iv. negotiations; and he never ceased to strive, during the Hist. de whole summer, to smooth away difficulties, and bring the 30-35. Allies to such terms as the French king would accept.1

397-399.

Marlb. iii.

18.

rough still

effect a pa

The messenger bringing the ultimatum of the French king, declining the proposals of the Allies, arrived at the MarlboHague on the 5th June, and conveyed to Rouillé an labours to order to notify the decision in form to the Duke of cification. Marlborough, as well as the other plenipotentiaries. Notwithstanding the great disappointment which he felt at this breaking off of the negotiations, the English general continued to entertain the hopes of peace, and never ceased to regret the rupture. He still clung

to the belief that an accommodation would be arrived at, and in his confidential letters expressed not only a sanguine hope, but a confident belief, that the pre- 2 Marlboliminaries would yet be ratified.2 He was so confi- rough to Godolphin, dent in this expectation that he even commenced June 4, arrangements with the Lord-Treasurer for the return of iv. 400, 401 the army to England, and the payment of the arrears

VOL. II.

B

1709. Coxe,

СНАР.

VII.

1709.

19.

False accusation

against Marlborough of

having pre

peace.

due to all the foreign troops; so that, to use his own words, "they might have no pretext to refuse marching, when ordered home agreeably to the treaties."

Although Marlborough had thus exerted himself to the utmost to bring about a general peace, and laboured alike to moderate the pretensions of the English ministry, and to conquer the repugnance of the French king, yet so vented the virulent is the spirit of party, and so utterly regardless of truth in the charges which it advances, that no accusation has been so perseveringly fastened on Marlborough, or so generally believed, as that of having exerted himself to break the negotiations which he was labouring assiduously to bring to a successful issue. He was overruled, however, by the ministry at home, who concluded the celebrated barrier treaty with the Dutch, which Marlborough refused to sign, and which was accordingly signed by Townsend alone, without his concurrence ! And it is now decisively proved, by the publication of his private correspondence with Lord Godolphin, that he disapproved of the severe articles insisted upon by the Allies and his own cabinet; and that, if the uncontrolled management of the negotiation had been committed to him, it would have been brought to a favourable issue on terms highly advantageous to England, and which would have prevented the treaty of Utrecht from forming a stain on its annals. 1*

1 Coxe, iv. 404-406. Marlborough to Godolphin, June 10,

1709. Coxe, iv. 405.

When the refusal of the French king to accept the ultimatum of the Allies was received at the Hague, the States

"I have as much mistrust for the sincerity of France as anybody living can have ; but I will own to you that, in my opinion, if France had delivered the towns promised by the plenipotentiaries, and demolished Dunkirk and the other towns mentioned, they must have been at our discretion; so that if they had played tricks, so much the worse for themselves.”—Marlborough to Lord Godolphin, June 10, 1709; Coxe, iv. 405.

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

20.

of the States

the rupture of the ne

gotiations.

General assembled, and passed a resolution in the following terms, which embodied the unanimous opinions of the allied cabinets on the occasion :-" As the refusal on the part of France to accept the preliminaries had been fore- Resolution seen, the ministers of the Emperor and of Her Britannic General on Majesty have determined that they could not admit of any alteration, especially on the essential and most contested articles, which concern the security of the Grand Alliance in general, and that of each of the states of which it is composed in particular. The deputies have maturely considered the matter, and are of opinion that they cannot recede from the demand of a barrier for the Duke of Savoy; that the pretensions regarding the two dispossessed Electors could lead to no other result but that of sowing dissension among the Allies; that the refusal on the part of the French king of the thirty-sixth article, which obliges him, within the space of two months, to execute what he undertakes, would annul all the rest, which would become useless without that; that if France engaged merely not to send any succours to the Duke of Anjou, the Allies would be under the necessity of continuing the war in Spain, and the other countries which acknowledged the authority of that Prince, while they would be bound to remain in inactivity in the Low Countries, the theatre of their great success; that the war for the reduction of Spain might be subject to various changes, during which France alone would be at peace, which would directly, Resolu traverse the end proposed in listening to the overtures tion des of its sovereign.1 From all these considerations the raux, June deputies have unanimously arrived at the conclusion Hist. de that the changes proposed by the French king cannot 41, 42. be admitted; and that, as the enemy has receded so

Etats-Géné

7, 1709.

Marlb. iii.

CHAP.
VII.

far, after having made such advances towards a general peace, it has become indispensable to combat them with 1709. vigour and firmness, in order to constrain them to close with the proposals which have been made to them by the allied powers."

21.

on the

rup

ture of this

negotiation.

[ocr errors]

On considering the respective merits of the great Reflections debate, and the rupture of a negotiation fraught with such incalculable consequences on the future fate of Europe, it must be evident to every impartial observer that it broke off not on any minor or inconsiderable point, but on the grand question involved in the whole quarrel, and for the solution of which the war had been undertaken. It was the interest of the Spanish succession which broke off the negotiation. The proposal of Louis that there should be a suspension of hostilities elsewhere, but the Allies should be left to carry on the war in Spain, in order to dispossess the Duke of Anjou, was directly calculated to stop hostilities in the quarter where France was endangered, and let them continue their course in that where she had the advantage. A single defeat, the reduction of two or three strong places, might bring the Allies to Paris, and enable them to dictate a humiliating peace in the halls of Versailles : years of doubtful, costly, and harassing warfare would hardly put them in possession of the throne of Madrid. The counter-propositions of Louis, therefore, went to relieve him of the danger which threatened him, and at the same time secure the advantages which he had won during the war; and Marlborough and the other plenipotentiaries would have deserted their duty if they had counselled the adoption of terms which defeated the whole objects of the war.

The rigorous terms demanded, however, by the

« ForrigeFortsett »