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VII.

1709. Noble ef

22.

forts of

save France.

allied cabinets, and the resolute conduct of the King of CHAP. France in rejecting them, had an important effect upon the war, and called for more vigorous efforts on the part of the confederates than they had yet put forth, or were even now disposed to make. Louis made a Louis to touching appeal to the patriotic spirit of his people, in an eloquent circular which he addressed to the prelates and nobles of his realm. He there set forth the great sacrifices which he had offered to make to secure a general peace; showed how willing he had been to divest himself of all his conquests, and abandon all his dreams of ambition; and concluded by observing, that he was now compelled to continue the contest, because the Allies insisted upon his descending to the humiliation of joining his armies to theirs, for the purpose of dispossessing his own grandson.* The appeal was not made in

* "The hope of an approaching peace was so generally diffused through my kingdom, that I feel I owe it to the fidelity which my people have shown me during my whole reign, to put them in possession of the circumstances which have prevented them from now enjoying a blessing which I had endeavoured to procure for them. I would have accepted, to attain such an object, conditions inconsistent with the security of my frontier provinces; but the more I showed myself disposed to dissipate the jealousy which my enemies affected to feel of my power and my designs, the more did they rise in their demands, in so far that, multiplying one requisition upon another, and making use of the name at one time of the Duke of Savoy, at another of the pretended interest of the princes of the Empire, they have made manifest their determination not merely to increase, at the expense of my crown, the states immediately adjoining France, but to open to themselves avenues by which they might penetrate into the interior of my kingdom whenever they deemed it for their interest to renew the war. Even that in which I am now engaged, and which I was so desirous to terminate, would not have ceased if I had consented to all the conditions which they sought to impose upon me; for they fixed at two months the time during which I was to be obliged on my part to execute the conditions of the treaty, and during that period they insisted upon laying me under an obligation to deliver to them the fortresses which they demanded in the Low Countries and in Alsace, and to raze those of which they demanded the demolition. They refused, on their part, to come under any other engagement but that of suspending all acts of hostility till the 1st

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

vain to the spirit of a gallant nobility, and the patriotism of a brave people. It kindled a flame of general enthusiasm and loyalty. All ranks and parties vied with each other in contributing their property and personal service for the maintenance of the war; and the campaign which opened under such disastrous auspices was commenced with a degree of energy and unanimity, on the part of the French people, which had never hitherto been evinced in the course of the contest. As afterwards, in the wars of the Revolution, too, the 1 Capefigue, misfortunes of the state tended to the increase of its

Hist. de

vi. 42-46.

Hist. de Marlb. iii. 36, 37. Coxe, iv. 401.

Louis XIV. military forces. The stoppage of commerce, and shock to credit, threw numbers out of employment; and starving multitudes crowded to the frontier, to find that subsistence amidst the dangers of war which they could no longer find in the occupations of peace.1

August, reserving to themselves the right of then resuming their arms in the event of my grandson, the King of Spain, persisting in his resolution of defending the crown which God had given him, and to perish rather than abandon the faithful people who, during nine years, have recognised him as their lawful sovereign. Such a suspension, more dangerous than war itself, destroyed all hopes of peace more than it advanced them; for it rendered it necessary, not only to continue the same expenses for the support of the armies, but, on the termination of the suspension of hostilities, my enemies would have assailed us with new advantages drawn from the places into which I myself had introduced them, while at the same time I had demolished those which served as the rampart of my frontier provinces. As I put my protection into the hands of Almighty God, and as I hope that the purity of my intentions will induce the Divine blessing on my armies, I have written to the archbishops and bishops of my kingdom, to awaken the fervour of the prayers of the faithful in their dioceses; and I wish, at the same time, that my people throughout the whole extent of your government should know that they would now have been in the enjoyment of peace, if it had depended solely on my will to procure what they with reason desire, but which must be acquired by new efforts, since the immense sacrifices which I was prepared to have made have been vain to re-establish the public tranquillity. I leave it, therefore, to your prudence to make my intentions known in the manner which you deem most expedient to the people of your province.

"VERSAILLES, 12th June 1709. "

"LOUIS.

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

23.

Eulogy of

M. Dumont

duct of

this occa

sion.

M. Dumont, one of the ablest historians of the Grand Alliance, has borne the following honourable testimony to the conduct of the French king and people on this occasion: "With truth it may be said, that never had the material resources of France been so manifested as on the conthey were on this occasion. After the battles of Hoch- France on stedt, of Ramilies, of Turin, and of Oudenarde, the entire destruction of its maritime resources, the disastrous issue of the sieges of Turin and Barcelona, it appeared impossible it could be raised from its prostrate condition. A crisis without example had taken place in its finances, and in its whole affairs. Credit was gone, specie had disappeared, commerce was at a stand, bankruptcy was universal, misery and insolvency were universal. To crown the whole, famine was making unheard-of ravages in the land. What an incredible and admirable change took place in the midst of the general ruin! They found the means of putting on foot in Flanders a numerous army, of finding subsistence in abundance, and providing funds to pay the troops, and retain them in the bonds of discipline. They regularly paid the soldier his dues -the officer alone was kept in arrear. It was presumed he would act from a spirit of patriotism and honour, and the expectation was not disappointed." 1 Dumont's There is no impartial mind which must not acquiesce in v. 172. the justice of this generous eulogium.1

Hist. Mil.

Skilfully availing themselves of this burst of patriotic 24. fervour, the ministers of Louis were enabled to open Forces on the campaign with greater forces than they had ever at the opencollected since the beginning of the war. The principal campaign.

effort was made in Flanders, where the

chief danger

was to be apprehended, and the enemy's most powerful

both sides

ing of the

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

Marlb. iii.

46, 47. Rousset, ii.

army and greatest general were to be faced. Fifty-one
battalions and forty-nine squadrons were drawn from the
Rhine to Flanders; and this large reinforcement, joined
to the crowds of recruits which the public distress im-
pelled to his standards, enabled the renowned Marshal
Villars, who had received the command of the French,
to take the field at the head of 112,000 men. With
this imposing force he took a position, strong both by
nature and art, extending from Douai to the Lys; the
right resting on the canal of Douai, the centre covered
by the village of La Bassée, the left supported by
Bethune and its circumjacent marshes. The whole line
was strengthened by redoubts and partial inundations,
and traversed in front by a ditch fifteen feet wide,
covered by exterior works. The banks of the canal, as
far as Douai, were lined with troops.
Never at any

former period had France sent such an army into the
field ; never had she one animated with so enthusiastic
and gallant a spirit. The soldiers, equally with the
nobles, were aware that this was the last effort for the

1 Hist. de independence of France. All felt, in the words afterwards used by Napoleon at Waterloo, "that the moment had arrived when it behoved every Frenchman to conquer or die."1

274.

25. Marlborough's

efforts to

Aware of the great augmentation of the enemy's army which was in progress in Flanders, seeing clearly that it was there that the vital point of the contest was to be, augmenta- and not less convinced of the necessity of reinforcements in the Low to stem the progress of disaster in Spain, Marlborough Countries. made the most vigorous efforts to obtain, both from the

obtain an

tion of force

British government and the allied powers, an increase of forces for carrying on the war. He knew well that the enemy was bringing forth his last reserve; that the

VII.

1709.

ban and arrière ban of France were in the field; that CHAP. this was their final effort; and that victory in this protracted struggle would remain with the party in war, as in a battle, which could throw in a reserve to which the enemy had nothing at the moment to oppose. By dint of vigorous representations, and by still having the majority of the cabinet and House of Commons on his side, though in a minority at Court, he succeeded in obtaining a reinforcement of 10,000 men to the English army; and the supplies voted for the ensuing year reached the unprecedented, and, as it was then thought, enormous amount of £7,000,000 sterling. But the other powers could not be prevailed on to make any similar additions to their contingents and so little was the British. government aware of the necessity of augmenting the forces at the vital point, that, instead of making any addition to their troops in the Netherlands, they proposed to withdraw seven regiments from Antwerp, and send them to Spain. Marlborough expressed, as well he might, the utmost uneasiness at this extravagant pro- 350, 355, posal - a proposal which shows what so many other borough to events in English history demonstrate, how ignorant Feb. 7. its government in general is of the first principles of iv. 372. military operations.1

* "I received last night the favour of yours of the 7th January, in which you continue of opinion that the seven regiments at Antwerp should be sent to England. I can say no more on that subject. You will see what the enclosed letter says as to the designs of France. As they draw their troops from all parts to strengthen their army in this country, if we, at the same time, are to be obliged to leave our troops where they cannot be of much use, there can be no doubt but at length my Lord Faversham will be gratified by our being beaten, for so great a superiority will undo us. I am of your opinion, that one reason for the enemy marching their troops from all parts so early into this country, is in hope they may incline the Dutch to hearken to peace." -Marlborough to Godolphin, Brussels, Feb. 7, 1710; Coxe, iv. 372. Again,"I know not what you may reason in England, but I am fully persuaded

1 Coxe, iv.

372. Marl

Godolphin,

1709. Coxe,

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