IX. 52. Quesnoy, light. In the middle of it, the allied forces had passed CHAP. the Scheldt, and taken post between Noyelles and the Brioise, close to Villars' position. To bring the sincerity 1712. of the English to a test, Eugene proposed a general Siege and attack on the enemy's line, which was open and exposed, capture of on the 28th May. But Ormond, in obedience to his July 4. orders, declined, requesting the operation might be delayed for a few days. The defection was now apparent, and the Dutch deputies loudly condemned such dishonourable conduct; but Eugene, anxious to make the most of the presence of the British troops, though their co-operation could no longer be relied on, proposed to besiege Quesnoy, which was laid open by Villars' retreat. Ormond, who felt acutely the painful and discreditable situation in which, without any fault of his own, he was to Marlboplaced, could not refuse, and the investment took place 9, 1712. that very day. The operations were conducted by the 199. Hist. Dutch and Imperial troops alone; and the town was iii. 421,422. taken, after a siege of six weeks, on the 4th July.1 1 Eugene rough, June Coxe, vi. de Marlb. indignation defection of excites in powers. This disgraceful defection on the part of the English 53. government excited, as well it might, the utmost indig- Universal nation among the Allies, and produced mingled feelings which the of shame and mortification among all real patriots or England men of honour in this country. By abandoning the the allied contest in this manner, when it was on the very point of being crowned with success, the English lost the fruit of TEN costly and bloody campaigns, and suffered the war to terminate without attaining the main object for which it had been undertaken. Louis XIV., defeated, and all but ruined, was permitted to retain for his grandson the Spanish succession; and England, victorious, and within sight, as it were, of Paris, was content to halt in the career of victory, and lost the opportunity, never to be IX. 1712. CHAP. regained for a century to come, of permanently restraining the ambition of France. It was the same as if, a few days after the battle of Waterloo, England had concluded a separate peace, guaranteeing the throne of Spain to Joseph Buonaparte, and providing only for its not being held also by the Emperor of France. No stronger evidence can be imagined of the extent to which faction and party spirit had perverted the minds of the Government and the nation, than that such a defection, after so glorious a war, could have been for a moment thought of by the one, or tolerated by the other. But it has been the same in other days. The first triumph of the factious is over the national feelings. 54. Eloquent Lord Halifax gave vent to the general indignation of all generous and patriotic men, when he said, in the Lord Hali- debate on the Address, on 28th May, after enumerating the Peace in the proud list of victories which, since the commencement speech of fax against the House of Peers. of the war, had attended the arms of England," But all this pleasing prospect is totally effaced by the orders given to the Queen's general, not to act offensively against the enemy. I pity that heroic and gallant general, who, on other occasions, took delight to charge the most formidable corps and strongest squadrons, and cannot but be uneasy at his being fettered with shackles, and thereby prevented from reaping the glory which he might well expect from leading on troops so long accustomed to conquer. I pity the Allies, who have relied upon the aid and friendship of the British nation, perceiving that what they had done at so great an expense of blood and treasure is of no effect, as they will be exposed to the revenge of that power against whom they have been so active. I pity the Queen, her royal successors, and the present and future generations of Bri CHAP. IX. 1712. 1 Parl. Hist. tain, when they shall find the nation deeply involved in debt, and that the common enemy who occasioned it, though once near being sufficiently humbled, does still triumph, and design their ruin; and are informed that this proceeds from the conduct of the British cabinet, in May 28, neglecting to make a right use of these advantages and 1130. Lockhappy occasions which their own courage and God's i. 392. blessing had put into their hands." 1 66 1712, vi. hart Papers, rough's speech in I the motion seconding of Halifax. Marlborough seconded the motion of Halifax in a 55. speech of peculiar interest, as the last which he made on Marlbothe conduct of this eventful war. Although," said he, "the negotiations for peace may be far advanced, yet can see no reason which should induce the Allies or ourselves to remain inactive, and not push on the war with the utmost vigour, as we have incurred the expense of recruiting the army for the service of another year. That army is now in the field; and it has often occurred that a victory or a siege produced good effects and manifold advantages, when treaties were still further advanced than in the present negotiation. And as I am of opinion that we should make the most we can for ourselves, the only infallible way to force France to an entire submission, is to besiege and occupy Cambray or Arras, and to carry the war into the heart of the kingdom. But as the troops of the enemy are now encamped, it is impossible to execute that design, unless they are withdrawn from their position; and as they cannot be reduced to retire from want of provisions, they must be attacked and forced. For the truth of what I say, I appeal to a noble duke, (Argyll), whom I rejoice to see in this house, because he knows the country, and is as good a judge of these matters as any person now alive." Argyll, though a bitter personal enemy of Marlborough, CHAP. IX. 1712. 1 Parl. Hist. vi. 1137. Coxe, vi. 192, 193. 56. ters falsely Allies to be parties to the negotia tion. thus appealed to, said—“ I do indeed know that country, Notwithstanding the creation of twelve peers to The Minis- swamp the Upper House, it is doubtful how the division declare the would have gone, had not Lord Strafford, a cabinet minister, observed, in reply to the charge that the British government was about to conclude a separate peace," Nothing of that nature has ever been intended; for such a peace would be so foolish, villanous, and knavish, that every servant of the Queen must answer for it with his head, to the nation. The Allies are acquainted with our proceedings, and satisfied with our terms." This statement was made by a British minister, in his place in Parliament, on the 28th May, eighteen days after the private letter had been despatched from Mr Secretary St John to the Duke of Ormond, already quoted, mentioning the private treaty with Louis, enjoining him to keep it secret from the Allies, and to communicate clandestinely with Villars. But such a declaration, coming from an accredited minister of the crown, produced a great impression, and ministers prevailed by a majority of sixty-eight to forty. In the course of the debate, Earl Poulett let fall such cutting IX. 1712. expressions against Marlborough, for having, as he CHAP. alleged, led his troops to certain destruction, in order to profit by the sale of the officers' commissions,* that the Duke, without deigning a reply, sent him a challenge on leaving the House. The agitation, however, of the Earl, who was less cool than the iron veteran in the prospect of such a meeting, revealed what was going forward, and, Papers, i. by an order from the Queen, the affair was terminated vi. 196, 197. without bloodshed.1 1 Lockhart 392. Coxe, 57. of the Utrecht, It soon appeared what foundation there was for the assertion of the Queen's ministers, that England was Conditions engaged in no separate negotiation for a peace. On the Treaty of 6th June, the outlines of the treaty, which afterwards June 6. became so famous as the PEACE OF UTRECHT, were divulged. The Duke of Anjou was to renounce for ever, for himself and his descendants, all claim to the French crown; and the crown of Spain was to descend, by the male line only, to his heirs, and failing them to certain princes of the Bourbon line by male descent, always excluding him who was possessed of the French crown.+ "No one can doubt the Duke of Ormond's bravery; but he is not like a certain general who led troops to the slaughter, to cause a great number of officers to be knocked on the head in a battle, or against stone walls, in order to fill his pockets by the sale of their commissions."-Parl. Hist., vi. 1137. The words of the treaty, which subsequent events have rendered of importance on this point, were these:-Philip V. King of Spain renounced " à toutes pretentions, droits, et tîtres que lui et sa postérité avaient ou pourraient avoir à l'avenir à la couronne de France. Il consentit pour lui et sa postérité que ce droit fût tenu et considéré comme passé au Duc de Berri, son frère, et à ses descendants et postérité male; et au defaut de ce Prince et de sa postérité male, au Duc de Bourbon son cousin et à ses héritiers, et aussi successivement à tous les princes du sang de France." The Duke of Saxony and his male heirs were called to the succession, failing Philip V. and his male heirs. This act of renunciation and entail of the crown of Spain on male heirs, was ratified by the Cortes of Castile and Aragon: by the parliament of Paris, by Great Britain and France in the sixth article of the Treaty of Utrecht.-Vide SCHOELL, Hist. de Trait., ii. 99-105; and DUMONT, Corp. Dipl., tom. viii. P. i. p. 339. VOL. II. Р |