CHAP. VII. 1709. 26. Which at length are partially successful. The forces at his dis posal. But all that he could obtain from the British government was a promise that the seven battalions should be retained in Flanders, and should not be removed at the commencement of the campaign in the Low Countries. At the same time, he made such vigorous representations to the Dutch ministry, of the danger of taking the field. with an inferior force, that he succeeded in obtaining a reinforcement of 4000 Würtembergers, in their pay, who were to be drawn from the Rhine. Yet, with all this, he was still inferior to the enemy when the campaign commenced; and but for the reinforcements thus tardily yielded to his urgent representations, he would have been so much so that the campaign, so far from leading to a prosperous result, would in all probability have terminated in nothing but disaster. At length, however, Marlborough took the field at the head of 110,000 men; and although his force was composed of a heterogeneous mixture of the troops of different nations, 1 Coxe, iv. yet it was held together by the firm bond of military v. 1-5. Hist. success, and inspired with that unbounded confidence iii. 45, 47. which is founded on experience of the resources and Events of the greatest and most not but be anticipated, from the 371-373; de Marlb. Rousset, ii. 274, 275. capacity of its chief.1 that it is of the last consequence to have the troops of Würtemberg and the seven regiments serve in this country in the next campaign; for, with those, all the troops that we may be able to get for the sum of money voted by Parliament, for the troops of augmentation, will fall very much short of the number of men the enemy will have in this country. Is it possible that men of good sense, and that mean sincerely well to the common cause, can be in the least doubt that, if the enemy make their greatest, indeed their only effort in this country, we must do the same, or expect to be beaten? which I pray Almighty God to avert, for it would be a fatal blow. If any orders have been sent for the march of these seven regiments, I do most earnestly beg you will lay before her Majesty and the lords of the cabinet my apprehensions." -- Marlborough to the Lord-Treasurer, Brussels, Feb. 11, 1710; Coxe, iv. 372. contest of two armies of such magnitude, headed by such leaders, and when the patriotic ardour of the French nation, now roused to the uttermost, was matched against the military strength of the confederates, matured by a series of victories so long and brilliant. CHAP. VII. 1709. 27. of Villars' Though relying with confidence on the skill and intrepidity of his troops, Marlborough, according to his Description usual system, resolved if possible to circumvent the position. enemy by manoeuvring, so as to reserve his hard blows for the time when success was to be won in no other way. His design was to begin the campaign either with a general battle or by the reduction of Tournay, lying on the direct road from Brussels to Lille, which would break through, in the most important part, the barrier fortresses. To prepare for either event, and divert the enemy's attention, strong demonstrations were made against Villars' intrenched position. If it had been practicable, he would have been attacked; but, after a close reconnoitre, both generals deemed it too hazardous an enterprise, and it was resolved to besiege the fortress. In truth, the position which Villars had taken up, and strengthened with all imaginable skill and diligence, was, literally speaking, impregnable. His left rested on Roubaix, to cover St Venant, and stretched from thence to Hinge to protect Bethune. From thence it extended towards the Scarpe by La Bassie. His whole left wing was thus covered by the streams of the Roubaix and two heights, his centre by the Marsh of Cambrin, and his right by the canal between Douai and Lille. Along this line intrenchments were thrown up wherever they were required; inundations were formed. in the low plains, and hedges cut and palisades constructed to facilitate or protect the communication. VII. CHAP. Along the whole front a ditch ran fifteen feet wide and six deep, behind which was a rampart; while, in all 1709. exposed situations, outworks, as in a regular fortification, were constructed. Behind them the French army, above a hundred thousand strong, was stationed in three lines, the cavalry being in rear, while a hundred guns, arrayed along the front, armed the intrenchments. So confident 1 Rousset, was Villars in the strength of his position, and the magnitude of his army, that he sent a trumpeter to the Allies' headquarters to announce "that they would find him behind his lines; or, if he was afraid to attack, he would level them to give them entrance."1 ii. 275. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 49-51. Coxe, v. 5, 6. 28. Marlborough's measures to deceive Villars. But Marlborough and Eugene had no intentions of gratifying his wishes in either particular. Seeing the position was too strong to be attacked, they resolved on another but not less important operation. On the 23d June, the right under Eugene crossed the Lower Dyle below Lille; while the left, with which were the whole English and Dutch contingents, crossed the Marque; and both columns were concentrated on the banks of the Upper Dyle, Marlborough fixing his headquarters at the Abbey of Looz. So threatening were the masses which the Allies now accumulated in his front that Villars never doubted he was about to be attacked; and in consequence he strengthened his position to the utmost of his power, called in all his detachments, and drew considerable reinforcements from the garrisons of Tournay and the other fortresses in his vicinity. Having thus fixed his antagonist's attention, and concentrated his force in his intrenched lines between Douai and Bethune, Marlborough suddenly moved off to the left, in the direction of Tournay. This was done, however, with every imaginable precaution to impose upon the VII. 1709. enemy. The allied army decamped at nightfall on the CHAP. 27th in dead silence, and advanced part of the night straight towards the French lines; but at two in the morning, the troops were suddenly halted, wheeled to the left, and marched in two columns, by Pont-à-Bovines and Pont-à-Tressins, towards Tournay. So expeditiously was the change in the line of march managed, and so complete the surprise, that by seven in the morning the troops were drawn round Tournay, and the investment complete; while half of the garrison being absent in the lines of Marshal Villars, it was thereby rendered incapable of making any prolonged defence. Meanwhile that commander was so deceived that he was congratulating himself that the enemy had "fixed on the 1 Mém. de siege of Tournay, which should occupy them the whole 63. Marlremainder of the campaign; when it is evident their to Godoldesign had been, after defeating me, to thunder against 27, 1709. Aire and St Venant with their heavy artillery, penetrate Hist. de as far as Boulogne, and, after laying all Picardy under 52, 53. contribution, push on even to Paris."1 Villars, ii. borough phin, June Coxe, v. 5. Marlb. iii. Tournay is an old town, the ancient walls of which 29. of Tournay. are of wide circuit; but it has a series of advanced Description works erected by Vauban, and its citadel, a regular pentagon, was considered by the great Condé as one of the most perfect specimens of modern fortification in existence. So little did the governor expect their approach that many of the officers were absent, and a detachment of the garrison, sent out to forage, were made prisoners by General Lumley, who commanded the investing corps. The fortifications, however, were in the best state, and the magazines well stored with ammunition and military stores. Its circuit is very large, and the Scheldt flows throw its centre. Vauban CHAP. had added immensely to the strength of its works, which exhibited all that modern genius could devise, or modern 1709. industry accumulate. It was the ancient capital of the Nervii, so celebrated for their valour in the wars with Cæsar; and an inscription on its walls testified that Louis XIV., after taking it in four days, in 1667, had assisted in the construction of additional works which it was supposed would render it impregnable.* The attempt to take such a place with a force no greater than that which Villars had at hand to interrupt the Mr Secre- operations, would have been an enterprise of the utmost temerity, and probably terminated in disaster, had it not been for the admirable skill with which the attention of the enemy had been fixed on another quarter; and the siege commenced with one-half of its garrison absent, and the other imperfectly supplied with provisions.1 1 Marlbo rough to tary Boyle, June 27, 1709. Des. iv. 520. Coxe, v. 7,8. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 54, 55. The heavy artillery and siege equipage required to be brought up the Scheldt from Ghent, which in the outset occasioned some delay in the operations. Marlborough commanded the attacking, Eugene the covering forces. By the 6th July, however, the approaches were com * Ludovicus Decimus Quartus Quibus copiis, consiliis, animo, celeritate, Anno MDCLXVII, Nerviorum Urbem Quatriduo ceperat, Iisdem, neunquam postea caperetur, Hoc Quoque Diebus vix octo Ab Area et Fundamentis Victricibus militum Manibus Extruxit Anno Domini -Hist. de Marlborough, iii. 71. MDCLXXI. |