VII. 1709. CHAP. thousand men in his army who are not new levies. The multitude of his intrenchments is a proof of his weakness, and of the little confidence which the generals have in their troops. That army is the last effort of exhausted France; let us dare to attack it; we shall disperse it, and the enemy of Europe will find himself constrained to take the law from our hands. Our soldiers, who are animated by the recollection of a long series of successes, await with impatience the result of this council; they will regard it as an insult if the result is not conformable to their wishes. Our true wisdom is to reckon confidently on their valour, which during seven years has 1 Rousset, never disappointed us. I may perhaps add that they are led by the same chief, who will know how to guide them on the path of victory, which is not altogether unknown to them."1 ii. 286. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 99, 100. The result of these deliberations was a middle course, which, as usual in such cases, proved in the end the most perilous which could have been adopted. It was resolved to fight rather than abandon the siege of Mons, and attack the enemy if he did not himself become the assailant, but to delay the conflict till the reinforcement of twenty-six battalions came up from Tournay, and till St Ghislain, which commanded a passage over the Haine, was taken. This was done next day, the fort being carried by escalade, and its garrison of two hundred men made prisoners; and on the day following all the reserves from Tournay came up. But these advantages, which in themselves were not inconsiderable, were dearly purchased by the time which Villars gained for strengthening his position. Instead of pushing on to attack the Allies, as Marlborough and Eugene had expected, in order to raise the siege of Mons, that able CHAP. VII. 1709. commander employed himself with the utmost skill and vigour in throwing up intrenchments in every part of his position. He did this with such judgment and energy, and took such skilful advantage of all the defences which the ground afforded, that by the morning of the 11th the position was well-nigh impregnable, and unquestionably would have proved so to any other troops but 34, 35. those of Eugene and Marlborough.1 66 Hist. de Marlb. iii. 100, 101. Coxe, v. 45. tifies his The nature of the ground singularly favoured his efforts. The heights he occupied, plentifully inter- Villars forspersed with woods and eminences, formed a concave position. semicircle, the artillery from which enfiladed on all sides the little plain of Malplaquet, so as to render it, in Dumont's words, une trouée d'enfer," which could not be approached without destruction. Around this semicircle, redoubts, palisades, abattis, and stockades, were disposed with such skill and judgment that, literally speaking, there was not a single inequality of ground (and there were many) which was not turned to good account. The two trouées or openings, in particular, already mentioned, by which it was foreseen the Allies would endeavour to force an entrance, were so enfiladed by cross batteries as to be well-nigh unassailable. Twenty pieces of artillery were placed on a redoubt situated on an eminence near the centre of the field; the remainder were arranged along the fieldworks, constructed along the lines. These fieldworks 2 Rousset, and intrenchments were so lofty and regular, that it Dumont's appeared scarcely possible even for the bravest troops to ii. 381-386. surmount them; and the French army, posted on their 770. Coxe, summit or behind their enclosures, seemed rather in a Hist. de regular fortress than in a field of battle.2 Half the army 105-107. laboured at these works without a moment's intermission ii. 286. Mil. Hist. Kausler, v. 34-37. Marlb. iii. VII. CHAP. during the whole of the 9th and 10th, while the other were under arms, ready to repel any attack which might be hazarded. With such vigour were the operations conducted, that by the night of the 10th the position was deemed impregnable. 1709. 46. tack by the rals, Sept. 10. The allied forces passed these two days in inactivity, Plan of at- awaiting the arrival of the reinforcements from Tournay allied gene- which the council of war had deemed indispensable to the commencement of operations. Meanwhile Marlborough and Eugene had repeatedly reconnoitred the enemy's position, and were fully aware of its growing strength. Despairing of openly forcing such formidable lines, defended by an army so numerous and gallant, they resolved to combine their first attack with a powerful demonstration in rear. With this view, the rearguard, of nineteen battalions and ten squadrons, which was coming up from Tournay under General Withers, received orders not to join the main body of the army, but, stopping short at St Ghislain, to cross the Haine there, and traversing the wood of Blangies by a country road, to assail the extreme left of the enemy at the farm of La Folie, when the combat had been seriously begun in front. Baron Schulemberg was to attack the left flank of the intrenchments in the wood of Taisnière with forty of Eugene's battalions, supported by forty pieces of cannon, so placed that their shot reached every part of the wood; while Count Lottum was to assail their 1 Marlb. right flank with twenty-two battalions. To distract ders, Sept. the enemy's attention, other attacks were directed along Des. v. 617. the whole line; but the main effort was to be made 784, 785. by Eugene's corps on the wood of Taisnière, and it 40-44. was from the co-operation of the attacks of Lottum and Gen. Or 10, 1709. Kausler, Coxe, v. Withers on its flanks that decisive success was expected.1 All the corps had reached their respective points of destination on the evening of the 10th. Eugene and Schulemberg were grouped near Sart, in four lines, in front of Taisnière; the allied position extended from Aulnois on the left to Frameries on the right; and the men lay down to sleep, anxiously awaiting the dawn of the eventful morrow. CHAP. 1709. 47. the soldiers sides, Sep At three in the morning of the 11th divine service was performed with the utmost decorum at the head of Feelings of every regiment, and listened to by the soldiers, after the on both example of their chief, with the most devout attention. tember 11. The utmost regularity pervaded their ranks, as, with a slow but steady step, the troops marched from their bivouacs to the posts assigned them in the field. The awful nature of the occasion, the momentous interests at stake, the uncertainty who might survive to the close of the day, the protracted struggle soon to be brought to a decisive issue, had banished all lighter feelings, and impressed a noble character on that impressive solemnity. A thick fog overspread the field, under cover of which the troops marched to their appointed stations: the guns were brought forward to the grand battery in the centre, which was protected on either side by an épaulement to prevent an enfilade. No sooner did the French outposts give notice that the Allies were preparing for an attack than the whole army stood to their arms, and all the working-parties, who were still toiling in the trenches, cast aside their tools, and joyfully resumed. their places in the ranks. Never, since the commencement of the war, had the spirit of the French soldiers been so high, or had so enthusiastic a feeling been infused into every bosom. They looked forward with confidence to regaining, under their beloved commander, VOL. II. D CHAP. VII. 1709. Marshal Villars, the laurels which had been withered in eight successive campaigns, and arresting the flood of conquest which threatened to overwhelm their country. When the general mounted his horse at seven, loud cries of "Vive le Roi !" "Vive le Maréchal de Villars!" burst from their ranks. He himself took the command of the left, giving the post of honour on the right, in courtesy, to Marshal Boufflers. On the allied side, enthusiasm was not so loudly expressed, but confidence was not the less strongly felt. It was the anniversary of the glorious victory of the Zenta, gained on September 11, 1697, by Prince Eugene over 150,000 Turks. The soldiers all knew this, and relied with reason on the tried and splendid abilities of their chiefs, on their own experienced constancy and success in the field. They had the confidence of veteran soldiers, who had long fought and conquered together. In allusion to the numerous fieldworks before them, which almost concealed the enemy's ranks from their view, the sarcastic expression passed through the ranks, "We are again about to make war on moles." The fog still lingered on 1 Ledyard, the ground, so as to prevent the gunners seeing to take aim; but at half-past seven it cleared up, the sun broke forth with uncommon brilliancy, and immediately the fire commenced with the utmost vigour from the artillery on both sides.1 ii. 172-180. Coxe, v. 45-47. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 105, 106. 48. For about half-an-hour the cannon continued to Commence- thunder, so as to reach every part of the field of battle battle. with their balls, when Marlborough moved forward his ment of the troops in échelon, the left in front, in order to commence his projected attack on the French centre and left. The Dutch, who were on the left, agreeably to the orders they had received, which were merely to threaten and |