CHAP. the proud pre-eminence which she has ever since maintained, was chiefly, if not entirely, owing to his own 1709. imprudence, and his unfounded contempt of the enemy whom he had to combat. The opinion of Napoleon seems unquestionably well founded, that his disasters were owing to his forgetting the first principle of military science that of maintaining a connection with the base of operations; and that if he had proceeded more methodically, and secured himself in Poland before he advanced to Moscow, he would have proved successful. It is remarkable that the very fault which that great man has so clearly pointed out in the campaign of Charles, is precisely the one into which he himself fell in his invasion of the same country. Marlborough was much affected with this total ruin of a monarch who had lately had such brilliant prospects, and a warrior whom he knew personally, and highly esteemed. Napoleon But he was too sagacious not to see that his undue iii. 172-174. contempt of his enemies had been the cause of all his misfortunes, and that his imprudence had been his ruin.1* in Month. Coxe, v. 97, 98. 15. Character of Peter of Russia. Peter the Great, who gained this astonishing and decisive success, was one of the most remarkable men the Great who ever appeared on the theatre of public affairs. He was nothing by halves. For good or for evil he was gigantic. Vigour seems to have been the great characteristic of his mind; but it was often fearfully disfigured by passion, and he was not unfrequently misled by the "If this unfortunate king had been so well advised as to have made peace the beginning of this summer, he might in a great measure have influenced the peace between France and the Allies, and made other kingdoms happy. I am extremely touched with the misfortunes of this young king. His continued successes, and the contempt he had of his enemies, have been his ruin."-Marlborough to Godolphin, August 26, 1709; Desp. v. 510. example of more advanced states. To elevate Russia to an exalted place among nations, and give her the influence which her vast extent and physical resources seemed to put within her reach, was throughout life the great object of his ambition; and he succeeded in it to an extent which naturally acquired for him the unbounded admiration of mankind. His overthrow of the Strelitzes, long the Prætorian Guards and terror of the Czars of Muscovy, was effected with a vigour and stained by a cruelty similar to that with which Sultan Mahmoud, a century after, destroyed the Janissaries at Constantinople. The sight of a young and despotic sovereign leaving the glittering toys and real enjoyments of royalty, to labour in the dockyards of Saardem with his own hands, and instruct his subjects in ship-building by first teaching himself, was too striking and remarkable not to excite universal attention. And when the result of this was seen,—when the Czar was found introducing among his subjects the military discipline, naval architecture, nautical skill, as well as other arts and warlike institutions of Europe, and in consequence long resisting and at length destroying the mighty conqueror who had so long been the terror of northern Europe, the astonishment of men knew no bounds. He was celebrated as at once the Solon and Scipio of modern times; and literary servility, vying with disinterested admiration, extolled him as one of the greatest heroes and benefactors of his species who had ever appeared among men. CHAP. VIII. 1709. 16. and delu But time, the great dispeller of illusions, whose mighty arm no individual greatness, how great soever, His errors, can long withstand, has begun to abate much of this co- sion regardlossal reputation. His temper was violent in the extreme; frequent acts of hideous cruelty, and occasional VOL. II. G ing him. VIII. CHAP. oppression, signalised his reign: he was often impelled, by ill-directed zeal for the advancement of his 1709. people, into measures which in reality and in the end retarded their improvement. At one time he could subject, on mere suspicion, his most faithful servants to the most cruel tortures; at another, destroy a splendid mirror in an ungovernable fit of passion. He was thoroughly despotic, and could tolerate no opposition, on any grounds, to his will. The destruction of the Strelitzes, or Prætorian Guards of the capital, was a frightful act of severity; but it was unavoidable, and was attended with as much good in the end as it was executed with courage in the beginning. But many of his other acts of gigantic despotism had not a similar excuse. More than any other man, he did evil that good might come of it. He impelled his people, as he thought, to civilisation, though, while launching into the stream, hundreds of thousands perished in the waves. "Peter the Great," says Mackintosh, "did not civilise Russia that undertaking was beyond his genius, great as it was; he only gave the Russians the art of civilised war." The truth was, he attempted what was altogether impracticable. No one man can at once civilise a nation: he can only put it in the way of civilisation. To complete the fabric must be the work of continued effort and sustained industry during many successive generations. That Peter failed in raising his people to a level with the other nations of Europe, in refinement and industry, is no reproach to him. It was impossible to do so in less than several centuries. The real particular in which he erred was, that he departed from the national spirit, that he tore up the national institutions, and violated in numerous in stances the strongest national feelings. He clothed his court and capital in European dresses; but men do not put off old feelings with the costume of their fathers. CHAP. VIII. 1709. 17. acter of his Peter's civilisation extended no further than the surface. He succeeded in inducing an extraordinary degree Real charof discipline in his army, and the appearance of con- changes. siderable refinement among his courtiers. He effected no material ameliorations in the condition of his subjects; and by endeavouring to force them at once up to a level with the states of Western Europe, he not only rendered his government unpopular with the rural population, but also prevented his improvements from penetrating the great body of the people. In his efforts to construct a European capital in the marshes of Livonia, he was in the end successful; but it was at the expense of the lives of a hundred thousand of his subjects, who perished in the attempt. His genius was vast, but it was after the manner of the Orientals rather than the Europeans. Cheops raising the pyramids from the toil and sweat of generations of captives was the emblem and prototype of his government. It could not be otherwise. It is easier to remodel an army than change a nation; and the celebrated bon-mot of Diderot, that the Russians were "rotten before they were ripe," is too happy an expression, indicating how much easier it is to introduce the vices than the virtues of civilisation among an unlettered people. To this day the civilisation of Russia has never descended below the higher ranks; and the efforts of the really patriotic Czars who have since wielded the Muscovite sceptre-Alexander and Nicholas have been mainly in abandoning the fictitious career into which Peter turned the people, and the reviving with the old institutions the true spirit and CHAP. VIII. 1709. inherent aspirations of the nation. The immense though less obtrusive success with which their efforts have been attended, and the gradual though still slow descent of civilisation and improvement through the great body of the people, prove the wisdom of the principles on which they have proceeded. Possibly Russia is yet destined to afford another illustration of the truth of Montesquieu's maxim, that no nation ever yet rose to durable greatness but through institutions in harmony with its spirit. Yet was Peter's attempt, though in many respects a mistaken, a great and glorious one it was the effort of a rude but lofty and magnanimous mind, which attributes to mankind in general that vigour and ambition of which it is itself conscious. And without shutting our eyes to his many and serious errors, in charity let us hope that the words of Peter on his deathbed have been realised: "I trust that, in respect of the good I have striven to do my people, God will pardon my sins." The great concentration of the forces on both sides. Campaign in Flanders during the campaign of 1709, rendered the Rhine, and operations of either feeble in other quarters. Great plans had been formed by Marlborough and Eugene for a simultaneous irruption into France from the side of Alsace and Piedmont, with the view of the two invading armies uniting at Lyons at the same time that the grand army moved direct from Flanders on Paris; but the vigorous efforts of the French king, and still more the jealousies and tardiness of the Allies, wherever Marlborough was not in person to allay them, rendered them abortive. So slow were the movements of the German princes on the Upper Rhine, that, before any considerable force could be collected to threaten Alsace, a strong body of men had been assembled under Marshal d'Har 18. on the its disasters, July 29. |