Instead of taking post behind the Weistritz, which he had passed during the night, he fell back upon Breslaw; and far from expecting the king (who followed him very closely) and after having thrown a strong garrison* into that city, which fell into the hands of the Prussians, he hastily continued his retreat. All that Zieten had predicted of the duke's army, and which would infallibly have happened to it, had the advice of the commander in chief been followed, was now literally fulfilled in that of prince Charles. The Austrian troops, doubly dispirited at having been beaten by those whom they had just before overcome, stood in more than ordinary need of encouragement. Instead of measures conducive to such end, his flight was precipitated, and the preservation of the army despaired of. Hence thousands of deserters come over to the Prussians; and the more so, as Zieten, who pressed them on every side, had left them no other resource.

* 17500 men.

On

On the 7th of December, the king had ordered Zieten to march in pursuit of the enemy with a considerable body of men, composed of three battalions of grenadiers,

*

three regiments of infantry, ** three of dragoons, four of hussars, **** and two free battalions, those of Angenelli and Kalben.

Notwithstanding the defeat and dispersion of the enemy, this division was not equivalent to the force which they still possessed. After having, two days before, exhibited a front consisting of more than eighty thousand men, they were now, according to the calculation of general de Tempelhof, reduced to nine thousand infantry, and twenty-eight thousand cavalry; a number, however, still superiour to Zieten's detachment.

Wedel, Manteuffel, Heyden. **Asseburg, Bornstedt, Meyerink.

*** Czettritz, Normann, Bayreuth,

**** Werner, Seidlitz, Puttkammer, Zieten.

But

But supposing them upon an equality (as a flying army loses much when compared with the army that pursues it) the Austrians would have been able to take post, and to cope with the Prussians, had Zieten left them time for such purpose. On this occasion it was that he displayed his knowledge of the country, and of the art of war in general. As soon as he foresaw a position which might prove advantageous to the enemy, he drove them forwards to hinder them from taking possession of it. Whenever they had any defiles to pass, he took care to occupy them beforehand; so that in order to gain Bohemia, they were not able to take the route they had intended to take, but such only as the Prussian general prescribed them. Prince Charles had entertained hopes of being able to halt under the ramparts of Schweidnitz. He marched for that purpose througn Boraw, but Zieten, who fol lowed him over the Lohe and thro' Gross-Mochber, prevented him from taking post there; and driving him continually before him, he was enabled, in the space of a fortnight (from the 7th till the 22nd of December) to recover all

Silesia from the Austrians, and to compel them to repass the mountains.

It is not possible to make a just estimate of their loss in troops, artillery, baggage, and military stores. An historian of the time has calculated it at nine thousand men, and three thousand waggons. Other writers affirm it to be still more considerable. Zieten had no leisure to make any estimate; he considered himself as having done nothing while any thing yet remained to be done; and looking before him only, he kept no reckoning with the past.

To satisfy the views of the king, and to pursue the enemy to the utmost, he was com pelled to put the vigour of his troops to the severest test, and to require miracles at their hands. They had been long and incessantly engaged in marches and encounters, while the rest of the army were enjoying the sweets of repose; his infantry could barely find accommodations in the villages on their route; his cavalry, ill-encamped, were exposed to all the

inclemency of the season, and during fifteen days the detachment had only one day of rest. It will appear from the correspondence of the king, which we shall lay before our readers, that the general, touched at the hardships which his men underwent, had ventured to make representations to his majesty, and the more so, as they were frequently in want of bread. At the same time, it will be seen, that being obliged to steel his heart to the feelings of compassion, which would have retarded the progress of the operations, he at length entered into the views of the monarch; and that, exerting himself anew, he was enabled to impart fresh ardour to his troops, to reconcile them to the endurance of hunger, cold, sickness, and the most painful privations.

It were to be wished that an accurate account could be given of the various marches, posts, and dispositions of this pursuit, which the general projected and varied from day to day. But the rapidity of the operations precluded all possibility of noting the details; and the memory of those who had a part in them.

soon