hereafter lawfully existing, and authorized to extend a line of railroad into the District of Columbia, or having secured the right to operate over the lines of any other then existing railroad, to a point of connection with the tracks of said terminal company, shall have the right to the joint use of said station and terminals upon the payment of a reasonable compensation for the use of the same; and if the parties be unable to agree upon such terms, then the same shall be prescribed by the supreme court of the District of Columbia, upon petition of either party in interest, under such rules of procedure as the said court shall prescribe."

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Pursuant to the authority vested in it, the Washington Terminal Company entered into a joint contract with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company and the Philadelphia, Baltimore, & Washington Railroad Company, also with their tenant companies, the Southern Railway Company, the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, and the Washington Southern Railway Company, whereby, for a stipulated consideration, each of said five companies is permitted to run its passenger trains over the tracks of the terminal company into and out of its union station. The contract provides, among other things, that "the terminal company, through its superintendent or other proper officer appointed by it, shall maintain and operate the said railroad property, passenger terminal, and yard, and have the control and supervision of all engines and employees connected therewith, and shall enforce such rules and regulations for the efficient operation and use thereof as may be necessary, and the trains and employees of each of the parties hereto, while in or upon the said railroad and property, shall be subject to such rules and regulations (being the rules and regulations of the board of managers of the terminal company), and to the orders of the superintendent or other proper officer, of the terminal company. * * * All claims for loss and damage arising from or in connection with the administration, operation, and use of said railroad property, passenger terminal, and Eckington car and engine yard, shall be

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cared for, dealt with, adjusted, defended, or otherwise disposed of, by said terminal company."

It appears from the record that the terminal company owns many miles of tracks and switches in the District of Columbia, over which all passenger traffic conducted by any steam railroad entering the District must pass; that it owns and operates what is known as the Eckington car and engine yards, with tracks, shops, tools, machinery, and roundhouses; that these yards are used for the housing and repairing of the engines and cars of the various companies using the lines of the terminal company; that the outgoing trains are made up by the use of the switch engines of the terminal company; that the terminal company owns the union station, tracks, yards, and switch engines; that it maintains baggage, mechanical, way, and transportation departments; that it operates and controls the tracks, switches, and signals within its territory; that it employs all the men in and about the yards, station, roundhouses, shops, and upon the engines operated by it; that the movements of all trains and engines are controlled by its yard master, and a record thereof kept; that the baggage is handled by the terminal company; that the terminal company employs and controls all gatemen, baggagemen, ticket agents, ticket receivers, and porters, who have charge of all passengers from the time they become such until they enter the trains, and from the time they leave the trains until they leave the grounds of the company, and that all employees of any railroad company, while operating trains over the lines of the terminal company, are subject to the control and orders of the superintendent of the terminal company.

The Washington Terminal Company, by its incorporation under the powers conferred by the act of Congress, is vested with all the rights, powers, and privileges of a railroad company. By the act of Congress (32 Stat. at L. 909, chap. 856), it is given the power to contract with other lines of railroad entering the city, and such railroad companies are compelled to contract with the terminal company for the use of its lines in order to gain access to the union station. In order that this arrangement may

be perpetually assured, the act further prohibits the sale by the terminal company of its railroad or other property. In other words, its organization is based upon the necessity of concentrating the passenger traffic at one union station, under single management and control, at the same time assuring not only the railroads entering the District at the present time, but all that may hereafter enter, uniform facilities and treatment, and thereby escaping the probability of conflict and unjust discrimination between rival companies. It is therefore apparent that the terminal company was authorized to incorporate, and construct, own, and operate its terminal facilities in connection with the railroad lines entering the District, to satisfy a public necessity.

The employers' liability act of 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 232, chap. 3073, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1148), provides "that every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the District of Columbia, or in any Territory of the United States, or between the several States, or between any Territory and another, or between any Territory or Territories and any State or States, or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, shall be liable to any of its employees," etc. With reference to the right of action under this act, its constitutionality, in so far as it applies to the District of Columbia, was upheld in Hyde v. Southern R. Co. 31 App. D. C. 466. This holding was based upon the plenary power of Congress to legislate for the District of Columbia; but, in determining whether the terminal company is a common carrier within the terms of the act, we must take into consideration the fact that it is not a line of railroad operated wholly and independently within the District of Columbia, but that it is a component part of various systems of railroad engaged, so far as it is concerned, entirely in interstate commerce. We must therefore ascertain its meaning as generally used in connection with the various acts of Congress regulating trade and commerce. The employers' liability act is limited in its operation to employees of common carriers generally engaged in interstate commerce and

within the Territories and the District of Columbia.

The act was passed by virtue of the power of Congress to regulate commerce between the States. Its application to the District of Columbia, in so far as granting a right of action to employees, or as applying to common carriers operating exclusively within the District, and not forming a part of an interstate system, is not dependent upon the right of Congress to legislate under the commerce clause of the Constitution, but its power to legislate generally for the District. In determining, therefore, whether or not the Washington Terminal Company is a common carrier, no broader or different meaning can be applied to it because of its location in the District of Columbia than would be admissible if its lines extended from the District into a State, since it will be treated as forming part of an interstate system. The power vested in Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes" (Const. art. I. sec. 8, cl. 3) is exclusive and sweeping. It is a sovereign power conferred upon the general government, which will not admit of any limitation by the States. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of the power of Congress to regulate commerce, said: "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution." It includes the power to regulate every agency of interstate commerce. In the case of railroads, the tracks, terminals, switches, stations, cars, engines, appliances, and the methods of operation, are all, when employed as component parts of a general system, engaged in interstate traffic, instrumentalities of interstate commerce within the scope of Congressional regulation. It is therefore competent, in considering what Congress contemplated by imposing upon common carriers the burdens of the employers' liability act, to keep in mind its general authority to include within its grasp every instrumentality that enters into interstate commerce. Such an act is clearly within the regulating power of Congress. It therefore calls for liberal construction, to the end that the intention

of Congress may be made effective. The power to regulate interstate commerce is so broad that under the authority of Congress rates may be established, freight classified, equipment prescribed and standardized, methods of operation enforced, and the rights of employees safeguarded. It follows that the same general rules apply to the construction and enforcement of the employers' liability act which apply to the safety appliance act or the interstate commerce act. In Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Voelker, 70 L.R.A. 264, 65 C. C. A. 226, 129 Fed. 522, speaking of the safety appliance act, the court said: "Obviously the purpose of this statute is the protection of the lives and limbs of men, and such statutes, when the words fairly permit, are so construed as to prevent the mischief and advance the remedy." So with the employers' liability act, it is for the protection of employees against the reckless and careless negligence of the fellow servant; but it possesses a broader and higher object, to require companies engaged in the business of common carriers to exercise the highest care in the selection of their employees and in the use of approved equipment, in order that the agencies of commerce may be operated not only with the greatest degree of safety to the men employed, but that people and property may be transported without loss or injury.

This brings us to the chief proposition: Is the Washington Terminal Company a common carrier under the various acts of Congress regulating interstate commerce? If so, this company must be held to be within the operation of the employers' liability act. In sec. 1 of the interstate commerce act, as amended by the act of Congress of June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 545, chap. 309), a railroad is defined to "include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease, and shall also include all switches, spurs, tracks, and terminal facilities of every kind used or necessary in the transportation of the persons or property designated herein, and also all freight depots, yards, and grounds used or necessary in the transportation or delivery of any of said property."