ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. See DISCOVERY, 1; EQUITY, 5.

ADMINISTRATORS. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

ADULTERATION.

While the food and drug act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 768, chap.
3915, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1187, contains penal provi-
sions, without which it could not be enforced, it was enacted to
remedy the great mischief resulting from the unrestricted sale of
adulterated drugs and articles of food, and ought to be given, where
possible, a construction that will effect the general legislative in
tention. United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co. 343.

ADVERSE POSSESSION, TITLE BY. See JUDICIAL SALES, 2.

AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
An affidavit of defense in an action by a landlord to recover possession
of demised premises is insufficient, which consists of denials that
the defendant ever rented the property as specifically described; that
the defendant rented the property at the rate set forth by the plain-
tiff; that he unlawfully held possession of the property described,
and that the notice to quit the premises was sufficient,-where none
of such contradictory statements of conclusions of law is supported
by any allegation of fact. (Following Columbia Laundry Co. v.
Ellis, 36 App. D. C. 583.) Pulliam v. Capital Traction Co. 301.

AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY.

See WILLS, 1.

AGENCY. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Vol. XXXVII.—39.

609

APPEAL AND ERROR. See BROKERS, 2; CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 5, 11, 19;
EVIDENCE, 5; MANDAMUS, 6; PATENTS, 1-8; STARE DECISIS;
STREET RAILROADS, 3; TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 8.

1. Where, on appeal in an equity suit, the appellant sought by designation
and direction to exclude from the record much irrelevant matter, but
the appellee caused it to be included, thereby greatly increasing the
cost of the transcript and printed record, this court, in affirming the
decree, required the appellee to pay one half of the costs. Smith
v. Lancaster, 25.

2. This court will not, on motion of the appellant, require part only of the
record to be printed, the appellee having the right to insist upon
the printing of the entire record. If, on the hearing, it appears that
unnecessary matter has been required to be printed, the costs of the
same will be taxed against the party causing it. (Citing Smith v.
Lancaster, ante, 25.) Lee v. Welch, 125.

3. Where, upon a suggestion of the diminution of the record by the ap-
pellee, this court granted the writ of certiorari upon condition that
the appellee deposit with the clerk the estimated cost of the addi-
tional matter, in order that the appellant might be reimbursed if it
should appear that the additional matter was immaterial, and it was
found on the hearing that such additional matter, so printed, was
immaterial and unnecessary, the clerk was directed to reimburse
the appellant for the printing of such additional matter. Frost v.
Chase, 179.

4. Where, in an equity suit by several complainants, the defendant did
not demur or file a plea, and did not raise the question of multi-
fariousness through misjoinder of complainants, in his answer or at
the hearing below, this court refused to consider the question for the
first time raised by him here. Knight v. Harriman, 236.

5. Where judgment is entered by the lower court upon the mandate of this
court, without objection or exception by the losing party, and with-
out any offer by him of evidence necessitating a new trial, there is
nothing presented for this court to review on an appeal by him from
such judgment, and the judgment will be affirmed. National Metro-
politan Bank v. Lincoln, 254.

6. Where an accused in a criminal case moves in arrest of judgment on the
ground of the insufficiency of the indictment, and, his motion being

APPEAL AND ERROR-continued.

overruled, appeals from the judgment, and there is no bill of ex-
ceptions in the record, the only question presented on the appeal is
the sufficiency of the indictment. Simon v. United States, 280.

7. In the absence of a bill of exceptions on an appeal from a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case, it will be presumed that the evidence
was sufficient to support the indictment. Id.

8. During the pendency in this court of an appeal from a decree sustain-
ing a demurrer to and dismissing a bill in equity by certain Indians
against the Secretary of the Interior, to enjoin him from distribut-
ing tribal funds, an order was made by this court on the application
of the appellants, restraining the appellee from distributing the
funds until the appeal should be determined. Gritts v. Fisher,
473.

9. On an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on verdict for the de-
fendant on the issue of negligence in a personal injury action, error
on the part of the trial court in the exclusion of evidence that the
plaintiff was unable to pursue her avocation as the result of her
injuries will not justify the reversal of the judgment. Chapman
v. Capital Traction Co. 479.

10. An assignment of error to the effect that the trial court erred in refus-
ing each of several, special instructions asked by the plaintiff, and
in granting each of specified prayers asked by the defendant, violates
rule 8 of this court, that errors assigned shall be separately and
specifically stated. (Citing District of Columbia v. Robinson, 14
App. D. C. 512; Hartman v. Ruby, 16 App. D. C. 45; and Clerks'
Invest. Co. v. Sydnor, 19 App. D. C. 89.) Id.

11. A judgment will not be reversed for the refusal of the trial court to
grant instructions asked by the unsuccessful party as to the degree
of care required of the defendant, where the charge of the court to
the jury clearly stated the degree of care required. Id.

12. A judgment on verdict in a personal injury action will not be reversed
on an appeal by the plaintiff because of the refusal of the trial court
to grant an instruction asked by the plaintiff on the subject of the
measure of damages, where the instruction was not different from the
charge of the court on the subject. Id.

13. Where a foreign trust company, to which was indorsed specially a prom-
issory note, sent the note to this District for collection, and after-
wards intervened in an action in which the proceeds of the note had
been attached in the hands of the collecting bank here, quære,
whether the plaintiffs in the action can properly raise the question
for the first time on appeal, whether the trust company, and not its
indorsee, was the proper party to intervene. Natl. City Bank v.
Banker's Trust Co. 553.

APPEAL AND ERROR-continued.

14. An appeal by the accused lies to this court from an order of the su-
preme court of the District of Columbia adjudging him guilty of
contempt of court, and sentencing him to imprisonment for at-
tempting corruptly to influence a member of the grand jury, which
proceeding was commenced by attachment, requiring the accused
to show cause why he should not be so adjudged in contempt.
(Construing sec. 226, D. C. Code [31 Stat. at L. 1225, chap. 854].)
Pierce v. United States, 582.

15. A proceeding in the lower court, sitting as a criminal court, instituted
by attachment, requiring a person not a party to an action to show
cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of court
for attempting to corruptly influence a grand juryman, is an action
at law, and an appeal by the accused from an order adjudging him
in contempt must be on a bill of exceptions; and on such an appeal
this court cannot review the action of the trial court upon questions
of fact, but only upon questions of law. (Following Gompers v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co. 33 App. D. C. 516, s. c. 221 U. S. 418, 55
L. ed. 797, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492.) Id.
16. Where the court below sentenced a person to three month's imprison-
ment in jail for contempt of court for attempting to corruptly
influence a grand juryman, this court, on an appeal from the order
of that court, stated that it did not regard the penalty imposed as
extreme or unusual, but held that, even if it did, that it was not
within its jurisdiction to modify the sentence. Id.

17. An application to this court for a writ of error to the Supreme Court
of the United States will not be granted where the judgment of
this court affirms an order of the lower court, holding a criminal
term, adjudging a person not a party to a cause guilty of contempt
of court, under sec. 725, Rev. Stat., for attempting to corruptly
influence a member of the grand jury; as a proceeding under that
section is in the nature of a criminal proceeding, and by sec. 250
of the act of Congress of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. at L. 1159, chap.
231), to "Codify, Revise, and Amend the Laws Relating to the
Judiciary," the judgments of this court in all cases arising under
the criminal laws are made final. Id.

APPOINTMENT TO AND REMOVAL FROM OFFICE. See OFFICERS, 1.

ARMY AND NAVY.
Mandamus will not lie at the instance of an officer of the Army against
the Auditor of the Treasury for the War Department and the
Comptroller of the Treasury, to compel them to consider and act
upon his claim for longevity pay, where it appears that the claim
had been made to and rejected by them on the ground that a similar

ARMY AND NAVY-continued.

claim by the relator had been rejected many years before by their
predecessors in office, and that they had no power to review the
action of the latter for mere mistake of law; and it also appeared
that the relator's right to an appeal to the court of claims from the
first rejection was barred by the statute of limitations. United
State ex rel. Todd v. Gongwer, 555.

ARREST OF JUDGMENT. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 6; JUDGMENT, 1, 2.

ASSESSMENT FOR TAXATION AS EVIDENCE OF VALUE. See EVI.
DENCE, 2, 3.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 10.

ATTACHMENT. See GARNISHMENT.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. Sec. 5 of the act of Congress of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 98, chap.
181), giving the Secretary of the Interior authority to suspend and
exclude agents and attorneys from practising before his department
after notice and opportunity for a hearing, is not invalid as not af-
fording an accused agent or attorney due process of law, because it
fails to provide for the administration of oaths to witnesses testify-
ing at the hearing provided for, or for summoning witnesses to ap-
pear at such hearing. (Citing Garfield v. United States, 32 App. D.
C. 109, and Hitchcock v. Smith, 34 App. D. C. 521.) Phillips v.
Ballinger, 46.

2. So much of sec. 5 of the act of Congress of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat. at
L. 98, chap. 181), as provides that the Secretary of the Interior may
disbar an agent or attorney practising before his department, who
is shown to be "disreputable," is not void because of the word "dis-
reputable" not being defined by the common law, and having no com-
mon or general signification. (Following Garfield v. United States,
supra.) Id.

3. In a suit in equity to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from further
continuing a proceeding to disbar an attorney practising before his
department, it will be presumed that the Secretary will be governed
by established rules, and will grant the attorney a fair and im
partial hearing. Id.

4. An averment in a bill in equity by an attorney practising before the
Interior Department, to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from
further continuing a proceeding to disbar the plaintiff, that, aside
from certain disputed evidence, there is nothing before the Secre-
tary upon which he can base a legal and valid order of disbarment,
is a statement of a conclusion of law. Id.