LANDLORD AND TENANT. See AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE, 1; EQUITY, 1.
1. Where the renewal clause of a lease provides for the appraisement of
the demised property for the purpose of determining what the rent
shall be during the renewal period, and that until the appraisement
shall be made the rent shall continue at the old rate, and the parties
being unable to agree upon appraisers, one of them brings suit for
the purpose of having an appraisement judicially made, the tenant is
entitled to pay rent at the old rate until the date of the entry of
the final decree on the report of the appraisers appointed by
the court fixing the new rate. Shoemaker v. Munsey, 95.
2. An objection by a tenant made in his affidavit of defense in an action
by his landlord, a corporation, to recover possession of demised prop-
erty, is insufficient, which is to the effect that the name of the cor-
poration was signed to the notice to quit by its attorney. Pulliam
v. Capital Traction Co. 301.
LEADING QUESTIONS. See PATENTS, 38; WITNESSES, 1.
LEASE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
LICENSEES. See RAILROADS, 2, 3.
LICENSES. See PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, 1.
LIENS. See BANKRUPTCY, 1; EQUITY, 2, 3; TENANTS IN COMMON, 1.
LIFE INSURANCE. See INSURANCE.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See PLEADING, 6.
MANDAMUS. See ARMY AND NAVY, 1; PATENTS, 29; PENSIONS, 1;.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, 1; PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
1. The supreme court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to issue
the writ of mandamus to compel the performance of a duty purely
legal, and in which no act of judgment is involved, by an official
board or commission of the Federal government, such as the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. U. S. ex rel. Humboldt S. S. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 266.
2. The writ of mandamus will lie to require an inferior court to assume
jurisdiction of and decide a matter within its jurisdiction and
pending before it for judicial determination, but the writ will not
issue to control its decision; and where the question of jurisdiction
is a peremptory one, enjoined by law, it is immaterial that the
officer, board, or tribunal may have granted a hearing before decid-
ing that issue. Id.
3. Mandamus by the supreme court of the District of Columbia will lie
to compel the Interstate Commerce Commission to take jurisdiction
and act upon an application by a carrier to establish through routes
and joint rates between its steamship lines in Alaska and certain
other carriers, operating in that territory, where the Commission,
after hearing testimony and arguments, dismissed the application
upon the ground that Alaska is not a territory of the United States,
and that it therefore had no jurisdiction in the premises, and denied
a petition for a rehearing.
4. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that may be granted by courts to
enforce a ministerial duty plainly defined and required by law. It
cannot be used to serve the purpose of an ordinary suit, or to oper-
ate as a writ of error. U. S. ex rel. Todd v. Gongwer, 555.
5. Where the duty to be performed is judicial in its nature, the courts
may be invoked to compel the reception and consideration of the
claim, demand, or action; that is, the taking of jurisdiction, and
the grant of an opportunity for hearing in a proper case; but the
courts cannot direct the officer in the decision that he may render
after taking jurisdiction. Id.
6. A writ of mandamus cannot be made to take the place of an appeal.
U. S. ex rel. Lang v. Moore, 493.
MARSHAL'S SALES. See JUDICIAL SALES, 1.
1. McNamara v. Washington Terminal Co. 35 App. D. C. 230, referred to.
McNamara v. Washington Terminal Co. 384.
2. Hyde v. Southern R. Co. 31 App. D. C. 466, referred to, which upheld
the constitutionality of the employer's liability act of Congress of
1906 (34 Stat. at L. 232, chap. 3073, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909,
p. 1148), so far as it applies to the District of Columbia. Id.
3. The application of the employer's liability act of Congress to the Dis-
trict of Columbia, so far as it grants a right of action to employees,
or as it applies to common carriers operating exclusively within the
District, and not forming part of an interstate system, is not de-
pendent upon the right of Congress to legislate under the commerce
clause of the Constitution, but to the power of Congress to legislate
generally for the District. Id.
4. The employers' liability act of Congress is for the protection of em-
ployees against the reckless and careless negligence of fellow serv-
ants, but it possesses a broader and higher object, namely, to re-
quire companies engaged in the business of common carriers to ex-
ercise the highest care in the selection of their employees and in the
use of approved equipment, in order that the agencies of commerce
MASTER AND SERVANT-continued.
may be operated not only with the greatest degree of safety to the
men employed, but that people and property may be transported
without loss or injury; and it should be liberally construed in order
that the intention of Congress may be made effective. Id.
5. The Washington Terminal Company, which exclusively manages, oper-
ates, and controls all steam railroad passenger traffic entering into
and leaving the city of Washington, while within the zone occupied
by its station and tracts, is engaged in interstate commerce, and is
a common carrier within the meaning of the employer's liability
act of Congress, and may be liable as such to one of its employees
for the negligence of a fellow servant. Id.
MISBRANDING OF DRUGS. See DRUGS, 1, 2.
MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL. See CRIMINAL LAW, 18, 32.
MISJOINDER OF PARTIES. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 4.
MISTAKE. See ARMY AND NAVY, 1; OFFICERS, 2.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. See CRIMINAL LAW, 36.
MOTIVE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13, 14.
MULTIFARIOUSNESS. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 4.
1. Quære, whether the commissioners of the District of Columbia have
power to dismiss a fireman from the service of the municipal fire
department without the notice and hearing provided for by their
own rules, which are given the force of law by statute. Rudolph v.
Mosheuvel, 76.
2. Moneys received by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia
from citizens, for street improvements, are not public moneys in a
legal sense. Such transactions are between the individuals holding
the office of Commissioner and the citizens who advance the money.
District of Columbia v. Petty, 156.
3. The Auditor of the District of Columbia is not, under an existing law,
the custodian of money received by the District of Columbia from
citizens for street and other improvements. Id.
4. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia are executive officers,
who, in the exercise of their supervisory power over the findings
Vol. XXXVII.—41.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS continued.
of the police trial board, perform a function judicial in its nature;
but the procedure on appeal to them from the trial board is not
necessarily that which obtains in the case of appeals to regular
courts of appeal, but depends upon the provisions of the statute
governing the particular case. (Following United States ex rel.
Wedderburn v. Bliss, 12 App. D. C. 485.) Rudolph v. United States
ex rel. Gillott, 455.
5. On an appeal by a policeman from a finding of the police trial board, to
the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, the Commissioners,
and not the policemen, have a right to elect whether the appeal
shall be submitted orally or in writing; and where the Commission-
ers have directed such an appeal to be submitted in writing, man-
damus upon the relation of the policeman will not lie to compel
them to hear the appeal orally. (Construing paragraph 5 of the
act of Congress of June 8, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 221, chap. 3056, and
the regulations theretofore promulgated by the Commissioners as to
the manner of taking appeals from the findings of the police trial
board.) Id.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. See PLEADING, 2-4; STATUTES, 1-3, 10.
MURDER. See CRIMINAL LAW, 11-17.
NEGLIGENCE. See DAMAGES, 1, 2; ELEVATORS, 1, 2; MASTER AND SERV-
ANT, 4, 5; PLEADING, 1; RAILROADS, 1, 3, 4; STREET RAILROADS, 1–8.
1. If the jury can fairly find from the evidence that, without contributory
negligence on the part of the injured person, the neglect of a statu-
tory duty was the proximate cause of the injury, negligence exists
as matter of law. (Following Capital Traction Co. v. Apple, 34
App. D. C. 567.) Ewing v. Chase, 53.
2. The proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact for
the jury. If there are no circumstances from which a jury can rea-
sonably find that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate
cause of the injury, the question is one for the court. If the facts are
such as to cause reasonable minds to differ, the question is one for
the determination of the jury. Munsey v. Webb, 185.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. See BILLS AND NOTES.
NEW TRIAL. See CRIMINAL LAW, 36.
NOTICE. See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 8, 9; JUDICIAL NOTICE; JU-
DICIAL SALES, 1; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1; PLEADING, 2; STREET
RAILROADS, 2.
One who practises bad faith will not be permitted to invoke the doc-
trine of constructive notice in aid of his wrongdoing, unless negli-
gence on the part of the injured party has supervened. Adriaans v.
Dill, 59.
NOTICE TO QUIT. See AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE, 1; LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT, 2.
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. See PATENTS, 38; TRIAL, 11.
OFFICERS. See ARMY AND NAVY, 1; BRIBERY, 1; INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION; MANDamus, 1–5.
1. A general power of appointment to an executive office or employment
carries with it the implied power to discharge the appointee with-
out notice or hearing; and any restriction upon the power must be
created by positive provisions of the law. Rudolph v. United States
ex rel. Gillott, 455.
2. Quare, whether the accounting officers of the Treasury Department have
the power to reopen and review the decisions of their predecessors,
except when, by reason of mistake or ignorance of fact, it would
be clearly inequitable and unjust that the decision should stand.
U. S. ex rel. Todd v. Gongwer, 555.
OPINIONS AS EVIDENCE. See CRIMINAL Law, 31.
PARTIES. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 4, 13; BILLS AND NOTES, 2; EXECUTORS
AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2, 3.
PARTITION. See EQUITY, 3; TENANTS IN COMMON, 1.
While a bill for partition cannot be made the means of trying a dis-
puted title, jurisdiction will be entertained of a suit in equity against
an executrix and widow, for the sale of land and division of the
proceeds among the heirs, without dower to the widow, where there
are no disputed questions of fact, the real question involved being
the interpretation of the will, and no objection to the jurisdiction is.
made by the parties. Taylor v. Leesnitzer, 356.
PARTNERSHIP. See TRADEMARKS, 9.
1. Where parties advertise as partners and use a partnership name, they
become partners by estoppel as to third persons dealing with them
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