44 Findings of Fact have obtained at any time by certifying that the goods would be used as scrap rags. The fact seems to be that when King's hope of quickly reselling the goods to the Columbia Waste Material Company was disappointed, he was unwilling to pay $1,866.29 or any other large sum to obtain possession of the $21.15 worth of goods he had purchased. The erroneous classification of the goods and the consequent overcharge of freight was not the reason for King's failure to pay the charges. And even if there had been a wrongful conversion, which there was not, there is no evidence that the goods were worth more than the plaintiff obtained for them by its sale at public auction. The Government has filed a contingent claim against the Columbia Waste Material Company, and against King, asserted to be the agent of the Columbia Company, asking that if any judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the Government, a judgment for the same amount be rendered in favor of the Government against Columbia and King. As to Columbia there is no evidence that King was its agent in the transaction or that Columbia was involved in any way in the transaction. The Government's claim against Columbia is therefore dismissed. King, by his direction, was the consignee of the goods, and, as between him and the Government, was obligated to pay the freight. The plaintiff may have a judgment against the United States for $966.63. The United States may have a judgment for the same amount against King. It is so ordered. LARAMORE, Judge; WHITAKER, Judge; LITTLETON, Judge; and JONES, Chief Judge, concur. FINDINGS OF FACT The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Commissioner Marion T. Bennett, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows: 1. Plaintiff, a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier by railroad of passengers and freight. Its principal office is in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Findings of Fact 131 C. Cls. 2. Upon motions made by the defendant and allowed by the court, Mr. Michael King and Columbia Waste Material Company, both of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were made parties to this proceeding. Columbia Waste Material Company is a corporation engaged in the buying and selling of surplus and waste textile material, particularly wool. Mr. King buys and sells merchandise of any kind. 3. On June 28, 1948, the defendant, represented by the Quartermaster Supply Section, Utah General Distribution Depot, United States Army, at Ogden, Utah, sold to Michael King, trading as Aaton Company, P. O. Box 9336, 5719 Addison Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, one lot of surplus filter pads, later designated to be wool filters, for the price of $21.15. The purchase price for the filter pads was paid to the defendant by Mr. King on July 7, 1948. Title to the filter pads passed to the purchaser on payment of the purchase price. The Aaton Company was the trade name of a single proprietorship of which King, contingent defendant in this action, was the principal. 4. Mr. King tried unsuccessfully to sell the materials he had purchased to someone in Ogden, Utah. On or about August 15, 1948, he spoke to Mr. Nathan Goldberg, President of the Columbia Waste Material Company, and attempted to negotiate a sale of the lot of wool filters. No details were agreed upon as to price, delivery, freight or quantity, although based on the samples shown by King, Mr. Goldberg of the Columbia Company expressed interest. 5. Mr. Vard L. Hurst, as the Transportation Agent of the Salvage Branch of the Utah Distribution Depot, United States Army, Ogden, Utah, at the direction of his superiors who were acting at the request of King to ship the filters by railroad to the Aaton Company, Philadelphia, delivered to the Union Pacific Company the lot of surplus property consisting of wool filters. 6. Pursuant to the bill of lading, the Union Pacific Company, and its connections, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and the plaintiff, in August 1948, transported one carload of the surplus property in car RI-25361 to Philadelphia. The property was shipped under commercial bill of lading (Union Pacific 44 Findings of Fact Waybill No. UP-883) with Aaton Company, Philadelphia, as consignee. 7. The nonrecourse clause of the commercial bill of lading was executed by Hurst, in his capacity described in finding 5, as consignor. The clause read as follows: Subject to Section 7 of Conditions, if this shipment is to be delivered to the consignee without recourse on the consignor, the consignor shall sign the following statement: The carrier shall not make delivery of this shipment without payment of freight and all other lawful charges. Section 7 of the terms and conditions of this uniform bill of lading is as follows: SEC. 7. The owner or consignee shall pay the freight and average, if any, and all other lawful charges accruing on said property; but, except in those instances where it may lawfully be authorized to do so, no carrier by railroad shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of the property covered by this bill of lading until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid. The consignor shall be liable for the freight and all other lawful charges, except that if the consignor stipulates, by signature, in the space provided for that purpose on the face of this bill of lading that the carrier shall not make delivery without requiring payment of such charges and the carrier, contrary to such stipulation, shall make delivery without requiring such payment, the consignor (except as hereinafter provided) shall not be liable for such charges. Provided, that, where the carrier has been instructed by the shipper or consignor to deliver said property to a consignee other than the shipper or consignor, such consignee shall not be legally liable for transportation charges in respect of the transportation of said property (beyond those billed against him at the time of delivery for which he is otherwise liable) which may be found to be due after the property has been delivered to him, if the consignee (a) is an agent only and has no beneficial title in said property, and (b) prior to delivery of said property has notified the delivering carrier in writing of the fact of such agency and absence of beneficial title, and, in the case of a shipment reconsigned or diverted to a point other than that specified in the original bill of lading, has also notified the delivering carrier in writing of the name and address of the beneficial owner of said prop Findings of Fact 131 C. Cls. erty; and, in such cases the shipper or consignor, or, in the case of a shipment so reconsigned or diverted, the beneficial owner, shall be liable for such additional charges. If the consignee has given to the carrier erroneous information as to who the beneficial owner is, such consignee shall himself be liable for such additional charges. On shipments reconsigned or diverted by an agent who has furnished the carrier in the reconsignment or diversion order with a notice of agency and the proper name and address of the beneficial owner, and where such shipments are refused or abandoned at ultimate destination, the said beneficial owner shall be liable for all legally applicable charges in connection therewith. If the reconsignor or diverter has given to the carrier erroneous information as to who the beneficial owner is, such reconsignor or diverter shall himself be liable for all such charges. If a shipper or consignor of a shipment of property (other than a prepaid shipment) is also the consignee named in the bill of lading and, prior to the time of delivery, notifies, in writing, a delivering carrier by railroad (a) to deliver such property at destination to another party, (b) that such party is the beneficial owner of such property, and (c) that delivery is to be made to such party only upon payment of all transportation charges in respect of the transportation of such property, and delivery is made by the carrier to such party without such payment, such shipper or consignor shall not be liable (as shipper, consignor, consignee, or otherwise) for such transportation charges but the party to whom delivery is so made shall in any event be liable for transportation charges billed against the property at the time of such delivery, and also for any additional charges which may be found to be due after delivery of the property, except that if such party prior to such delivery has notified in writing the delivering carrier that he is not the beneficial owner of the property, and has given in writing to such delivering carrier the name and address of such beneficial owner, such party shall not be liable for any additional charges which may be found to be due after delivery of the property; but if the party to whom delivery is made has given to the carrier erroneous information as to the beneficial owner, such party shall nevertheless be liable for such additional charges. If the shipper or consignor has given to the delivering carrier erroneous information as to who the beneficial owner is, such shipper or consignor shall himself be liable for such transportation charges, not 44 Findings of Fact withstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph and irrespective of any provisions to the contrary in the bill of lading or in the contract of transportation under which the shipment was made. The term "delivering carrier" means the line-haul carrier making ultimate delivery. Nothing herein shall limit the right of the carrier to require at time of shipment the prepayment or guarantee of the charges. If upon inspection it is ascertained that the articles shipped are not those described in this bill of lading, the freight charges must be paid upon the articles actually shipped. 8. The carriers, including the plaintiff, had no knowledge of the transactions, the terms and conditions of the contract of sale, or the communications between the defendant and the purchaser until after the shipment was completed. With respect to the shipment and the circumstances surrounding it, the carriers, including the plaintiff, had only the bill of lading upon which to rely. 9. An arrival notice was sent to the consignee on September 9, 1948. The organization known as the Aaton Company could not be located and the arrival notice was returned to plaintiff by the postal authorities. 10. On September 11, 1948, in response to an inquiry by the plaintiff, the freight agent of the Union Pacific Company telegraphed plaintiff to contact King, who had ordered the shipment. 11. On September 13, 1948, plaintiff wrote Michael King, notifying him that car RI-25361 had arrived. It was shortly thereafter that plaintiff gave notice to Mr. Goldberg of Columbia Waste Material Company that the merchandise was available for his inspection at the siding. 12. Upon inspection of the car by Goldberg, it was discovered that the wool filters were packed and crated in wooden boxes which would necessitate such handling and labor charges as would preclude any possibility of profit on the part of Columbia Waste Material Company if it purchased the product. Inspection further revealed that the carload contained lace, masks and other discarded Government materials different from samples shown by King and different from what the Columbia Company had handled in the past. Mr. King and employees of plaintiff were |