SUIT FOR SALARY-Continued
It is held, on the facts, that it is not so required in the instant case. Id. Administrative Law and Procedure
229.
V. In the instant case, plaintiff, accused of taking lumber from the Navy Yard, was discharged on September 18, 1952. He had been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be discharged but had not done so. On separation he was notified of his right to appeal, either directly to the Civil Service Commission or through military channels. He elected to appeal to the military authorities and his separation was approved on appcal, except that the Grievance Review Board, Civilian Person- nel, in view of plaintiff's excellent record, rec- ommended his restoration to duty as of a current date. He was restored to duty August 3, 1953. The instant suit is for pay during the period of his separation, 320 days. Id.
United States 39 (11).
VI. On the showing made, on the motions for summary judgment, where it is determined that the penalty imposed by plaintiff's separation was a departure from fair dealing and tolerable personnel policy, with reference to a veteran with an excellent record, it is held that the action of the Review Board was arbitrary and unfair and should be set aside. Id. Officers 72 (1).
VII. Where it is found that a suspension of 30 days without pay would have been sufficient punishment for the offense with which plaintiff was charged, it is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover for his wrongful suspense for 290 days. Judgment suspended. Id. United States 39 (8).
VIII. Plaintiff, a veteran, brings suit to recover back pay al- leged to be due him because of the failure of the Gen- eral Services Administration to reemploy him in conformity with an order of restoration by the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act, which order subsequently was vacated on appeal. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the petition is dismissed. Roberts, 108.
United States
39 (11).
SUIT FOR SALARY-Continued
IX. Under the Regulations of the Civil Service Commission (5 C. F. R. 22.11 (e)) the Commission has the author- ity, within its discretion, to entertain a request from either party to reopen an appeal, if the request is made within a reasonable time. Id.
X. In the instant case, where it is shown that an order of restoration was received by the agency on August 26, and on September 4, plaintiff was informed by the Commission that the agency was appealing the decision, it is held that the request of the agency was timely made. Id.
XI. It is held, further, that the Commission, under the applicable regulation, was fully authorized to enter- tain the agency's request to reopen the appeal and the Commission's subsequent final decision with- drawing the restoration order served to eliminate plaintiff's grounds for recovery in the Court of Claims. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied. Id.
XII. Where plaintiff, entitled to veteran's preference, sues for loss of salary arising from his dismissal as a Civil Service employee in the Public Health Service Hospi- tal in Fort Worth, and where it is shown that in his discharge and on appeal all procedural requirements were substantially complied with, including 30 days notice; it is held that plaintiff is not entitled to re- cover except for 30 days when he was placed on annual leave without pay. Taylor, 387.
XIII. Where plaintiff was placed on annual leave for the period of the 30 days notice, and was deprived of his pay during that period; it is held that plaintiff was entitled as of right to pay for the period of annual leave, and plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount due. Id.
XIV. There is no provision in the statute which permits en- forced leave, covering the period of 30 days notice, to be charged against an employee's annual leave, without pay, where he has sufficient annual leave to his credit.
SUIT FOR SALARY-Continued
XV. Where plaintiff sues for salary of the position from which he was separated, alleging that he was wrong- fully separated from his civil service position in a reduction in force, it is held, on all the evidence, that no legal wrong was involved in the treatment which plaintiff received, and of which he complains, and he is not entitled to recover.
XVI. Plaintiff in 1932 began work for the New Orleans Dis- trict, Corps of Engineers, War Department, as foreman of an asphalt plant. He was a temporary employee, not under civil service. In 1933 civil service status was accorded to the type of position which plaintiff held. In 1946 he was made a general foreman, Flood Control, Grade 23, a wage board position within the classified civil service. United States 39 (13).
XVII. In August 1950, by reason of a faulty fuel feed system on his unit, plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff requested a grievance hearing, alleging gross neglect on the part of the Chief, Operations Division. The Dis- trict Engineer appointed a grievance board but with instructions that plaintiff's request for disci- plinary action was not a proper subject for the board's consideration. Plaintiff then cancelled his request for the hearing because of the limitations imposed. Thereafter, plaintiff claimed that, because of his charges, his superiors became prejudiced against him and that his later separation was the result of that prejudice. Upon consideration of all the evidence and in view of all the facts and circum- stances brought out by the testimony, it is held that plaintiff's charge of prejudice is not sustained. Id. United States 39 (13).
XVIII. Further, it is held that plaintiff's separation in 1951, in a reduction in force, was justified by all the facts and circumstances of the case, as shown by the evidence. Id.
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XIX. Further, it is held that in effecting plaintiff's separation all procedural requirements were met and oppor- tunity for appeal was accorded. There is no basis for concluding that his separation was arbitrary, capricious or actuated by malice. Id. Officers 72 (1).
SUIT FOR SALARY-Continued
XX. Where plaintiff, a Civil Service employee, between September 9, 1947, and May 24, 1952, was employed as a correctional officer at the Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson, West Virginia, sues for night differential and overtime pay for overtime duty, it is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover under the provisions of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, as amended. Farley, 776.
United States 39 (4).
XXI. The Federal Employees Pay Act (5 U. S. C. 911, 912, 921) requires the payment of overtime, in addition to basic compensation, for all hours of employment officially ordered or approved in excess of 40 hours per week, and provides, further, for 10 percent additional in excess of the basic rate of compensation when the overtime work is performed between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. Id.
United States 39 (4).
XXII. In the instant case, each correctional officer, such as the plaintiff, was required to work regularly five days each week, eight hours per day, a total of 40 hours per week. In addition each officer was re- quired to remain on duty two nights one week and three nights the alternate week. No compensation was paid for this overnight service, which amounted to an average of 43 hours for each 2-week period. It is held that this night work was a duty assignment and was in excess of the 40-hour regular weekly per- formance of duty, for which overtime the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Id.
United States 39 (4).
XXIII. While simple conditions of employment, such as wear- ing of a uniform or badge, may properly be made without incurring an obligation for extra compensa- tion, it is held that an agreement to work overtime without pay cannot be enforced contrary to the clear provisions of the statute limitng the work- week to 40 hours and providing overtime pay for extra duty. Id.
United States 39 (4).
SURPLUS PROPERTY.
See Transportation of Freight I, II, III, IV, V.
TANKER "BLUE SUNOCO".
See Report To Congress I, II, III.
I. (1) Plaintiff, during the taxable years 1944, 1945, 1946, and 1947, filed his individual income tax returns on the cash receipts and disbursement bases of account- ing. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue made a deficiency assessment for each of these years, using the increase in net worth computation method. The Commissioner collected the deficiency for each year, together with penalty and interest, and plaintiff in turn filed a timely claim for refund. It is held that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the deficiency, penalty and interest collected for the fiscal year 1944, with interest as provided by law. Jacobs, 1.
Internal Revenue 1288.
II. (2) Under the applicable statutes, the Commissioner is permitted to use another method of ascertaining the taxpayer's taxable income where the method used by the taxpayer in his return does not clearly reflect his income. It is held that in the circum- stances of the instant case the Commissioner's use of the net worth method was proper. Id. Internal Revenue 1288.
III. (3) The determine tion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is prima facie correct unless arbitrary, capricious or excessive, and the burden is upon the taxpayer to show that the tax assessed is not due. Id.
Internal Revenue 1307.
IV. (4) In the years 1945, 1946, and 1947 the net worth computation is approved where the taxpayer did not show that the increase of his net worth from his furniture business, returns on his investments and market transactions in that period was not due to unreported income.
Id.
Internal Revenue 1288.
V. (5) For the fiscal year ending October 31, 1944, it is held that the Commissioner did not prove that the taxpayer had understated his income by more than 25 percent. When the Commissioner made his assessments for that year the normal 3-year statute of limitations had expired and the Commissioner was relying on the 5-year statute of limitations where the taxpayer has understated his income by more than 25 percent. In such case the burden of
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