Attainder and ex post facto? Define Bill of Attainder? him, it is at the same time imperatively his duty to obey the process of the United States, to hold the person in custody under it, and to refuse obedience to the marshal or process of any other government. And, consequently, it is his duty not to take the prisoner, or suffer him to be taken, before a State judge, or court, upon a habeas corpus under State authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any authority to interfere with him or to require him to be brought before them. And if the authority of a State, under form of judicial process or otherwise, should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or agent of the United States in any respect, in the custody of his prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it and call to his aid any force that might be necessary to maintain the authority of the law against illegal interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violation. (United States v. Booth, 21 How. 526?") Stanbery in Gormley's Case; 1 Kent's Com. 32, 11th Edition, note 1. This general language is to be confined to process issued by the United States courts, not to any other kind of imprisonment. (Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 284.) Stanbery. It was the duty of Commodore Selfridge to produce the body of the marine. Id. The decision of the Secretary of the Navy was revoked, and the Commodore ordered to obey the writ of the Court. of Quarter Sessions of Pennsylvania. New York Herald of 7th Oct., 1867. [3.] No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 142. A BILL OF ATTAINDER is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a legal trial. And it includes bills of pains and penalties. (Story's Const. § 1344.) Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 4 Wallace, 323. They may be directed against individuals or a whole class. Id. And inflict punishment absolutely or conditionally. Id. Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana, 510. Give exam- 19. The test oath required of Attorneys (note 242) of the courts of the United States, partakes of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and it is subject to the constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder, under which general designation they are included. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 377; H. Stanbery's Opinion of 24th May, 1867, p. 14. In Cummings v. The State, (4 Wallace, 326), we considered the meaning of a bill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clause of the Constitution forbidding their passage by the States, and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said. A like listed in the navy? The laws of Pennsylvania in relation to the writ of Habeas When for Corpus reviewed. Opinion of Attorney-General, Henry Stanbery persons enin Gormley's case, 6th Oct., 1867. And also the several acts of Congress of 1789, 1833, 1842, and 1863, upon the subject of Habeas Corpus. None of these acts declare the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to be exclusive of the State courts. Id. From an examination of the acts of 1789, 1806, 1809, 1820, 1837, 1845, and July 1, 1864, it appears that minors between the ages of thirteen and eighteen may be enlisted in the navy with the consent of their parents or guardians, to serve until the age of twenty-one years; and that minors above eighteen years may be enlisted without such consent. Id. The weight of authority is in favor of the power of the State courts to hear the application of enlisted persons or persons held by United States authority, and to discharge or remand them. Id. The production of the body is the life of the writ. Id. But judicial convictions and sentences by the United States courts are exceptions to the rule. Neither the regularity nor validity of the proceedings can be called in question by any other court, State or Federal, by habeas corpus. (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 526.) Stanbery's opinion in Gormley's Case. State "We do not question the authority of a State court or judge, who Define the is authorized by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas demarcation between the corpus, to issue it in any case where the party is imprisoned within powers of its territorial limits, provided it does not appear when the applica- United tion is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under States and authority of the United States. The court or judge has a right to Courts? inquire into this mode of proceeding for what cause and by what authority the prisoner is confined within the territorial limits of the State sovereignty. And it is the duty of the marshal or other person having the custody of the prisoner, to make known to the judge or court, by a proper return, the authority by which he holds him in custody. This right to inquire, by means of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, grows necessarily out of the complex character of our government, and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its power, and each, within its own sphere of action, prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other. But after the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and under the jurisdiction of another government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus or any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offense against their laws, they alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their tribunals can release him and afford him redress. And although, as we have said, it is the duty of the marshal, or other person holding him, to make known by a proper return the authority under which he detains Attainder him, it is at the same time imperatively his duty to obey the process of the United States, to hold the person in custody under it, and to refuse obedience to the marshal or process of any other government. And, consequently, it is his duty not to take the prisoner, or suffer him to be taken, before a State judge, or court, upon a habeas corpus under State authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any authority to interfere with him or to require him to be brought before them. And if the authority of a State, under form of judicial process or otherwise, should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or agent of the United States in any respect, in the custody of his prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it and call to his aid any force that might be necessary to maintain the authority of the law against illegal interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violation. (United States v. Booth, 21 How. 526?") Stanbery in Gormley's Case; 1 Kent's Com. 32, 11th Edition, note 1. This general language is to be confined to process issued by the United States courts, not to any other kind of imprisonment. (Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 284.) Stanbery. It was the duty of Commodore Selfridge to produce the body of the marine. Id. The decision of the Secretary of the Navy was revoked, and the Commodore ordered to obey the writ of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Pennsylvania. New York Herald of 7th Oct., 1867. [3.] No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall and ex post be passed. facto? Define Bill of Attainder? Give exam 142. A BILL OF ATTAINDER is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a legal trial. And it includes bills of pains and penalties. (Story's Const. § 1344.) Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 4 Wallace, 323. They may be directed against individuals or a whole class. Id. And inflict punishment absolutely or conditionally. Id. Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana, 510. The Constitution of Missouri, which required an expurgatory ple of such? oath of all priests, teachers, &c., was in effect, a bill of attainder. Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 323, 325. 19. The test oath required of Attorneys (note 242) of the courts of the United States, partakes of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and it is subject to the constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder, under which general designation they are included. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 377; H. Stanbery's Opinion of 24th May, 1867, p. 14. In Cummings v. The State, (4 Wallace, 326), we considered the meaning of a bill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clause of the Constitution forbidding their passage by the States, and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said. A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution against enactments of this kind by Congress. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 378. cers? Attorneys and counsellors are not officers of the United States. Are attorId. They are officers of the court, and hold during good behavior, neys offiand can only be deprived of their offices for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court, after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. (Ex parte Heyfron, 7 Howard, Mississippi, 127; Fletcher v. Dangerfield, 20 California, 430.) Id. Their appointments and removal are judicial acts, and they can only be deprived of the right for moral and professional delinquency. (In the matter of the application of Henry W. Cooper, 22 New York (8 Smith), 81; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9.) Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 379. The removal cannot be effected by an act of Congress requiring new qualifications. (Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wallace, 329.) Ex purte Garland, 4 Wallace, 380. Such laws are forbidden both to Congress and the States. Id. 386. In the opinion by Mr. Justice Miller, expressing the dissent of What was Chief-Justice Chase, Justices Davis, Swayne, aud himself, he the dissent? defines " ATTAINDER," in the language of Sir Thomas Tomlins, as "the stain or corruption of blood of a criminal capitally condemned; the immediate and inseparable consequence of the common law, on the pronouncing the sentence of death." Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 387. Bills or acts of attainder were laws which declared certain persons attainted, and their blood corrupted, so that it had lost all heritable quality. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 387. States? The power to pass attainders is forbidden in this section to Con- Is the power gress, in section nine to the States, and in section three of article forbidden to III., it is declared that no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person 159. attainted. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 387, 388. tainders at Attainders were convictions and sentences pronounced by the Define atlegislative department, instead of the judicial; the sentence pro- common nounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no law? previous law or fixed rule; the investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any were made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence, or that of the counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry. (Story's Const. § 1344.) Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 389. (A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or both. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 138; 1 Kent's Com. Lect. 19, p. 382.) The act of Congress and the Constitution of Missouri, requiring expurgatory oaths, do not come within the definitions, and are not bills of attainder. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 388. They designate no criminal, either by name or description, declare no guilt, pronounce no sentence and inflict no punishment, and can, in no sense, be bills of attainder. Justice Miller in ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 390. See 2 Woodeson's Lectures, 622 624. 18. 143. 143. Ex post facto laws are such as create or aggravate crime, Define ex or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence for the post facto? purpose of conviction. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390; Cummings v. 156. Give an example? 18. 122. Missouri, 4 Wallace, 326; Shepherd v. People, 25 N. Y. 406. The phrase only applies to penal and criminal laws, which inflict forfeitures or punishment, and not to civil proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 463; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 138; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 138; United States v. Hall, 2 Wash. C. C. 366; Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 271; Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wallace, 173. There is nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress to pass laws violating the obligation of contracts, though such a power is denied to the States. Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 323; Mayer v. Knight, 27 Tex. 719; Paschal's Annotated Digest, note 220, p. 91, and note 157, p. 42. An ex post facto law renders an act punishable in a manner it was not punishable when committed. (Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138.) Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wallace, 326. An act repealing a law on which a grant rests and annulling the title, is, in effect, an ex post facto law. Idem. The Constitution of Missouri, which disqualified all persons who had aided in the rebellion or sympathized with the rebels, unless they took an expurgatory oath, was in effect an ex post jacto law. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wallace, 327. Some of the things enumerated in the oath were not offenses when committed; and therefore are within the definition of an ex post facto law. "They impose a punishment for an act not punishable at the time it was committed." Id. So the clauses which imposed a further penalty was ex post facto, because "they impose additional punishment to that prescribed when the act was committed." (Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138.) Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wallace, 328. (For the Missouri oath, see Constitution of Missouri, Article II., 1 New York Convention Manual, p. 348.) This provision to secure the liberty of the citizen, cannot be evaded by the form in which the power of the State is exerted. Id. In the cases of Cummings and Garland, Mr. Justice Miller declass of cases livered the dissentient opinion for Chief-Justice Chase, Justices does ex post facto only Davis, Swayne, and himself. He held that all the cases agree, that apply? the term ex post facto is to be applied to criminal and penal cases alone, and not to civil proceedings. (Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 266; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380.) Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 390, 391. To what 159. 238. 158. They make acts done before the passage of the law, and which were innocent when done, criminal, and punish such actions; or change the punishment and inflict greater punishment than the law annexes to the crime when committed; or they alter the rules of evidence and receive less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense. (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.) Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 391; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 325, 326; Shepherd v. People, 25 N. Y. (11 Smith) 406. The true distinction, is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws. (Calder v. Bull.) Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 391. The minority held that the test oath to attorneys in the act of |