Elements of the Art of War.

37. The infantry regiments of the reserve will march first over the bridges (for in such a case there must always be more than one), and they will be followed by those of the second line, with a considerable part of the heavy cannon and all the howitzers. When the passage of these regiments is completed, they must post themselves opposite the flanks of the first line, and the ar tillery must gain such a situation as will enable it to cover them, and at the same time to rake the ground in front. This is a matter of great importance, and an advantage which cannot be gained, except by making choice of a large bend in the river. The infantry regiments of the first line must then begin to retreat froin both wings, while those in the centre and the cavalry keep draw ing themselves by degrees towards the bridges, that their flanks may be constantly appuyed to the river. The fire from the opposite side must also become heavier as the front diminishes, otherwise the enemy may fall upon the last regiments and drive them into the water. At the conclusion of the retreat, the few remaining battalions must form themselves into columns, and continue their fire till they are upon the bridges, when they will either cut away two or three of the last pontoons or set them on fire. These battalions are usually chosen on account of their known courage and good conduct.

38. The cavalry, or, at all events, some regiments of dragoons, must remain near the last battalions till they are upon the bridges, and then swim over the river.

59. Such an undertaking cannot but be attended with much difficulty and the loss of many lives, particularly when it is exe. cuted in the day time; and, perhaps, the last regiments must be altogether sacrificed. Therefore, whenever it is possible, re trenchments and tetes de pont ought to be thrown by for the security of the army; and, if the enemy be near us, half or twothirds of the infantry should remain under arms, while the rest are at work.

40. These retrenchments may either be inclosed, or they may consist merely of detached works or redoubts. In this case the army must throw up as many fleches along its front as the nature

Elements of the Art of War

of the country or the position of the enemy may require, and then join them together with parapets.

41. Whenever there is a wood near the river, one wing of the army should be posted in it, and defended by single or double abs batis, because the formation of them is less troublesome than that of works, and they give the troops at the same time a favourable opportunity of retiring from one to the other, and of crossing the river without being either discovered or pursued by the enemy.

42. When the retrenchments are completed in front of the army, the bridges must be formed, and each of them defended by a convenient tete de pont with two sorties.

43. The baggage must be sent first, and if the opposite side of the river should not be in our possession, it must be attended by a strong escort of infantry and cavalry, to secure it from the attacks of any of the enemy's cavalry that may have been sent through the river for that purpose.

44. As soon as we have sent over all those things, which are either likely to be useless or troublesome in case of an attack, considerable part of the cannon and howitzers must follow, and take post according to the rules laid down in the 37th paragraph.

45. When this is done, one part of the second line or reserve must defend the tetes de pont, while the other marches through them over the bridges and posts itself along the banks and be tween the batteries, for the support of the first line. The first line must then face about, and keep up a constant retreating fire, provided the enemy should follow; and when it arrives near the works, the different battalions must break off, to allow the troops within to act with vigour, and afterwards post themselves between them in as many small lines as the nature of the ground may require. These lines will also begin their retreat from the rear, through the tetes de pont and over the bridges, and as soon as they have gained the opposite bank they will take the most advantageous positions. When all these troops have passed the river, the battalions of the second line or reserve, which have been in possession of the tetes de pont, will retreat over the bridges, leaving only a few men with some pieces of cannon, who must necessarily fall into the bands of the enemy.

Elements of the Art of War.

46. The bridge itself may be wheeled to the shore; but as it has been found by experience that this is not to be done without much difficulty, br, indeed, seldom with success, it will in ge neral be more adviseable to cut them away or destroy them. While the bridge is moving away, the soldiers who remain be hind must fill the entrances into the tetes de pont with wood or fascines steeped with pitch; and when they have set them on fire they must take refuge in the boats or pontoons, and endeavour to gain the opposite shore in the best manner they are able. Sometimes ropes are fixed to them for that purpose, and in that case a few men can easily draw them acros the river.

47. As inclosed lines are not to be formed without much labour and difficulty, and are, after all, easily penetrated, I should rather give the preference to detached works. I would also add a circle of redoubts in the rear of the army where the passage is intended to be made, and each bridge should be covered by a small tete de pont with two convenient entrances.

48. If detached works are made use of to cover our passage of a river, they must be well occupied, and the remaining battalions posted in one or more lines in the intervals between the first chain of redoubts. When the retreat is begun, the rear lines march first through the tetes de pont, and over the bridges, and, as soon as they are formed, the battalions of the first line follow them. The works which compose the first chain are then abandoned from both ends towards the centre, that the batteries on the opposite side of the river may keep off the enemy, in case he should attempt to break in upon either of the flanks, or to attack those in the rear. The second chain is also quitted in the same manner.

ART OF WAR.-PART FOURTH.-STRATEGY. BEING MILITARY ESSAYS ON THE ART OF WAR AS RESPECTS THE DUTIES OF COMMANDERS, &c.

On magazines, considered as the basis of military operations in modern warfare.

The modern system of war originates, in a great measure, from the composition or organization of our armies, and from the great variety of wants arising from that organization. Numberless

Elements of the Art of War.

horses are required for the conveyance of ammunition, that is, powder and balls. Each company has an ammunition-cart or waggon, drawn by two, three, or four horses; the lightest field piece requires at least two horses, and twelve pounders and other pieces of heavy ordnance from six to twelve horses. Further, to each piece of ordnance is attached a caisson or ammunition-cart, and the cumbersomeness originating from thence is still more increased by the injudicious management of the provisions of modern armies. In our opinion, it is evident, for instance, that bread should be universally replaced by biscuit, in which case the soldiers would be able to carry with them provisions for a longer time; there would be no occasion for field ovens, and the whole train of bakers, &c. which continually follow the army; the flour transports from the magazine to the field ovens would cease; and, lastly, a waggon with biscuit would carry provisions for a longer time than another laden with bread or flour.

The baggage of our modern armies is immense, and so is the number of horses necessary for its removal from one place to another. Every commissioned officer, even of the lowest rank, carries with him his bed, beddings, &c, Every officer of rank has his saddle-horses, as well as an officer of horse. All this renders a modern army an unwieldy ridiculous mass, with which it is nevertheless intended to perform great enterprises.

The cavalry, which in modern times has been so considerably augmented, perhaps not without reason, greatly increases the number of horses, and all these numerous animals, which in our climate cannot be replaced by others equally useful and less expensive, require large quantities of hay, straw, and oats, for their food, and these articles demand much room, and are liable to be spoiled by dampness and moisture. They must, therefore, be stored up in large buildings fit to shield them from wetness, and io must flour, ammunition, in short, nearly every article of conumption which an army stands in need of. It will hardly be necessary to mention, that the numerous draught and bat horses require a considerable number of waggoners, bat-men, and attendants, and that, of consequence, the increased consumption of pre

VOL. II. NO 9.

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Elements of the Art of War.

vender is attended with a proportionate increase of the consumption of provisions.

In the warfare of small states, their armies might no doubt do well without a magazine; but as the European powers now take the field with two, nay three hundred thousand men, it is evident that armies so numerous and so organized cannot for any length of time be subsisted by mere foraging in an enemy's country, but that, on the coutrary, it is indispensably necessary to resort to magazines, well stored with ammunition, provisions, provender, &c.

We make no doubt but that the wants of armies might be considerably reduced, for instance, by substituting biscuit in the stead of bread, by inducing subaltern officers to take the field with less baggage, by allowing fewer officers' servants, and by, reducing the retinue and equipage of generals and field officers to ■ smaller compass. All this, we conceive, might be done; it would render our modern armies less unwieldy and expensive than they are at present, but not altogether independent of large magazines, which would nevertheless be required for the sustenance both of men and horses. In order to produce any change on this head, it would be necessary considerably to decrease the strength of our armies and the number of horse, to discontinue almost entirely the use of artillery, to arm the infantry with pikes instead of muskets, to substitute the system of thrusting and cutting instead of the modern systern of firing; in short, to resume the whole military system of the antients.

Now, such a reform would be an operation, not only requiring a great deal of precaution, but altogether impracticable, from the general opinion running strong against it. For supposing, for i moment, it were possible to dispense with the greatest part of our modern artillery, and to defeat with a weaker army, armed after the manner of the antients, a stronger body of troops, organised according to our present system, which remains at best very doubtful, the idea that our system of firing is superior to any other is so deeply rooted in the minds of men, that the general prejudice in favour of our modern artillery and small fire-arms would alone be sufficient to discourage troops armed after the manner of the antients, and to make them give way before a modern army.