dent introduced in evidence a settlement between the parties an account current in the handwriting of the libellant in which sundry promissory notes were credited and admitted as cash. This account was balanced, and, for the sum remaining due, a receipt in full was given, being expressed at the foot of the account as a payment by note, which was not produced or offered for cancellation. No evidence was introduced showing any understanding modifying or contradicting this receipt, and it was, of course, held, as in Allen v. King, prima facie evidence of payment. Besides, the original agreement, as shown by the account, certainly waived all lien upon the vessel.

Although a note under certain circumstances will not operate as an extinguishment of the debt, yet, when the creditor accompanies the act of receiving it in payment with the manifest intention to take it as his sole security, and not to look to the ship, such intention, clearly expressed or certainly implied, operates as an abandonment of the lien which the law gave him. Such an intention was not manifested in this case. There was no understanding to release the vessel. It is true that she was not yet attached by process; and it is true the clerk threatened it; but it is alike true that, at the interview between the clerk and the respondent, all the latter wanted was further time to pay the debt. The former wanted the money due; and, under these circumstances, the note was given and taken.

But if the note was not taken with the understanding that it was absolute payment, can it be inferred that it was received as additional security? If it was, it would not help the respondent's defence. He pleads payment, and relies upon a change of securities. The note was not a

higher security than the ship. Why, then, collateral, or why a change? There can be but one answer. The note was received to raise the money at the time for the mutual accommodation of the clerk and the respondent, by placing the former in possession of funds which he then needed, and extending to the latter further time to meet an acknowledged obligation then due. This intention of the parties is too obvious to be disregarded or overlooked. The one did not receive the note in discharge of the lien; the other did not give it with such an understanding. The intention must govern. The note was to be payment, if paid at maturity; if unpaid, all the relations of the parties as to the vessel and the debt, remained unchanged. The cir

cumstance, so ingeniously pressed, that the note was cashed, and the libellants thereby received the amount of the lien, (which then ceased and could not be revived,) does not materially vary the transaction, or exhibit a different intention. The note gave thirty days' time to the respondent. Until that time elapsed, the vessel could not be attached. Why? Certainly not because the debt was paid, or the lien waived, but because the note and its discount evidenced an understanding to await its maturity, and the default of the makers to meet it.

It was in proof that the note was discounted on the indorsement of the libellants. That it was never paid by the respondents, but by the former, fully appears by their present possession. The witness stated that the note was returned by the indorsees, who had cashed it in May last, and that the libellants were charged with the amount in their account current with the broker. In other words, the note, when due, was lifted by the libellants.

In cases of this description, the material man is not to be deprived of any of his remedies, except upon the most conclusive proof, that exclusive credit has been given to other security than the owner, the master, or the ship. Looking to either of the former, to the exclusion of the latter, releases the lien, but must be clearly established. In no case will either be released, except such was the manifest intention of the party. The maritime law guards, with most scrupulous care, its various subjects. The material man, the furnisher of supplies, and the mariner, are equally protected.

That credit was originally extended to the vessel in this case, is not questioned. The schedule appended to the answer, reads:

"Steam Boat Fashion,

"To MOORE & FOOTE, Dr. "To merchandise rendered on account."

To this the receipt is attached upon which the defence is based. So that the lien was in existence and recognized the day the note was given. There is no proof that it was ever waived no proof of an intention to waive it.

The court was forcibly impressed during the hearing with the fact that the instrument was negotiable, and had been discounted, and that, therefore, as the libellants had received the money, their relation to the vessel had ceased. But the subsequent production of the note, and its tender for cancellation, removed all difficulty as to sustaining

the lien. This note is not now outstanding. No innocent indorsee can be affected by the decree, nor can it be discovered how sustaining the libel on the principle stated will peril vessels hereafter by secret liens. The purchaser of a ship, or any vessel, afloat, purchases with the presumed knowledge of the existing legal responsibilities. The note and the lien cannot both be sustained. While the one is still current as cash, or outstanding, the other is without force or vitality; but, if the former is itself dead, and as waste paper, the legal existence of the latter is not impaired. Here, the ship contracted the debt. That debt never has been paid. The note was but a promise to pay -a broken promise. It was made and accepted with the sole view to an extension of time. Certainly in this tribunal, as a court of equity, the respondent cannot complain of being dealt with inequitably by a decree enforcing payment of the debt of the boat from the boat; a debt not denied, either in its character or amount.

Decree for the entire claim and costs, and the cancellation of the note on payment of the decree.

Alfred Russell, for libellants, Moore & Foote.
John S. Newberry, for respondent.

Miscellaneous Entelligence.

PERSONAL IDENTITY. It was stated yesterday in the Traveller, that on the testimony of the captain of a vessel and six of his crew, a man named James Guard, had been arrested by the police on the charge of attempting to rob a vessel, but was afterwards released on its appearing that he could not be the man, as on the night of the robbery he was safely slumbering in the watch house of the North End, where he had repaired for lodging. It was also stated, that on Monday night a body was found in the water at the end of Commercial wharf, which an officer of the North station testified before a coroner's jury was the body of the unfortunate James Guard, who but a night previous had been so falsely charged with crime, but who, nevertheless, appeared to have rather suddenly come to a tragic end.

The coroner's jury had no doubt, from the testimony of the officer, that the body was really that of James Guard, and they returned a verdict in accordance thereto, stating that "James Guard came to his death by accidental drowning." Thus the matter was deemed and considered to be settled, when last night, as the aforesaid officer sat meditating in his office at the station house upon matters connected, no doubt, with the city's

welfare, the door slowly opened, and what appeared to be the body of James Guard entered. In these days, a police officer is not apt to be a believer in ghosts, but, for a moment, thoughts of that character flitted through his brain. A request for lodgings, uttered in no ghostly tones, awakened him to a sense of reality and an explanation ensued, when it appeared that James Guard, who had been once charged with robbery, and on the oath of a coroner's jury with having been picked up drowned, was in reality alive and kicking, with sufficient love of the things of this world to receive with gratitude the gift of a soup ticket presented to him by the penitent police officer. Thus, the body now lying in the dead-house is not that of James Guard, but of some one who so closely resembled him as to have been mistaken for him by a dozen persons. It is, probably, fortunate for the living, that this "Dromio," who might have continued to work mischief for him, has really deceased. It is, certainly, a strong case of personal resemblance. Boston paper.

SWALLOWING A WRIT. In Newington Church is buried Mr. Serjeant Davy (d. 1780.) He was originally a chemist at Exeter, and a sheriff's officer coming to serve on him a process from the Court of Common Pleas, he civilly asked him to drink; while the man was drinking, Davy contrived to heat a poker, and then told the bailiff that if he did not eat the writ, which was of sheepskin and as good as mutton, he should swallow the poker! The man preferred the parchment; but the Court of Common Pleas, not then accustomed to Mr. Davy's jokes, sent for him to Westminsterhall, and for contempt of their process committed him to the Fleet Prison. From this circumstance, and some unfortunate man whom he met there, he acquired a taste for the law; and on his discharge he applied himself to the study of it in earnest, was called to the bar, made a serjeant, and was for a long time in good practice. - Timb's Curiosities of London.

"A CANDLE OF THE LORD." It is said that as an eminent member of the Suffolk Bar was cross-examining a witness the other day, he asked him what profession he followed for a livelihood? The witness replied, "I am a candle of the Lord, a minister of the gospel." "Of what denomination? asked the counsellor. "A Baptist.' "Then," said his questioner, you are a dipt, but I trust not a wick-ed candle."

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ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN FRANCE. -The following is an extract from the judgment of the First Chamber of the Civil Tribunal of the Seine, on this subject: "The Tribunal, having heard the conclusions and pleadings of Blondel, counsel, assisted by Ploeque, attorney for Abrahams; Quétand, counsel, assisted by Lacroix, attorney for Harris ; the conjoint conclusions of M. Marie, substitute for the Attorney-General; and after having deliberated conformably to law, judging in first resort: whereas article 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which ordains that judgments given by foreign tribunals shall not be capable of receiving execution in France, but so far as they shall have been declared executory by a French_tribunal, makes no distinction between judgments pronounced between French persons and foreigners, and those pronounced exclusively between foreigners; that there is reason to conclude from these general terms that the French tribunals take cognizance of all demands having for their object the obtaining the putting in execution in France a judgment emanating from foreign judges, whatever may be the nationality of the parties concerned. Whereas the obligation imposed on the French tribunals to exercise jurisdiction in such matters can never be considered as an attack upon their rights of examination and control; the thorough revision of the dispute which the tribunal before which it is brought makes, before

authorizing or refusing the execution of the judgment deferred to its decision, having precisely the effect of preventing all derogation from the preceding laws. Whereas, regarded in this light, a demand of the nature of that which is this day brought before the tribunal, does not present the features of a cause brought before it by one foreigner against another foreigner, -a cause which a French tribunal is always at liberty to accept or decline the cognizance of, - as those of a suit terminated by a definitive judgment pronounced in a foreign country between foreigners, judgment whereof the execution is demanded in France on these grounds: The tribunal declares itself competent, retains the cause, and is adjourned for a fortnight to be fully pleaded. Condemns Harris to the expenses of the incident payment whereof to Pleoque, who has required it. Given and judged by Messrs. Martel, President; Berthelin, Chauveau Lagarde, Coppeaux and Gallois, judges. In presence of M. Marie, substitute, 11th March, 1854.". Law Times.

Notices of New Books.

REPORTS OF CASES argued and determined in the Court of Common Pleas for the City and County of New York, with Notes, References, and an Index. By E. DELAFIELD SMITH, Counsellor at Law. Vol. 1. New York. Jacob R. Halsted, Law Bookseller and Publisher. 1855. pp. 871. The cases reported in this bulky volume, as we learn from the preface, commence mainly with those decided in 1850. A few decisions of earlier date are inserted, and the volume is brought down to Jan. 1853, the reports of cases under the New York lien law, including, however, all the decisions of the court in proceedings under the Act of 1851, which have had the concurrence of a majority of the court at general or special term to December, 1854. Judge Daly has contributed an account of the judicial tribunals of the State of New York from the time of its settlement, which we should think would be of much interest to all students of American or judicial history. The New York Court of Common Pleas is an important tribunal. Its jurisdiction is extensive and dignified, while the multitude of questions which must arise in the great centre of American trade, cannot fail to comprise many of interest in all quarters of the Union, and we think Mr. Smith has done good service in preserving the decisions of the court. His volume strikes us quite favorably from our hasty examination, and we recommend it to the profession, with the hope that he may be encouraged to continue his labors.

ENGLISH REPORTS IN LAW AND EQUITY, vol. xxv. ; containing cases in the House of Lords, the Privy Council, the Courts of Common Law, and the Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts, during the years 185354. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1855. pp. 674.

This useful series of Reports has reached its twenty-fifth volume. We notice that the English Court of Common Pleas has put a limit upon the curiosity of common carriers, by deciding in the case of Crouch v. The London and North Western Railway Co., p. 287, that they have no general right, in every case, and under all circumstances, to require to be informed of the contents of packages tendered to them to be carried. The case of Dansey