1. Under a proviso in a charterparty, that "the ship should lie at New York for tak- ing on board her cargo, and at London for delivering the same, twenty running days in the whole, if not sooner discharged,' the ship may be detained for these pur- poses seventy days at each place. Steven- son v. York. Page 578 2. The discharge of an outward bound cargo at a particular place, is not in general a condition precedent to the providing a re- turn cargo. A freighter, who covenants to load a return cargo, must, if he objects to the ship's delay in proceeding to take it on board, make the objection before he loads the cargo, and within a reasonable time, and must not, by any act, take to the ship. Olhsen v. Drummond.
CERTIORARI.
See COSTS, 15, 16.
See BANKRUPT, 1. OVERSEERS. 1. It is not necessary, on prisoner being brought up by habeas corpus, that the war- rant of commitment should state that the offence was feloniously done. It may be a sufficient ground for committing, and not bailing, though the ground would not be sufficient to convict. Rer v. Croker. 138 2. A commitment in execution for three months, on 12 Geo. 2. the Goldsmith's Company Act, for not paying penalties re- covered by judgment in an action, cannot be obtained till a fieri facias has been in- effectually issued. Biddle, qui tam. v. Ustonson. 139
COMMISSIONER OF AFFIDAVITS.
See BAIL, 34 to 38. COMMISSIONER OF SEWERS. See CERTIORARI, 4.
COMMON (RIGHT OF).
See PLEADING, 7.
COMPUTE (REFERENCE TO).
See ANNUITY, 1. BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 1.
COMPOSITION DEED.
See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
COMPROMISE. See COVENANT, 2. CONCEALMENT.
See INSURANCE.
CONDITION.
See PLEADING, 22.
CONSENT OF PARTIES TO ACTION.
See EJECTMENT, 1, 2. SETTING ASIDE PROCEEDINGS, 1.
See PLEADING, 32. TRADE, 1, 2. OFFICE, SALE OF.
See CRIMINAL INFORMATION, 2. INDICT- MENT, 2.
Constable seizing a person by direction of custom house officer, who had himself no power to seize, is not within protection of the Custom House Act, there being no pretence that he was acting within the scope of his duty. Norton v. Miller. 140
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT. See CONTRACT, 1, 2. CHARTERPARTY.--OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, see FISHERY. MANDAMUS, 3.-INCLOSURE ACT. SHIPS AND SHIPPING, 2.-Of DeEDS, see PART- NERS.-OF DEVISES, see DEVISE. INDEM- DEBTOR NITY, 3. AND CREDITOR. COVENANT, 2.
CONTINGENCY.
See INSOLVENT Debtor, 1.
2. The description of an act in a conviction, as having been passed in the 25th year of the king's reign, when in fact the parlia- ment, in which the act was passed, was continued by prorogation from the 24th to the 25th year of the reign, is not mis- description. Rex v. Windsor.
513 3. A conviction, stating an offence to have been committed in the alternative, is bad. A conviction under the 5 Geo. 3, c. 14, for killing fish in a private river, without the consent of the owner, should state that the offence was committed in an inclosed ground. Rex v. Sadler.
519 4. In a conviction, it must appear that the evidence on which the defendant was con- victed, was given in his presence; and where a conviction merely stated that the defendant, on such a day, appeared before a magistrate on a summons, and that the magistrate proceeded to examine into the offence, and that it appeared to him, on the oath of the witnesses, that the offence was committed; it was held bad. So the evidence whereon the defendant is con- victed, must appear on the face of the conviction. In a conviction under the Hawker's act, 25 Geo. 3, c. 78 (now re- pealed), against a party for travelling about from town to town, and selling goods by retail there, the places of sale not being his usual place of abode, the conviction should specify the goods sold. It is not necessary in a conviction to state how the witnesses were sworn. Rex v. Selway, 521
See APPEARANCE, 3. ARBITRATION, 2, 4. ATTORNEY, 4, 5, 6. BAIL, 23. DECLA- RATION, 1. EVIDENCE, 9, 10, 11. IRRE- GULARITY, 10, 11. NEW TRIAL, 3, 7. NON PROS. PLEADING, 2. PROCHEIN AMI. QUO WARRANTO, 2. REG. GEN.11. STRIKING OUT PLEAS, 2. WARRANT OF ATTORNEY, 2.
1. The defendant was arrested at the suit of a plaintiff, who becoming bankrupt, the proceedings were dropped; and the assig- nees having again arrested the defendant, the proceedings were set aside, the Chan- cellor having superseded the commission ; but a fresh commission having issued, and another set of assignees being chosen, they arrested the defendant again, and were proceeding in their action; held, that these proceedings could not be stayed until the costs of the proceedings at the suit of the first set of assignees were paid. Semble, where proceedings have been set aside for irregularity, the plaintiff is not bound to pay the costs thereof, before he is at liberty to commence a fresh action. Dawson v. Sampson. 146 2. Costs for defendant under the 43 Geo. 3, c. 46, where a verdict was taken for a less sum than that which the plaintiff held the defendant to bail for refused, where the right to recover the whole sum claimed was fairly triable. Edgington v. Hood.
3. Costs of a special original allowed between attorney and client, where action was brought on a bond, the penalty of which was more than 50%., but the sum due was only 20%. v. Bonar. Page 148 4. The court will grant a rule, that plaintiff may give security for costs, though it does not appear that application has been made to him to give security, notwithstanding an express decision to the contrary, in Mich. 55 Geo. 3. Hancock v. Smith. 150 5. The court will not grant a rule to stay the proceedings till security for costs be given, unless a previous application be made to the plaintiff's attorney for security of costs; aliter when it is not moved to stay the proceedings. And semble, it must be sworn, that defendant has not pleaded. Anon.
150 6. Rule granted for proceedings to be stayed till plaintiff give security for costs, though after plea pleaded. Anon.
7. If the plaintiff is a native of England, and departs for France for a mere temporary absence, the court will not compel him to give security for costs. Anon.
152 8. Where, in an action on a bond against se- veral defendants, they sever in pleading, and there is an issue in fact, and verdict for plaintiff against some defendants, and the other defendant pleads infancy, and obtains judgment on a demurrer to a re- plication of ratification after age, the de- fendants who tried the issue, are not en- titled to costs. Baylis v. Dynely. 153 9. Where the judge does certify that the cause was proper for a special jury, the party is only entitled to the costs actually paid to the attending jury in court; it is the constant practice not to allow more costs. Cursum v. Durham.
10. Independently of the statute as to taxa- tion of costs, the court still retains power at common law to order bills generally to be taxed. Anon.
11. Full costs in an action on statute of Edward 6, for treble value of tithes not set out, where there was a verdict for plaintiff, subject to a reference, and the arbitrator directed a verdict to be entered for treble value, 17. 10s. Pedley v. Framp- ton. 155 12. An award of less than 57. on the reference of a cause, brings it within the London Court of Conscience Act. Day v. Mearns, 156 13. If the submission to a reference men- tions nothing respecting costs, the arbi- trators have no power to award them to be paid by either party in particular. Bell v. Belson. 157 14. If a party obtain a rule for setting aside judgment and execution, on condition of his paying costs, the court will not issue
an attachment, in the first instance, for not paying those costs.
v. Mynde. Page 158 15. Where an indietment was removed by certiorari, at the instance of the defendant, who was brought up in the King's Bench to receive sentence, being that he should be imprisoned in Morpeth gaol; held, that the costs of sending thither should be taxed to the defendant. Rex v. Gilbie. 159 16. Rule granted to refer it to the Master of the Crown Office to tax, in favour of de- fendant, the costs of a certiorari, the re- cord having been withdrawn without no- tice. Rex v. —.
COUNSEL.
See NEW TRIAL, 1.
COURT OF CONSCIENCE ACT FOR
See CONSTRUCTION. ACTION OF, see SET- OFF, 2. VENUE, 6. PLEADING, 16. BANK- RURT, 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4. 1. In an action of covenant for not indemnify- ing against taxes, no plea of set-off can be sustained. Couper v. Robinson.
2. A covenant by a party, that so long as de- fendant should continue and be in the ac- tual receipt of the profits of a rectory, she would pay a yearly sum during the life of the rector, by two half yearly payments, must be construed as a covenant for the payment of such yearly sum, whilst the covenantor is in receipt of the profits, during the life of the rector, and not whilst he is merely in receipt of the pro- fits. Combe, executor of Phipps, v. Jones.
CURATE.
See MANDAMUS, 4.
CUSTOM HOUSE ACT. See CONSTABLE.
See PLEADING, 6, 28. INQUIRY, 1. INTE- REST, 2. ESCAPE.
See EJECTMENT, 21. ARBITRATOR, 8.
DEBT (ACTION OF).
See BANKRUPT, 3. BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 9. INTEREST, 2. ESCAPE, 6.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 10. INTEREST, 2. 1. A covenant in an indenture (whereby a debtor assigned his effects to trustees for benefit of creditors), not to sue if trustees fairly accounted for effects, does not ope- rate as a release of the creditors' debts, if trustees refuse to account. Kesterton v. Sabery and another.
2. In an action against a trustee under a composition deed (between the defendant A. B. and his creditors), for the amount of plaintiff's (a creditor's) dividends, (the deed reciting that the debtor was indebted to the several creditors, whose debts were set opposite their names in the schedule annexed to the deed, and the deed cove- nanted to pay a specific ratio of the debts), it is no defence to say that the plaintiff did not set the amount of his debt oppo- site to his name in the schedule. It is sufficient, to render the defendant liable, that he had notice of the amount of plain- tiff's claim before action. Daniel v. Saun- ders. 564
See AMENDMENT, 1, 2. EJECTMENT, 5,7, 8, 9, 10. NEW TRIAL, 7. REG. GEN.
1. It is irregular to serve the writ and the notice of declaration at the same time; but where the defendant omitted to take advantage of the objection until after judg- ment was signed, and a whole term had elapsed, the court would not set aside the judgment with costs. M'Queick v. Davis. 164
2. A notice of declaration served with a
By a charterparty under seal, the freighter was at liberty "to keep the ship on de- murrage, at her loading and delivery ports, ten days each, besides a certain number of days limited for her stay at the same, or as many of them as need should require," the ship having been compelled to put into an intermediate port of her ports of loading and discharge, and the freighter having detained the vessel ten days there, and also fourteen days more than ten days at the port of her delivery; in an action on the charterparty it was held, that the master could not recover on this covenant for more than the ten days demurrage, at 57. per day at the port of London, the covenant not extending to the payment of demurrage beyond ten days at each of the ports of loading and discharge; and a breach, averring that the plaintiff did not pay 57. per day for demurrage for the extra delay beyond the ten days at the port of delivery, and for the delay at Bristol, as well as for the de- murrage for ten days delay at the port of delivery, was held bad. York.
See ABATEMENT, 2. PLEADING, 4.
1. Under a devise of a copyhold estate to
testator's wife, during her life, provided she continue single, but in case she did not, then unto A. B. when he should at- tain the age of 23 years; it was held, that though the widow married before A. B. attained that age, she was entitled to the estate until that event, and that the heirs at law were not entitled to it. Doe ex dem. Dean and Chapter of Westminster, &c. and others v. Freeman et Ux. Page 498 2. Under a devise to a party, of premises for life, provided he chooses to reside therein, and then to A. B. in fee, it is not neces- sary to complete A. B.'s right to the pre- mises on the death of the devisee for life, that such devisee should have actually re- sided in the premises. The intention to reside, and which intention would have been carried into effect, had circumstances permitted,, is sufficient. Roe on the de- mise of Sampson v. Down and another. 529 3. A will, directing testator's debts to be paid, and devising several estates to his wife for life, and after her decease devis- ing his property in the words following, viz. "I give Mr. W. the income of my four shares in the Corn Market for his life, and all the rest of my estates, with all monies in the stocks, in Mr. M.'s hands, or any other securities, to be di- vided in equal shares to E. S. and others," passes a reversionary interest in the said four shares in the Corn Market to E. S. and others. Fletcher v. Smiton.
4. Under a devise as follows: "And as touching my real estates, both freehold and leasehold, situate, &c. I devise the rents and profits thereof to my executors hereafter named, until my daughters at- tain their several ages of 21 years, in trust, that they my executors improve the same in like manner and purpose as I have hereby directed: my personal estate for the advantage and education of my daughters; and as to the freehold and inheritance of my real estate, I devise the same to my said daughters, when and as they attain their several ages of 21 years, equally be- tween them and their heirs for ever, to take as tenants in common; provided that if both my daughters die without lawful issue, then I devise my real estates unto and amongst my said two brothers, T. Scholes and R. Scholes, and my nephew J. Scholes, son of my late brother J. their heirs and assigns for ever, to take as ten- ants in commen;" it was held, that the daughters only took an estate tail, with remainders over. Chapman on the demise of Scholes v. Scholes, 643 5. Where testatrix by will devised all her real property to A. T. and E. O. (except what she might mention in a codicil), means except what she shall mention in a valid
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