THE HE government obtained a few addresses, thanking them for having convoked the cortes, which, it was said, like an elixir of life, would revivify the social body to its very extremities, and congratulating them up on their triumph over internal divisions, and over those who would so hastily and inopportunely have established a regency. But these congratulations were as premature as the triumph was short lived. They thought it necessary for their safety to imprison the Count de Montijo, and D. Francisco Palafox, who was one of their own members, and whose name, as brother to the defender of Zaragoza, would have been deservedly popular throughout Spain, if he had possessed any qualities which could renderit respectable. Romana's declaration against them was not the only symptom that they had lost the confidence of the army, as well as of the nation, Count de Norona, who commanded in Gallicia, being superseded, addressed a proclamation to the Gallicians, telling them, " they must now perceive that the country was in danger, and that for his part he had given up all dependance upon the existing government. I have been unceasing in my applications," said he, "not only for money but for arms, and to none of them have I received

Alburquerque's Retreat.

the slightest answer; on the contrary, they seem to have given offence. Under these circumstances, it remains for you to act for yourselves; and what I would recommend is, that you form in your own kingdom a separate junta, to be empowered to act in the name of the inhabitants, who shall be authorized to raise money." A similar disposition prevailed in many of the provinces, and Spain seemed on the point of relapsing into that state from which the formation of the central junta had delivered it.

That body endeavoured to conciliate Romana, and to avail themselves of his military talents, and therefore they requested him to repair to the head-quarters at Carolina, where the wreck of Areizaga's army were collecting, investing him with full powers for whatever measures he thought might best tend to repair the loss, and prevent the apprehended consequences; but Romana was either too much disgusted with the government to serve under them, or saw the consequences too clearly to risk his own reputation by attempting what there was little hope could be effected. The Andalusians appear to have relied upon the passes of the Sierra Morena; this confidence would have been reasonable, had there been any thing like an equality, either in num

bers or discipline, between the armies in the field; but the disproportion in both these things being what it was, the example of Somosierra ought to have undeceived them. Flattering statements were circulated, that no means had been neglected for placing Areizaga's army upon the most respectable footing; that he had been joined by considerable reinforcements, and supplied with every kind of stores. The whole artillery of two divisions of his army had reached La Carolina, cannon and ammunition were passing through Cordova, and the works, it was said, which were judged necessary for strengthening the passes, were carrying on with the utmost activity: in reality the principal pass was only defended by three or four ill-mounted cannon. The junta, notwithstanding these boasted preparations, were prudent enough when they convoked the cortes, to appoint the Isle of Leon for the place of meeting. Upon the remains of the central army they could, have little reliance, for in battles like that of Ocana, the best and steadiest part of the army is that which falls. The Duke del Parque's force was not equally broken up, it had lost more in reputation than in actual strength; but its strength was comparatively trifling, and it was at a distance. The main hope of the government seems to have been upon a corps of 12,000 men, under Alburquerque, whose head-quarters were at Don Benito, having 2000 men at Truxillo, and other advanced parties upon the Tagus.

After the battle of Medellin, the Spanish writers announced to the people without disguise the whole extent of their danger, that they might prepare themselves without dismay for the worst. "What," said Don J. M. Blanco, in that manly spirit of sound philosophy which

characterises his writings," What if the French were to enter Andalusia, and make themselves masters of Andalusia, wherefore should the nation then think itself conquered? Has the enemy armies enough to keep up the communication from Bayonne to Cadiz, if he.be harassed by the people along the road? and if he can establish this immense line, how can he occupy 18,000 square leagues of land, or deprive us of the advantage of two immense coasts, open to our colonies and our allies?" The danger which had then been averted was now near at hand; but the junta, whatever their own individual apprehensions may have been, did not venture to proclaim the whole truth, and call forth in the Andalusians the dreadful strength of despair, which the French. had found so destructive at Zaragoza. Instead of this, they suffered a. treacherous hope to be held out, that if the enemy should enter the kingdoms of the south, the passes would be occupied behind them; the Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque would. hasten to the scene of action, and another day like that of Baylen might be expected.

While the junta fixed its attention as well as its hopes upon the Sierra Morena, the French, knowing how easily that barrier would be surmounted, looked on to Cadiz, the possession of which they considered as not less important than that of Madrid. The actual command of the army was vested in Soult, the ablest of their generals, having under him Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani; and the intruder came in person to take pos session of the southern provinces of Spain. Areizaga was perfectly sensible of his own inability to defend the lines, notwithstanding the great advantage which the exceeding strength of the position would have afforded

to a determined people, under a general of any enthusiasm, or any military skill. He made known his hopelessness to the government, and by sending away great part of his stores for the purpose of securing them, betrayed it also to the army and to the people. The French, to exaggerate their own merits, affirmed that, confiding in the entrenchments which he had thrown up at the entrance of the defile, in the cuts which had been made in the roads, and the mines which he had dug at the brink of the precipices, he considered his position impregnable; but Areizaga had lost his presumption at Ocana, and was prepared for defeat before he was attacked. In fact, the Sierra More. na was not better defended than Somosierra had been; at every point the men gave way, because they knew, by the conduct of their general, that it was not expected they should stand their ground: one division took to flight at Navas de Tolosa, the very spot where one of the most glorious victories in Spanish history had been gained over the Moors. The operations began on the 20th of January, and the head-quarters of the intruder were the next day established at Baylen, of which the French now reminded the Spaniards with bitter exultation.

The junta, who had ventured to hint their apprehensions of this event no otherwise than by convoking the cortes to the Isle of LeJuly 15. on, instead of Seville, announced, five days before the French forced their way into Andalusia, their intention of transferring the seat of government to Cadiz, not daring even then openly to assign what was the obvious cause. The Isle of Leon, they said, was the fittest place for the cortes to hold its sittings,

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because there were buildings there plicable to the purpose; from thence their decrees could be communicated to every part of the peninsula, whatever might be the vicissitudes of war ; and there they might devote themselves to their noble and arduous functions with a perfect tranquillity, which was hardly attainable amid the distractions of a great city. But this having been determined, the junta found itself in the predicament which had been provided for by a decree of the preceding year, wherein it had been declared, that at whatever place the representatives of the Spanish nation should be convoked, to that place the government must remove its seat. They gave notice, therefore, that on the first of February they should meet in the Isle of Leon. Accordingly they made immediate preparations for their removal.

The people of Seville could not but perceive that their city was to be abandoned to the enemy; this was obvious. What other designs the members of the junta might have: formed, every one guessed, according as he suspected or despised this unfortunate administration. Some said that they were sold to the French, and that the junta were only pretending to fly, that they might deceive other provinces with a show of patriotism, and sell them as they had sold Andalusia; others acquitted them of treason, to fix upon them the charge of peculation: a few of the members,> they said, were, for their known virtue and talents, entitled to the love of their countrymen; the rest were a sordid race, who, having appropriated to their own use the free gifts contributed for the use of the army, while they left the soldiers to perish for want of food and clothing, were now about to fly to England or to the

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Canaries, and there enjoy in safety the riches of which they had defrauded their brethren and their country. Those persons who could command the means of removal, hastened to secure themselves in the sea-ports; others, whose fortunes rooted them to the spot, and who were thus compelled to share its fate, or whose bolder spirits were impatient of flight or of submission, joined in imprecations upon the government, by which they believed themselves to have been sacrificed;—whether the cause had been guilt or imbecility, the effect to the country was the same. On the 20th, the junta announced that the pass of Almaden had been forced; but the danger, they said, was not so great as terror might perhaps represent it. The division which had been stationed there, and which was far too weak to maintain the post, was gone to join Alburquerque, who threatened the flank of the enemy; the Duke del Parque was advancing by rapid marches; their junction would form an army far superior to the French force at Almaden, who would thus be checked in their career, or driven back; while Areizaga's army occupied the other passes, and was ready to hasten to the defence of Seville, whether also the two dukes would repair in case of necessity. This, they said, was the true state of things, which the government had neither exaggerated, nor dissembled. They had issued orders for marching off all the men in arms who could be collected to join the armies, and for supplying them; and they called upon the people of this capital to lay aside all terror, all idea of confusion or tumult, and display the same courage and calmness as they had so honourably manifested in times of greater danger. The French depended more upon the distrust and

disunion which they hoped to create than upon their own strength.

While the junta thus admonished the people to be calm, they themselves were completely bewildered by the danger which pressed upon them. The series of their instructions to Alburquerque, from the time when they first clearly saw that Andalusia was seriously threatened, exhibits their incapacity and their wavering councils in the most extraordinary manner. A month before the attack was made, that able general, the only one whose talents were equal to the exigency, warned them that the pass of Almaden was threatened, and, explaining in what manner such a movement on the part of the enemy would threaten his own position, observed how expedient it was to call his troops from Truxillo and the advanced posts upon the Tagus: his head quarters at this time were at Don Benito. The answer was, that if the enemy made the movement which he apprehended, he must endeavour to prevent them, by taking a good position, where he might fight them to advantage; meantime the force at Truxillo must not be lessened, and he must not forget to leave a competent garrison in Badajoz. By another dispatch they enjoined him to act offensively and with energy, to destroy the plans of the French from penetrating by the road of La Plata. Another ordered him to hold himself ready to march as soon as he received instructions; and had he been a man of less decision, would thus have suspended his movements till those instructions arrived. His army was thus upon the Guadiana when the passes were forced, and the enemy moved a column along the road de la Plata, in order to occupy Gua dalcanal, and thus prevent him from entering Andalusia. This purpose

Alburquerque understood, and made his own movements so judiciously, that when they expected to take easy possession of Guadalcanal, they found him there with the main body of his infantry, while the horse escorted his artillery to St Olalla and Ronquillo; and thus the whole army was ready to move wherever its services were required. Here he received those instructions for which he was too zealous a patriot, as well as too good an officer, to wait, They directed him to approach the enemy as near as possible, to oppose them if they attempted to enter Andalusia, and if they should retreat to La Mancha, to harass them as much as possible; for it appears that the junta even indulged this hope. Alburquerque informed them, that an army, consisting of 8000 disposable men, and 600 horse, could not approach very near to watch the movements of a hostile force, more than three-fold its own number; if he added to his own little division that which was destined to garrison Badajoz, an important place, which had at this time scarcely 400 effective men, it would only increase his own troops to 11,700, which would still be insufficient either to occupy the line of defence, which they instructed him to take up, or to observe the enemy with any hope of impeding them. Nevertheless he would do all that was possible. On the 21st, the junta ordered him to march immediately for Cordova, in consequence of the enemy's having occupied the pass called Puerto del Rey; the next morning they summoned him to Seville, by the shortest route, and with the utmost expedition; and before night changed their purpose, and dispatched another express, ordering him to Cordova. This vacillation was imputed to treason, especially as the

VOL. III. PART I.

war minister, D. Antonio Cornel, had long been suspected by the people. Certain it is, that if Alburquerque had obeyed these orders, his own army must have been cut off, and Cadiz would inevitably have been taken by the enemy, according to their aim and expectation; but the error of the junta, on this occasion, is sufficiently accounted for by their incapacity and their alarm.

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The termination of their power was at hand. When this last order was expedited to Alburquerque, every hour brought fresh tidings of the progress of the enemy, and the murmurs of the people became louder as their agitation increased, and their danger appeared more imminent. The junta were hastening their departure for Cadiz; their equipages were conveyed to the quays, and the papers from the public offices embarked on the Guadalquiver. This alone would have informed the populace of the real state of things, even if it had been possible to keep them in ignorance of the disasters which so many breathless couriers announced. During the nights of the 22d and 23d, the troles were doubled; no disturbance, however, took place; the agents of the Count de Montijo, and D. Francisco Palafox, were preparing to strike an effectual blow, and carefully prevented a premature explosion. On the morning of the 24th, the people assembled in the square of St Francisco, and in front of the Alcazar; some, giving full way to indignation, demanded that the central junta should be deposed; others, more violent in their rage, cried out, that they should be put to death; but the universal cry was, that the city should be defended; and they took arms tumultuously, forbade all persons to leave the city, and patrolled the streets in numerous small +

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