General Craufurd had considered as a complete defence against cavalry; it enclosed a vineyard, in which some companies had been stationed, but there had been a heavy rain during the whole of the preceding night, and the troops had pulled down this wall in many places to make use of the stones to form a shelter; through these openings the enemy's horse entered, and here they made most of the prisoners who were taken in the action. To retire in order over such ground was impossible, but the retreat was made with characteristic coolness. On the other side the bridge, the ground was equally unfavourable for re-forming; the 43d and part of the 95th regiments were ordered to form in front of the bridge, and defend it as long as they could, while the rest of the troops should pass over and take a new position. They obeyed these orders so literally, that they defended it all day; three times the enemy attempted to force the passage, and each time they were always desperately repulsed at the point of the bayonet; at length, when night closed, every thing had passed over, and the enemy had ceased to assail them, these brave men retreated from which they had maintained so nobly, and where so many of their comrades had fallen: the heaviest loss fell upon these gallant regiments. Our total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to 330.

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Massena's official statement of this action was a masterpiece of impudent falsehood. He asserted that General Craufurd's force consisted of 2000 horse and 8000 foot, and that they were all posted under the guns of the fortress; that they gave way before the French, our cavalry not daring to meet them with the sabre, and the infantry pursued at a running step;

that we lost 60 officers, of whom 24 were buried in the field of battle; 400 killed, 700 wounded, 400 prisoners, one stand of colours, and two pieces of cannon, while the loss of the conquerors did not amount to 300. He took no colours, and the two pieces of cannon were the dismounted guns at the windmill. In a subsequent dispatch, Massena assured the war minister that all his troops were burning with impatience to teach the English army what they had already taught Craufurd's division. Our own gazette had already shown the veracity of this boaster's account, but this new insult called forth a counterstatement from General Craufurd, from which this detail has chiefly been drawn, and to the truth of which the whole British army are witnesses. Certain it is, that General Craufurd ought not to have exposed himself to such an action; but never did men behave more gallantly than all who were engaged that day, British and Portugueze alike. They effected their retreat under the most disadvantageous circumstances, without losing a gun, a trophy, or a single article of field equipment, and they inflicted upon the enemy a loss, which, by his own account, was nearly equal to what we know to have been the sum of ours, and which in reality doubled its amount.

Massena affirmed likewise, that one of our couriers had been taken with all his dispatches, which represented that the English had never been engaged in so brisk an affair; that they were in full route; and that it was impossible to form an idea of their deplorable condition. Of the condition of that army, and the full route to which he had driven them, it was not long before Massena obtained some correct personal knowledge; but it is probable that some desponding letters

may have fallen into his hands, and as the manner of General Moore's retreat had been marked with no public disapprobation in England, it is likely also that he expected to drive the British army before him full speed to Lisbon. Letters had been written from that army to Porto, in which the writers had delivered it as their opinion that our forces must inevitably retreat, Massena having such an immense superiority, that Portugal could not possibly be defended against him. These letters excited such alarm among the British merchants in that city, that the vice-consul applied to our admiral at Lisbon, requesting he would take into consideration the necessity of having a sufficient force off the Douro to protect the British subjects, who, on account of the imminent danger, might be compelled to embark without the least delay. They were in the utmost consternation, he said. Admiral Berkeley thought it proper to send this requisition to Lord Wellington, who in consequence issued general orders upon the subject. "He would not make any inquiry," he said, "to ascertain the authors of these letters, which had excited so much fear and consternation in a place where it was most to be wished that none should exist. He had frequently lamented the ignorance displayed in letters from the army, and the indiscretion with which those letters were published. It was impossible that many officers could possess a sufficient knowledge of facts to be able to form a correct opinion of the probable events of the campaign, yet when their erroneous opinions were published, they could not but produce mischievous effects. He requested, therefore, that the officers, on account of their own reputation, would refrain from giving opinions upon mat

ters, with regard to which they could not possibly possess the necessary knowledge for giving it with correctness; and if they communicated to their correspondents facts relating to the position of the army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, preparations for cutting down or blowing up bridges, &c., they would at least tell their correspondents not to publish these letters in newspapers, unless it was certain that the publication could not prove injurious to the army and to the public service."

There was good cause for this reproof. The effect of such aguish predictions in Portugal, could only be to make the Portugueze believe we should forsake them, and thus dispose them for submission to the enemy; while, in England, they assisted the party of the despondents, whose journalists, Scotch and English, were labouring to strike their country with a dead palsy. "We had been lulled," they said, "into the most dangerous confidence. Massena was only waiting for the advance of his flanks, that he might, with his whole combined army, either force our handful of men to a battle, or surround them: all that could be expected was, that the survivors might be enabled to retire to their ships with eclat." By the next dispatches it appeared, that it was more easy for a journalist to in agine such a manœuvre, than for Massena to execute it; but this had no other effect than to make them change the note of alarm. "If Massena did not destroy Lord Wellington's army by fighting, it could only be because he meant to destroy it by not fighting; for Massena was the most consummate captain of all Buonaparte's generals. And did ministers anticipate with complacency the continuance of our army in Portugal through the win

ter? The rainy season was approaching; might it not be the deep policy of this arch-statesman and conqueror to keep our army there? He would be content to devote Massena and his army to destruction, if it would facilitate some ulterior plan; might he not mean to ruin us by the expence of our army there? What should we say, if it were really a part of his policy to keep that army there, while he, having possession of the Dutch, the Danish, and the Swedish fleets and ports, made a descent upon England or Ireland? They trusted ministers were upon their guard, and that they destined their troops at home for a service more imminent than the reinforcement of Lord Wellington."

While these writers, in the pure spirit of faction, were thus advising a diversion in favour of the enemy, Ney, who conducted the siege of Almeida, directed Loison to summon the governor. Loison had made himself peculiarly infamous in Portugal during the French usurpation; his cruelty and rapacity were equally notorious. When his quarters were in the archbishop's palace at Evora, he had actually been seen, while the archbishop was sleeping, to steal his ring from the table, and had destroyed great part of this venerable prelate's collection of manuscripts in despite, because he found nothing concealed behind them. This ruffian addressed the governor as a PortuJuly 24. gueze, admonishing him not to hazard the interests of his nation for a vain point of honour. "None," said he, "knows better than you do, that the French come to deliver you from the yoke of the English. There is not a Portugueze who is ignorant of the little consideration which his country enjoys among that people. Have they

not given abundant proofs of the little attention which they pay to a nation worthy of esteem, and for a long time the ally of France? Their occupation of all the civil and military posts, proves to demonstration, that the intention of the English government is to consider Portugal as one of her colonies. The conduct which the English have held with regard to the Spaniards, whom they promised to defend, but abandoned, should open your eyes, and convince you that they will do the same with regard to Portugal. Sir Governor, his excellency has charged me to offer you the most honourable capitulation, by which you may retain the government

of your fortress, and your garrison be admitted into the number of those Portugueze troops that have remained faithful to the interests of their country. In your hands, therefore, is placed the fate of Almeida, and of your companions in arms. If you refuse to accede to this proposal, you will become responsible for all the blood shed unavailingly, in a cause which is foreign to the Portugueze nation."

Brigadier Cox happened to be in the covered way, close to the barrier gate, when the flag of truce arrived with. this summons. Without permitting the French officer to enter, he returned a verbal answer, that the fortress would be defended to the last extremity. The Portugueze troops, of whom Loison spoke as being engaged in the service of France, were the remainder of those whom Junot had hurried away from their own country. The men, Buonaparte was too wary to send back; but Massena brought with him a few nobles, who, having long preyed upon the country which they disgraced, completed their infamy by betraying it. To

these traitors, Loison appealed in his summons, saying, they could assure the governor of the honourable manner in which they had been treated. The Marquis of Alorna, D. Pedro de Almeida, was the most conspicuous among them; he and his accomplices used all their influence to persuade their countrymen to submission; but the Portugueze had already experienced the effects of non-resistance, and the inhabitants of Castello Mendo, and a few other villages on the borders of Beira, were the only persons who were unfortunate enough to be deceived. These poor people, instead of abandoning their habitations on the approach of the enemy, in obedience to the orders which had been issued, remained in them, fearing to encounter the evils of wandering in search of shelter, and hoping, that, as they submitted to the enemy without resistance, their pro perty would be safe, their women preserved from violation, and their lives secured. But the French, in Spain and Portugal, conscious of the wickedness of the cause in which they are engaged, seem, like the pirates of the last century, to consider themselves in a state of reprobation, and to commit crimes which make humanity shudder, as if for the purpose of showing their desperate defiance of God and man. "The inhabitants of these submissive villages, suffered all the evils which a cruel enemy could inflict; their property was plundered; their houses burnt; their women atrociously violated and those, whose age and sex did not provoke the brutal violence of the soldiers, fell victims to the confidence which they placed in promises made only to be broken." The warmest advocates against the Spanish and Portugueze, however anxious to dis

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credit the accounts of the enormities of their detestable invaders, must be satisfied with the authority upon which these facts are recorded. They were publicly proclaimed by the Portugueze government, and are here related in the words of Lord Wellington himself.

That general addressed a procla mation to the Portugueze upon the occasion, telling them they now saw what they had to Aug. 4. expect from the French. They now saw, that no means remained to avoid the evils with which they were threatened, but a determined and vigorous resistance, and a firm resolution to obstruct as much as possible the advance of the enemy, by removing out of his reach all such things as might contribute to his subsistence, or facilitate his progress. "The army under my command," said he, " will protect as large a portion of the country as is possible; but it is obvious that the people alone can deliver themselves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods by removing them out of the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore, that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to the Portugueze nation, oblige me to make use of the power and authority with which I am furnished, to compel the careless and indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. In conformity with this, I make known and declare, that all magistrates and persons in authority who shall remain in the villages or towns, after having received orders from the military officer to remove from them, and all persons, of whatever class they may be, who shall maintain the least communication with, or aid and assist