CHAPTER IV THE CULLOM BILL In an earlier chapter1 the writer has stated three propositions which may serve as an introduction to a discussion of pending legislation: (1) That the present situation with respect to railway affairs in the United States is untenable and indefensible. (2) That the great majority of railway managers and other railway officials are sincerely desirous of administering, to the best of their abilities, the properties under their control in the most efficient manner, having due regard for the interests of both the stockholders and the public; but that all the various interests affected by their action are not represented in proportion to their importance, if at all; and that consequently injustice may be done.2 (3) That there is nothing in the present statutory and administrative regulation of railways to prevent the arbitrary and harmful action of the weak or unscrupulous manager from defeating the 1 Pt. I, ch. IV. 2 A writer on criminal law, for instance, would hardly consider it necessary to state that the majority of citizens were neither thieves nor robbers. Public opinion has so often passed judgment on railway men en masse that this statement appears to be necessary in the present connection. desires of the majority of the officials, who would voluntarily pursue a more beneficent course. The third proposition bears directly upon the present status of the Interstate Commerce Law. "That the leading traffic officials of many of the principal railway lines-men occupying high positions and charged with the most important duties - should deliberately violate the statute law of the land, and in some cases agree with each other to do so; that it should be thought by them necessary to destroy vouchers and so to manipulate bookkeeping as to obliterate evidence of the transactions; that hundreds of thousands of dollars should be paid in unlawful rebates to a few great packing houses; that the business of railroad transportation, the most important but one in the country to-day, paying the highest salaries and holding out to young men the greatest inducements, should to such an extent be conducted in open disregard of law must be surprising and offensive to all rightminded persons. Equally startling, at least, is the fact that the owners of these packing houses, men whose names are known throughout the commercial world, should seemingly be eager to augment their gains with the enormous amounts of these rebates, which they receive in plain defiance of a federal statute. These facts carry their own comment, and nothing said here can add to their significance. The Commission is not unmindful of the palliating circumstances under which railway traffic officials act. These have been fully set forth in previous reports, and the Commission has stated in that connection what, in its opinion, is the proper remedy. We certainly believe that existing laws should be so amended that railway managers who desire to observe them can do so without risk of sacrificing their property."1 The Commission may mediate, report, advise, investigate, order-all good things in themselves and sometimes very effective; but when it comes to the vital point of enforcing right rules of action it is absolutely helpless in practice, irrespective of what theoretical analyses of the law may attribute to it. To repeat an earlier statement, the Commission may recommend everything and do nothing. Neither in the federal law, nor in the laws of a single state, nor in the laws of all the states collectively does there exist adequate power to protect the railways against each other, on the one hand, or the public against the railways on the other. In view of such a situation, amendments to the Interstate Commerce Law are imperative. Several of these are indispensable; with respect to others, compromises might well be resorted to, or they might be omitted altogether, if thereby the work of bringing into existence an efficient law can be facilitated. The changes contemplated in the Cullom Bill 2 are enumerated differently by different persons, 1 Fifteenth Annual Report (1901), p. 6. 2 Bill, S. 1439, 56 Cong., I Sess. A bill to amend an act entitled "An Act to Regulate Commerce," etc. This bill has not yet been varying in number from several to nineteen,1 depending upon individual classifications and judg ment. The centre of the "railway problem” has always been the question of rates, and it is but natural that the nucleus of the proposed amendments should consist of provisions governing rates. Under the present Interstate Commerce Law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Commission has no power to prescribe a rate for the future. The Commission has power to pass upon the absolute and relative reasonableness of a particular rate and, if the rate is found unreasonable, order a reduction or a change in the relations of rates. This order can be enforced through the courts. "Now the actual history of these suits shows that it has required between three and four years to arrive at a conclusion." 2 Let us assume three years as the average. Suppose a certain rate of $1.25 is pronounced unreasonable, and that $I is considered reasonable. The latter the Commission cannot prescribe under the present law, but it can order a reduction of the former. A recalcitrant manager satisfies the order of the Commission by reducing the rate a fractional part of a cent, after three years of litigation in the courts. Even at the rate of five cents per order, it would taken up by the present Congress. A similar bill was introduced in the preceding Congress by Senator Cullom. 1 Blanchard, testimony before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce (1900), p. 382. 2 Commissioner Prouty, testimony before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce (1900), p. 37. require fifteen years to establish the reasonable rate. But long before this result may have been achieved new contingencies may have arisen, and a rate which at first appeared reasonable may be most unreasonable under the changed circumstances. Practically immediate obedience to orders is the only manner in which carriers and shippers. can be protected. A delay of some duration, or even of a week, may change the situation enough to make future changes relatively valueless to the complainant. Here, as in so many other cases, we are again confronted by the relentlessness of the third proposition, there exists no power capable of compelling prompt obedience. "Promptness," which consumes years and which affects interests. based upon short periods of time, is an abuse of the English language. The Cullom Bill provides a remedy: "If after a full hearing it is determined that any party complainant is entitled to an award of damages under the provisions of this Act for a violation of its provisions, the Commission shall make an order directing the carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or before a day named. If, after such hearing, it is determined that any carrier is in violation of the provisions of this Act, the Commission shall make an order directing such carrier to cease and desist from such further violation, and shall prescribe in such order the thing which the carrier is required to do or not to do for the future to bring itself into conformity with the provisions of this Act; and in |