49 Opinion of JACKSON, J. case one or more state appellate courts, which have the same limited opportunity to know the truth that we do. Amid much that is irrelevant or trivial, one serious situation seems to me to stand out in these cases. The suspect neither had nor was advised of his right to get counsel. This presents a real dilemma in a free society. To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime, because, under our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is to protect his client-guilty or innocent and that in such a capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under this conception of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances. If the State may arrest on suspicion and interrogate without counsel, there is no denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits of the constitutional guaranty of the right to assistance of counsel. Any lawyer who has ever been called into a case after his client has "told all" and turned any evidence he has over to the Government, knows how helpless he is to protect his client against the facts thus disclosed. I suppose the view one takes will turn on what one thinks should be the right of an accused person against the State. Is it his right to have the judgment on the facts? Or is it his right to have a judgment based on only such evidence as he cannot conceal from the authorities, who cannot compel him to testify in court and also cannot question him before? Our system comes close to the latter by any interpretation, for the defendant is shielded by such safeguards as no system of law except the Anglo-American concedes to him. Of course, no confession that has been obtained by any form of physical violence to the person is reliable and Opinion of Jackson, J. 338 U.S. hence no conviction should rest upon one obtained in that manner. Such treatment not only breaks the will to conceal or lie, but may even break the will to stand by the truth. Nor is it questioned that the same result can sometimes be achieved by threats, promises, or inducements, which torture the mind but put no scar on the body. If the opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER in the Watts case were based solely on the State's admissions as to the treatment of Watts, I should not disagree. But if ultimate quest in a criminal trial is the truth and if the circumstances indicate no violence or threats of it, should society be deprived of the suspect's help in solving a crime merely because he was confined and questioned when uncounseled? We must not overlook that, in these as in some previous cases, once a confession is obtained it supplies ways of verifying its trustworthiness. In these cases before us the verification is sufficient to leave me in no doubt that the admissions of guilt were genuine and truthful. Such corroboration consists in one case of finding a weapon where the accused has said he hid it, and in others that conditions which could only have been known to one who was implicated correspond with his story. It is possible, but it is rare, that a confession, if repudiated on the trial, standing alone will convict unless there is external proof of its verity. In all such cases, along with other conditions criticized, the continuity and duration of the questioning is invoked and it is called an "inquiry." "inquest" or "inquisition." depending mainly on the emotional state of the writer. But as in some of the cases here, if interrogation is permissible at all, there are sound reasons for prolonging it-which the opinions here ignore. The suspect at first perhaps makes an effort to exculpate himself by alibis or other statements. These are verified, found false, and he is then confronted with his falsehood. Sometimes 49 Opinion of JACKSON, J. (though such cases do not reach us) verification proves them true or credible and the suspect is released. Sometimes, as here, more than one crime is involved. The duration of an interrogation may well depend on the temperament, shrewdness and cunning of the accused and the competence of the examiner. But, assuming a right to examine at all, the right must include what is made reasonably necessary by the facts of the particular case. If the right of interrogation be admitted, then it seems to me that we must leave it to trial judges and juries and state appellate courts to decide individual cases, unless they show some want of proper standards of decision. I find nothing to indicate that any of the courts below in these cases did not have a correct understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless this Court thinks it means absolute prohibition of interrogation while in custody before arraignment. I suppose no one would doubt that our Constitution and Bill of Rights, grounded in revolt against the arbitrary measures of George III and in the philosophy of the French Revolution, represent the maximum restrictions upon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of organized society itself. They were so intended and should be so interpreted. It cannot be denied that, even if construed as these provisions traditionally have been, they contain an aggregate of restrictions which seriously limit the power of society to solve such crimes as confront us in these cases. Those restrictions we should not for that reason cast aside, but that is good reason for indulging in no unnecessary expansion of them. I doubt very much if they require us to hold that the State may not take into custody and question one suspected reasonably of an unwitnessed murder. If it does. the people of this country must discipline themselves to seeing their police stand by helplessly while those sus pected of murder prowl about unmolested. Is it a necessary price to pay for the fairness which we know as "due process of law"? And if not a necessary one, should it be demanded by this Court? I do not know the ultimate answer to these questions; but, for the present, I should not increase the handicap on society. EXHIBIT 27 (The Stanford Law Review, owner of the copyright, has courteously granted permission to the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee to reprint the following material, from vol. 5, Stanford Law Review, April 1953, pp. 459-479, as part of these hearings.) The Privilege Against Self Incrimination: Two doctrines-one a rule of evidence, the other a rule of constitutional law-may operate to exclude evidence obtained by the police in the informal setting of the police station. The rule of evidence is the confessions doctrine, which keeps out confessions which are not voluntary.' The rule of constitutional law is the notion of due process, which ordinarily preserves those things essential to a "scheme of ordered liberty." Each, in its own way, may help to discourage the "third degree." What of the privilege against self incrimination? Does this rule of constitutional law give the accused any protection in the police station? Assume that the privilege against self incrimination does exist in this informal environment. The confessions doctrine would be raised to the stature of a constitutional rule. Moreover, it would no longer be necessary to draw a fine line between a confession and a mere admission. The constitutional privilege would operate to exclude either where coercion was involved. The distinction between a confession and an admission would be important, however, in at least two instances. First, where promises or inducements short of coercion evoke an incriminating statement, the privilege against self incrimination would probably be held to be waived. Since the privilege does not operate to keep out the evidence, it becomes important to differentiate an admission from a confession; for if the statement is a confession, it is involuntary and inadmissible. Second, the privilege would not operate where one unconnected with the government forces a person to make an involuntary statement. Again the distinction between confessions and admissions is vital, for if the statement amounts to a confession the evidence may be excluded." Extending the privilege against self incrimination to an informal setting would affect another evidentiary rule-the doctrine of implied admissions. It is doubtful that the silence of an ac 1. 3 Wigmore, EVIDENCE §§ 815, 822 (3d ed. 1940). 2. U.S. CONST. Amends. V, XIV. 3. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 834–36 (3d ed. 1940). 4. 8 id. at 325. And see Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247 (U.S. 1833); RoTTSCHAEFER, CONstitutional Law 724 (1939). |