ton. not come in time to save it. On the 17th of June draughts arrived, and militia were hourly expected; after mentioning this in a letter to congress, he exclaims-" Thank heaven for the precious time the enemy have so foolishly lost!" He had no idea of marching for the Rariton; but his cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry, was at this period so posted, as to give the alarm of an attack upon New-York: and he proposed moving the main body of his army to White-Plains, and taking a strong camp in that neighbourhood, to keep up the alarm: which was highly approved of by gen. Washington, and procured his thanks. On the 25th his excellency moved his army to KingsUpon receiving intelligence that Sir Henry was prosecuting his route towards Monmouth court-house, he dispatched 1000 select men under brigadier gen. Wayne, and sent the Marquis de la Fayette to take the command of the whole advanced corps, with orders to seize the first fair opportunity of attacking the enemy's rear. Gen. Lee declined the command, as he was against attacking, on which it was offered to the marquis, who accepted it with pleasure. In the evening of the same day, the whole army marched from Kingston, intending to preserve a proper distance for supporting the advanced corps, and arrived at Cranberry early the next morning. The intense heat of the weather, and a storm coming on, made it impossible to resume the march that day without great injury to the troops. The advanced corps, being in consequence hereof too remote from the main body, and too far upon the right to be supported, the marquis had orders sent him to file off by his left toward English-town, which he executed early in the morning of the 27th. Sir Henry being sensible of the approach of the American army, changed the disposition of his troops, and placed in the rear what were deemed the best, consisting of all the grenadiers, light-infantry and chasseurs of the line; at the same time gen. Knyphausen was requested to take the baggage of the whole army under the charge of his division, which made the first column. Under the head of baggage was comprised, not only all the wheel carriages of every department, but also the bat-horses-a train which, as the country adź. mitted but of one rout for carriages, extended near twelve miles. The alteration made by Sir Henry laid gen. Washington under the necessity of increasing the number of the advanced corps. His excellency embraced this opportunity of gratifying gen. Lee, with the consent of the marquis. Lee observed that his having declined the command of the advanced corps had lessened him in the opinion of officers and soldiers, wished to be appointed afresh. Washington would not consent to remove the marquis; but a reinforcement being wanted, he detached Lee with two brigades brigades to join the marquis at English-town, and of course to take upon him the command of the whole. The main body marched the same day, and encamped within three miles of that place. Morgans corps was left hovering on Sir Henry's right flank, and the Jersey militia, amounting to about 700, under gen. Dickinson, on his left. The royal army was strongly en camped in the neighbourhood of Monmouth court-house, where they halted till the morning of the 28th. When once arrived at the heights of Middletown, about twelve miles in advance, there would have been no possibility of attempting any thing against them with a prospect of success, the American general therefore determined to attack their rear the moment they moved from their present ground, and communicated his intention to Lee, who was ordered to make the necessary disposition, and to keep his troops in readiness for the shortest notice. The like was done with respect to the troops under his own immediate com mand. [June 28.] General Knyphausen moved at day-break: Sir Henry, that he might not press upon him, did not follow till near eight o'clock, with the other division, composed of the 3d, 4th, and 5th brigades of British, two battalions of British grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers, a battalion of light-infantry, the guards, and the 16th regiment of light-dragoons, a body of troops not easily to be equalled. About one o'clock in the morning, gen. Lee received a letter from gen. Washington, and in pursuance of the directions it contained, wrote to gen. Dickinson to select some hundreds of his best men, and detach them as nigh to the British rear as he could, These troops were to act as a corps of observation, and to forward the earliest intelligence respecting the enemy. He also ordered col. Morgan to advance with the men under his command so near as to attack them on their first movement: but it was left to him how to act, only he was to take care and not expose his troops, in that manner as to disable him from acting in conjunction with Lee, should there be a necessity for it. Orders were likewise sent to Grayson, as the commanding officer of the two brigades (of Scot and Varnum) consisting of about 600 men, to get them instantly in readiness to march. By daylight they entered English-town; but it was not till between five and six that they marched from thence toward Monmouth courthouse, having been detained for want of guides. Nearly at the same time, Lee gave orders to the several detachments and Maxwell's brigade, to prepare for marching immediately, leaving their packs behind under proper guard: they followed the two just mentioned brigades about seven o'clock. About five Dick * inson sent an express to general Washington, informing that, the front of the enemy had began their march. His excellency instantly put the army in motion, and sent orders to Lee to move on and attack them, unless there should be very powerful reasons to the contrary; and acquainted him that he was marching to support him, and for doing it with the greater expedition and convenience, should make the men disencumber themselves of their packs and blankets. The exceptive clause in the orders rendered them discretionary, they manifested the earnest desire of the commander in chief, that an important blow might be struck which the enemy should feel; but Lee could not consider them as requiring him to risk a general engagement, in direct repugnency to the spirit of those councils of war that had been repeatedly held upon the subject. While Lee was advancing with his column, he sent forward an aid to order Grayson to push on as fast as possible and attack the enemy.. Before the aid overtook him, he had passed Frechold meeting-house with the two brigades. The aid delivered Lee's orders: but gave it as his opinion, that Grayson had better not move on, for that he had been informed that the main body of the enemy was near Monmouth court-house and was thought to be marching to attack them, of which circumstance he supposed Lee was ignorant. The aid on his return fell in with Dickinson, who gave him the same information, and charged him with a message to Lee. Lee conformed to it on its delivery, and gave orders for posting two militia regiments upon a hill for the securing of a particular road, and then pushed forward over a morass, or ravine, by the bridge or sauseway, to a height where Dickinson was with a few militia. During his stay on this height, intelligence of the most extraordinary nature was continually brought him. Some asserted, that the enemy had moved off with precipitation, and that it was only a covering party which remained; others averred, that the main force was still on the ground, and filing off in columns to the right and left-one while the enemy's troops were turning the flanks of the American's-at another, pushing in front. These opposite reports occasioned Varnum's brigade, and part of Scott's, and col. Durgee's brigade of Lee's colunin, to pass and repass the bridge over the morass several times, as it was universally agreed to be by no means warrantable to risk an action, with a ravine in the rear, over which there was only one good passage. While these marchings and counter-marchings took place, the marquis de la Fayette arrived at the head of the main body of Lee's troops; when the general having reconnoitred a wood, into which it had been reported a battalion or two of the enemy had thrown themselves, and being satisfied that Gen. Washington's letter of July 1, 1778, to congrefs. it was groundless, determined to march on, and ascertain with his own eyes, the number, order and disposition of the enemy, and then to conduct himself accordingly. His whole command amounted to about 4000 men, exclusive of Morgan's corps and the Jersey militia; and consisted of gen. Scott's detachment, gen. Wayne's, gen. Maxwell's brigade, gen. Varnum's, generat Scott's and col. Jackson's regiment. When they had nearly passed through the woods, with which the country abounds, and were arrived at a point facing the court-house, and on the edge of a plain about three miles in length and one in breadth, they were formed, but within the skirt of the wood, that the enemy might not discover them. Here they remained while generals Lee and Wayne, and a few others, went out upon the right and rode forward to reconnoitre. From the observations Lee made, and the intelligence he obtained, he concluded that the forces he saw, were no other than the enemy's covering party, and entertained hopes of an interval between them and the main body, sufficient to afford him the opportunity of cutting them off. That he might perfect this business, Wayne was appointed to com mand 700 men, to whom were attached two pieces of artillery. Wayne was to attack the covering party in the rear faintly, so as to halt them, but not with vigor lest that should occasion their retreating with celerity to the main body, or drawing from it so powerful a reinforcement as to defeat the principal design.-Mean time Lee was to endeavor, by a short road leading to the left, to gain the front of the party. While marching on this road, one of gen. Washington's suite came up to procure intelli gence. Lee, with a fixed firm tone of voice and countenance which suggested confidence of success, desired him to infrom his excellency, that the enemy did not appear well to understand the roads; that the route he was on cut off two miles; that the rear of the enemy was composed of 1500 or 2000; that he expected to fall in with them, and had great certainty of cutting them off; and that general Wayne and col. Butler were amusing then with a few loose shot while he was performing the route. Wayne's command was advanced to the right and drawn up. The enemy appeared just in the edge of the wood upon an eminence with their light-dragoons. A few of the American light horsemen were advanced upon the right, at a very considerable distance. One of Lee's aids-de-camp observed the queen's lightdragoons parading as though they meant to charge these American light-horsemen, who had no officer of eminence to head them: he therefore rode up and advised them to let the British dra goons come as near as could be done with safety, and then to retreat off to where gen. Wayne was, and let him receive them. The The British horse pursued till they came near the general, when receiving a fire from col. Butler's regiment, posted on the skirt of a wood, they wheeled and galloped off in great haste to their own body; as they were retiring, the two pieces of artillery fired a few shot at them. Wayne then advanced, and encouraged his men to follow on, and charge the enemy with bayonets. The aid rode back to Lee, who immediately sent him forward to Wayne, with orders that he should only feign an attack, and not push on too precipitately, as that would subvert his plan and disappoint his intentions. Lieut. col. Oswald, who commanded the artillery, supposed that the enemy were retreating, and so passed the morass in front, over a causeway, into a grain field, and began to cannonade. This happened after ten o'clock. About the same time a part of Lee's troops issued out of a wood on the left of, and about a mile below the court-house, in small columns, and in an oblique direction with respect to the royal forces, rather toward their right, and within cannon shot.These were drawn up ready to face the Americans, with their right near a wood, and their left on open ground, covered by their cavalry, and forming an obtuse angle with the court-house. The cavalry filed off to the left, as if with design to attempt something on the right of Lee's troops, which occasioned an order to the marquis de la Fayette to wheel his column by his right, and to gain and attack the enemy's left flank. Lee having also ordered to the right the three regiments in Wayne's detachment, Wesson's, Stewart's and Livingston's, rode toward Oswald's artillery and reconnoitred the enemy, who appeared in full view, marching back again toward the court-house, and in greater numbers than was expected, so that Lee said, he believed he was mistaken in their strength. Let us now advert to the manoeuvres of Sir Henry Clinton. Soon after he had begun with his column to follow gen. Knyphausen, reconnoitring parties of the Jersey militia appeared on his left flank. The queen's rangers fell in with, and dispersed some detachments among the woods in the same quarter. His rear-guard having descended from the heights above Freehold into the plain, some American columns appeared likewise descending into it, and began the cannonade on his rear, which was returned by a superior fire. At this instant intelligence was brought to Sir Henry, that the enemy were discovered marching in force on both his flanks. He conjectured that the object of the Americans was the baggage, which at that juncture was engaged in defiles that continued for miles. He conceived that the only means of parrying the apprehended blow, was by facing about, attacking the corps which harrassed his rear, and pressing |