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it; and, for the same reason, to be in effect an impost or duty upon exports. This view is so clearly supported by numerous previous decisions of this court that it is necessary to do little more than refer to a few of the most pertinent. Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 276-277; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 244; Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 336; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 648; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 109; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227.

Most of these cases related to interstate commerce, but there is no difference between this and foreign commerce, so far as the present question is concerned.

The principal reliance of the Commonwealth is upon Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1. Undoubtedly that case is near the border line; but we think its authority would have to be stretched in order to sustain such a tax as is here in question. Consistently with due regard for the constitutional provisions, we are unable thus to extend it. In that case the complaining parties were established in business within the taxing district as general merchandise brokers, and had taken out general and unrestricted licenses to do business of all kinds, both internal and interstate. As it happened, one of them (Ficklen), during the year in question, did an interstate business exclusively, and the other (Cooper & Co.) did a business nine-tenths of which was interstate. And the court, by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, said (p. 21): "Where a resident citizen engages in general business subject to a particular tax, the fact that the business done chances to consist, for the time being, wholly or partially in negotiating sales between resident and non-resident merchants, of goods situated in another State, does not necessarily involve the taxation of interstate commerce, forbidden by the Constitution;" and again (p. 24): "What position

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they [the plaintiffs in error] would have occupied if they had not undertaken to do a general commission business, and had taken out no licenses therefor, but had simply transacted business for non-resident principals, is an enentirely different question, which does not arise upon this record." Besides, the tax imposed in the Ficklen Case was not directly upon the business itself or upon the volume thereof, but upon the amount of commissions earned by the brokers, which, although probably corresponding with the volume of the transactions, was not necessarily proportionate thereto. For these and other reasons the case has been deemed exceptional.

In Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 695, the court, again speaking by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, said: "It is settled that where, by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of interstate commerce, or on the receipts derived therefrom, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, a tax is levied by a State on interstate commerce, such taxation amounts to a regulation of such commerce and cannot be sustained."

The tax now under consideration, so far as it is challenged, fully responds to these tests. It bears no semblance of a property tax, or a franchise tax in the proper sense; nor is it an occupation tax except as it is imposed upon the very carrying on of the business of exporting merchandise. It operates to lay a direct burden upon every transaction in commerce by withholding, for the use of the State, a part of every dollar received in such transactions. That it applies to internal as well as to foreign commerce cannot save it; for, as was said in Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 277, "The State may tax its internal commerce, but if an act to tax interstate or foreign commerce is unconstitutional, it is not cured by including in its provisions subjects within the domain of the State." That portion of the tax which is measured by the receipts from foreign commerce necessarily varies in proportion to the

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volume of that commerce, and hence is a direct burden upon it.

So obvious is the distinction between this tax and those that were sustained in Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217; U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 347; Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 87; Kansas City &c. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227, 232, 235; and some other cases of the same class, that no time need be spent upon it.

The judgment under review must be

Reversed.

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.

No. 18. Submitted November 7, 1917.-Decided December 10, 1917.

The power of a State under the Webb-Kenyon Law to forbid shipment into its territory of intoxicating liquor from other States includes the lesser power to prescribe by law the conditions under which such shipments may be allowed. The Webb-Kenyon Law having subjected interstate shipments of intoxicating liquor to state legislation, a state law requiring carriers to keep records of such shipments, open for the inspection of any officer or citizen, is valid, notwithstanding the prohibition of § 15 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended June 18, 1910, against the divulging of information by interstate carriers.

Section 5, North Carolina Public Laws, 1913, c. 44, p. 76, sustained. 169 N. Car. 295, affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Murray Allen for plaintiff in error.

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Mr. James S. Manning, Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, and Mr. Robert H. Sykes, Assistant Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

Pertinent provisions of "An Act to secure the enforcement of the laws against the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors" established by the General Assembly of North Carolina March 3, 1913, (P. L., 1913, c. 44, p. 76), are copied in the margin.1 Section 5 requires rail

1 Public Laws of North Carolina, 1913, c. 44, p. 76:

"Sec. 1. That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, association or company, by whatever name called, other than druggists and medical depositories duly licensed thereto, to engage in the business of selling, exchanging, bartering, giving away for the purpose of direct or indirect gain, or otherwise handling spirituous, vinous or malt liquors in the State of North Carolina. Any person, firm or corporation or association violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

"Sec. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation by whatever name called, other than druggists and medical depositories duly licensed thereto, to have or keep in his, their or its possession, for the purpose of sale, any spirituous, vinous or malt liquors; and proof of any one of the following facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of the violation of this section:

"First: The possession of a license from the government of the United States to sell or manufacture intoxicating liquors; or

"Second: The possession of more than one gallon of spirituous liquors at any one time, whether in one or more places; or

"Third: The possession of more than three gallons of vinous liquors at any one time, whether in one or more places; or

"Fourth: The possession of more than five gallons of malt liquors at any one time, whether in one or more places; or

"Fifth: The delivery to such person, firm, association or corporation of more than five gallons of spirituous or vinous liquors, or more than twenty gallons of malt liquors within any four successive weeks, whether in one or more places; or

Opinion of the Court.

245 U. S.

road companies to keep a separate book in which shall be entered the name of every person to whom intoxicating liquor is shipped, together with amount, kind, date of receipt, etc., to be followed by the consignee's signature acknowledging delivery. And it further provides that the

"Sixth: The possession of intoxicating liquors as samples to obtain orders thereon:

"Sec. 3. Upon the filing of complaint, under oath, by a reputable citizen, or information furnished under oath by an officer charged with the execution of the law, before a justice of the peace, recorder, mayor, or other officer authorized by law to issue warrants, charging that any person, firm, corporation, association or company, by whatever name called, has in his, their or its possession, at a place or places specified, more than one gallon of spirituous or vinous liquors or more than five gallons of malt liquors for the purpose of sale, a warrant shall be issued commanding the officer to whom it is directed to search the place or places described in such complaint or information,

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"Sec. 5. All express companies, railroad companies, or other transportation companies doing business in this State are required hereby to keep a separate book in which shall be entered immediately upon receipt thereof the name of the person to whom the liquor is shipped, the amount and kind received, and the date when received, the date when delivered, by whom delivered, and to whom delivered, after which record shall be a blank space, in which the consignee shall be required to sign his name, or if he cannot write, shall make his mark in the presence of a witness, before such liquor is delivered to such consignee, and which said book shall be open for inspection to any officer or citizen of the State, county, or municipality any time during business hours of the company, and said book shall constitute prima facie evidence of the facts therein and will be admissible in any of the courts of this State. Any express company, railroad company, or other transportation company or any employee or agent of any express company, railroad company, or other transportation company violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor: Provided, upon the filing of a certificate signed by a reputable physician or two (2) reputable citizens that the consignee is unable, by reason of sickness or infirmities of age, to appear in person, then the said company is authorized to deliver any package to the agent of said consignee, and the agent shall sign the name of the consignee and his own name, and the certificate shall be filed of record."

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