Law and Force had met. On the one side was the CHAP. XIV. Code democratic, which France had declared to be perpetual; on the other a battalion of the line. Charles Baudin, pointing to his book, began to show what he held to be the clear duty of the battalion ; but the whole basis of his argument was an assumption that the law ought to be obeyed; and it seems that the officer in command refused to concede what logicians call the major premiss,' for, instead of accepting its necessary consequence, he gave an impatient sign. Suddenly the muskets of the frontrank men came down, came up, came level; and in another instant their fire pelted straight into the group of the scarfed Deputies. Baudin fell dead, his head being shattered by more than one ball. One other was killed by the volley; several more were wounded. The book of the Constitution had fallen to the ground, and the defenders of the law recurred to their fire-arms. They shot the officer who had caused the death of their comrade and questioned their major premiss. There was a fight of the Homeric sort for the body of Charles Baudin. The battalion won it. Four soldiers carried it off.* Plainly this attempted insurrection in the Faubourg St Antoine was without the support of the multitude. It died out. in central The Committee of Resistance now caused barri- Barricades cades to be thrown up in that mass of streets between Paris. the Hôtel de Ville and the Boulevard, which is the accustomed centre of an insurrection in Paris; but * Xavier Durrieu, pp. 23, 24. XIV. CHAP. they were not strong enough to occupy the houses, and therefore the troops passed through the streets without danger, and easily took every barricade which they encountered. When the troops retired the barricades again sprang up, but only to be again taken. This state of things continued during part of the 3d of December; but afterwards the efforts of the troops were relaxed, and, during the night and the whole forenoon of the next day, the formation of barricades in the centre of Paris was allowed to go on without encountering serious interruption.* State of two o'clock of Dec. At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 4th, the condition of Paris was this:-The mass of streets on the 4th which lies between the Boulevard and the neighbourhood of the Hôtel de Ville was barricaded, and held without combating by the insurgents; but the rest of the city was free from grave disturbance. The army was impending. It was nearly forty-eight thousand strong,† and comprised a force of all arms, including cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers, and Attitude gendarmes. Large bodies of infantry were so posted that brigades advancing from all the quarters of the compass could simultaneously converge upon the barricaded district. Besides that, by the means already shown, the troops had been wrought into a feeling of hatred against the people of Paris, they had clearly been made to understand that they were to allow no consideration for bystanders to interfere with their fire, that they were to give no quarter, and that they were to put to death not only the combatants whom * Magnan's Despatch, 'Moniteur.' of the troops. + 47,928. XIV. repudiated the notion that they had consented to CHAP. go and consult' with Louis Bonaparte, and Morny, and Fleury, and Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy.* The Elysée derived great advantage from this stratagem, because for many precious hours, and even days, it kept the country from knowing what was the number and what was the quality of the persons who were really abetting the President; but Magnan of course knew the truth, and when he found, on the morning of the 4th of December, that even the complete success of all the arrangements of the foregoing Tuesday had not been hitherto puissant enough to bring to the Elysée the support of men of weight and character, he had grounds for the alarm which seems to have been the cause of his inaction. For, regarded in connection with the state of isolation in which the plotters still remained, the insurrection, feeble as it was, became a source of grave danger to the General in command of the troops. It would have been no new thing to have to act against insurgents in vindication of the law, and under the orders of what had been commonly called a 'Government;' but this time the law was on the side of the insurgents, and the knot of men who had got the control of the offices of the State were not so circumstanced in point of repute as to be able to make up for the want of legal authority by the weight of their personal character. Therefore it was * Their letters to this effect appeared from time to time in the English journals. CHAP. seemed to be failing, for no one of mark and character had come forward to abet the President. XIV. Its probable grounds. There were many lovers of order and tranquillity who wished the President to succeed in overthrowing the Constitution, or giving it the needful wrench; but they had assumed that he would not engage in any enterprise of this sort without the support of some, at least, of the Statesmen who were the known champions of the cause of order. Those whose views had lain in this direction were shocked out of their hopes when, on the 2d of December, they came to find that all the honoured defenders of the cause of order had Apparent been thrown into prison, and that the persons who were sheltering the President by their concurrence account and their moral sanction were Morny and Maupas terror of the plot ters on of their isolation. of forming 'sultative continued or De Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy. The list of the Ministry, which was published on the following day, contained no name held in honour; and the plotters of the Elysée, terrified, as it seems, at the state of isolation in which they were placed, Stratagem resorted to a curious stratagem. They formed what the Con- they called a 'Consultative Commission,' and proCommis mulgated a decree which purported to appoint as members of the body, not only most of the plotters themselves, and others whose services they could command, but also some eighty other men who were eminent for their character and station.* In so far as it represented these eighty men to be members of the Commission, the decree was a counterfeit. One after another, the men with the honoured names *Annuaire,' Appendix. 'sion.' XIV. repudiated the notion that they had consented to CHAP. go and 'consult' with Louis Bonaparte, and Morny, and Fleury, and Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Roy.* The Elysée derived great advantage from this stratagem, because for many precious hours, and even days, it kept the country from knowing what was the number and what was the quality of the persons who were really abetting the President; but Magnan of course knew the truth, and when he found, on the morning of the 4th of December, that even the complete success of all the arrangements of the foregoing Tuesday had not been hitherto puissant enough to bring to the Elysée the support of men of weight and character, he had grounds for the alarm which seems to have been the cause of his inaction. For, regarded in connection with the state of isolation in which the plotters still remained, the insurrection, feeble as it was, became a source of grave danger to the General in command of the troops. It would have been no new thing to have to act against insurgents in vindication of the law, and under the orders of what had been commonly called a 'Government;' but this time the law was on the side of the insurgents, and the knot of men who had got the control of the offices of the State were not so circumstanced in point of repute as to be able to make up for the want of legal authority by the weight of their personal character. Therefore it was * Their letters to this effect appeared from time to time in the English journals. |