they beat about. From six to eight frigates and CHAP.

two steamers have been seen off the port of Bartin

XVIII.

and Amasbre, and this news is certain. Besides,

the great naval port of the enemy is near.

He may

'therefore receive reinforcements, or attack us with fire-ships. That being the case, if reinforcements are not sent to us, and our position continues the same 'for some time-may God preserve us from them !— it may well happen that the Imperial fleet may incur 'disasters.'*

the Am

and the

Admirals.

The power and habit of concentrating all energy Inaction of in a single channel of action, was one of the quali- bassadors ties which gave force and grandeur to Lord Stratford in the field of diplomacy, but it also seems to have had the effect of preventing him from casting a glance beyond the range of his profession; and it is curious that, when the exigencies of the time called upon him to perform duties not commonly falling within the sphere of a diplomatist, his mind refused to act. England and France, without the wholesome formality of a treaty, had glided into an engagement to defend 'Constantinople, or any other part of the • Turkish territory, whether in Europe or in Asia, 'that might be in danger of attack.' So much of this grave duty as consisted in originating a resolve to put forth the naval strength of the Allies remained committed to the two Ambassadors, but it was of course understood that any plans for active measures would be concerted between them and the Admirals; and since the nature of the duty which *Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 313. + Ibid. P. 143.

6

XVIII.

CHAP. they might be called upon to undertake was known of course to the Admirals, it must be adjudged that it was incumbent upon them, as well as upon the two Ambassadors, to take measures for ascertaining whether the Russians were preparing to operate against the coasts of Turkey. Moreover the English Ambassador had been instructed by his Government that, if the Russian fleet were to come out of Sebastopol, the fleets would then, as a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus ;'* and, implicitly, this instruction required that measures should be taken for ascertaining whether the Czar's naval forces were in harbour or at sea, for if they were gone to sea, that was an event which (according to the orders from home) was to be the ground of a naval operation.

Yet not only were no measures taken for ascertaining the truth, but the rumours of great naval operations in the Black Sea, and the despatch of the 22d, announcing that the Russian squadron was hovering over Sinope, and even the despatch containing the touching appeal of the Turkish Commander at Sinope, all alike failed to draw men into action. This last despatch was communicated to Lord Stratford on the 29th. Even then an instant advance of the steam squadrons might not have been altogether in vain, for though the attack commenced on the 30th, the Russian fleet did not quit Sinope until the 1st of December. Yet nothing was done. Nothing but actual intelligence of the disaster was cogent enough to lift an anchor. What Lord Strat*Eastern Papers,' part ii. P. 143.

6

XVIII.

ford says of the causes of all this inaction ought to CHAP. be stated in his own words. Writing on the 4th of December, he says: 'Rumours of Russian ships of the line being at sea have occasionally prevailed for

some time. Uncertainty of information, a wish to 'avoid as long as possible the chances of a collision, 'the arrival of a new French Ambassador, and the state of the weather, were natural causes of demur in coming to a decision as to sending the squadrons into the Black Sea at this time of the year.'

But

even supposing that there were reasons which justified hesitation in sending the squadrons to sea, the Home Governments of the Western Powers were entitled to ask why some humbler means of ascertaining the truth were never resorted to, and why no measures followed upon the receipt of the alarming despatch from Samsoon, or even upon the appeal for help which had come from the Turkish Commander at Sinope.

aster of

On the 30th of November, Admiral Nachimoff, The diswith six sail of the line, bore down upon the Turkish Sinope. squadron still lying at anchor in the port of Sinope. There was no ship of the line in the Turkish squadron, It consisted of seven frigates, a sloop, a steamer, and some transports. The Turks were the first to fire, and to bring upon their little squadron of frigates the broadsides of six sail of the line; and although they fought without hope, they were steadfast. Either they refused to strike their colours, or else, if their colours went down, the Russian Admiral was blind

*Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 311.

CHAP. to their signal, and continued to slaughter them. XVIII. Except the steamer, every one of the Turkish ves

sels was destroyed. It was believed by men in authority that 4000 Turks were killed, that less than 400 survived, and that all these were wounded.** The feeble batteries of the place suffered under the enemy's fire, and the town was much shattered.* The Russian fleet did not move from Sinope until the following day.*

This onslaught upon Sinope, and upon vessels lying in port, was an attack upon Turkish territory, and was therefore an attack which the French and English Ambassadors had been authorised to repel by calling into action the fleets of the Western Powers. Moreover, this attack had been impending for many days, and all this while the fleets of the Western Powers had been lying still in the Bosphorus within easy reach of the scene of the disaster. The honour of France was wounded. England was touched to the quick.

CHAPTER XIX.

XIX.

the in

furnished

Admirals

Western

EITHER from sheer want of forethought, or else in CHAP. tenderness to the feelings of men who shunned the bare thought of a collision, the Governments of Chasm in France and England had omitted to consider the structions plight in which they would stand, if, under the eyes to the of their naval commanders, a Russian Admiral should of the come out from Sebastopol and crush a Turkish Powers. squadron in the midst of the Black Sea. It is true that this was not the event which had occurred, for the onslaught of Sinope was an attack upon Turkish 'territory,' and was therefore within the scope of the instructions from home. But it is also true that the Governments of Paris and London had not committed, either to their Ambassadors or their Admirals, any power to take part in a naval engagement against Russia upon the open sea; and it was obvious that this chasm in the instructions furnished a ground of palliation to the Ambassadors and the naval commanders; for after all the angry negotiations that had taken place between Russia and the Western Powers, a French or an English Admiral might naturally be loth to go watching the movements of a fleet which,