est extra fortunæ potestatem. Ergo, Sapiens est beatus. Reasoning consists in the comparison of judgments in which the mind has previously acquiesced, and in deducing from them a new and distinct judgment. When, for example, we infer the immortality of the soul from its immateriality, the mind first acquiesces in the judgment that Every thing immaterial is immortal. It then assumes that The soul is immaterial. Whence it proceeds to the third judgment, namely, that The soul is immortal. Again, if this judgment has been previously formed, that Any institution which has a direct tendency to prevent contests is advantageous to men; and this also, that The institution of property has a direct tendency to prevent contests; the very juxtaposition of these judgments will, as it were, compel the mind to advance to a further judgment, namely, that The institution of property is advantageous to men. The sentence, The institution of property is advantageous; because it increases the produce of the earth; it preserves the produce of the earth to maturity; it prevents contests; and it improves the conveniency of living: contains four such acts of reasoning. No element is liable to decomposition; Water is liable to decomposition; Therefore water is not an element. Whatever makes a man most effectually superior to his enemies confers genuine glory; But the disposition to pardon their injuries makes him most effectually superior to them; Such a disposition therefore confers genuine glory. It is an undeniable truth, that it is the glory of a man to pass by an offence; for the wisest of men asserts it to be so. The mention made in the text of the characteristic particle which denotes an inference (Ergo) has relation, not to the operation of reasoning, but to the language in which it is expressed. It is therefore somewhat misplaced here. The same observation applies in some degree to the mention of the copula employed in expressing judgment. But it is very difficult to speak of the pure mental operations without some reference to the modes of communicating them. It is however useful to habituate ourselves to view them as really distinct. The English word Discourse, as employed in the sense of reasoning, is nearly obsolete, and consequently ambiguous. Hooker speaks of "the instruments without which the understanding is not able by discourse to work." Dryden also addresses the deist thus: Vain, wretched creature! how art thou misled, The expression, discursive faculty, is however not uncommon, nor is it liable to the same objection. Singulis operationibus sui accidunt defectus: Apprehensioni, Indistinctio; Judicio, Falsitas; Ratiocinio, Mendosa Collectio. 1. There are innumerable objects of which our notions or apprehensions must, from the weakness of our nature, be necessarily indistinct. Such, for instance, are our conceptions of the Divine Being, and of all his attributes, Infinity, Omnipotence, Omniscience, Perfection, &c. The apprehensions which we form of Heaven, of Angels, of the Human Soul, of the Operations of our own minds, are necessarily indistinct. In numberless other instances our ideas are accidentally indistinct; that is, not from any inherent defect, but from the want of an actual acquaintance with the object, arising from deficiency either of opportunity or of observation. Thus an uninstructed person forms an inaccurate conception of the nature and use of philosophy; A native of the torrid zone has an indistinct apprehension of ice: The ancients had no correct notion of an eclipse. Of those objects with which we are familiar we form ideas proportionately less indistinct; but there exist probably very few things, the nature of which we can be said, strictly speaking, to comprehend distinctly. 2. Nor is the faculty of judgment free from imperfection. It is misled by sense in the rustic who conceives that The earth is stationary: or that The sun rises out of the sea. It is unduly influenced by authority and example in those who conceive that Earth, air, fire, and water, are simple elements; and in the illiterate mechanic, who judges that All which some e factious demagogue says must be true: and that Whatever Government does must be wrong. It is often perverted by the passions; as when men decide that The Gospel consists in the repeal of the obligation of the moral law; that Honesty is the whole of religion; that Pride is noble; that Revenge is a branch of justice. The Lycaonians at Lystra were guilty of a false judgment, when they said of Paul and Barnabas, The Gods are come down to us in the likeness of men. So also were the Pharisees, when they said of our blessed Lord, We know that this man is a sinner. 3. The powers of reasoning are likewise imperfect. The defect in this faculty manifests itself when a conclusion is supposed to be derived from judgments or principles on which it has no real dependence. Thus in the apparent argument, Kings deserve honour; but subjects are not kings; therefore subjects do not deserve honour; the two introductory judgments are correct: but it does not follow from them that none but kings deserve honour, and consequently that subjects do not deserve honour. Again, in this form of reasoning; Severe punishments are requisite to suppress the progress of crime; now capital punishments are undoubtedly severe; these therefore are requisite for that purpose; the judgments which form the basis of the argument are correct; but they comprehend nothing which authorizes the inference professedly deduced from them, because they do not prove that the particular kind of severe punishments specified belongs to that class of severe punishments which are requisite for the suppression of vice. The last judgment therefore may, so far as depends on the others, be either correct or incorrect. It is not unusual for the mind to find itself bewildered by such arguments; while it feels their insufficiency, but is unable to discover where the error lies. One important purpose of Logic is, by analysing the mental process, and by classifying the various occasions of error in the mode of deducing inferences, to afford a facility in detecting fallacies. It may be further observed, (although the observation does not immediately belong to this branch of the subject,) that if the previous judgments on which an argument depends, or either of them, be inaccurate, while the reasoning process is carried on correctly, the new judgment deduced from them will probably, but not necessarily, be erroneous. If from the principles, Singularity ought by all means to be avoided, To continue sober in a company of drunkards is singularity, it is inferred that, To continue sober in a company of drunkards ought by all means to be avoided; the argumentative process is correct; and the falsehood of the conclusion is to be attributed to the falsehood of the principle on which it is founded. This is one of the most extensive means of the propagation of error; and it is the more effectual, because, in consequence of the elliptical mode of argument usually adopted, the unsound principle does not meet the eye or ear, but is only insinuated. This is the case in the two following examples, in ̧ which the false principle, that any measures, however unlawful, may be resorted to for the purpose of maintaining reputation or avoiding unpleasant imputations, is implied though not expressed. I must accept a challenge, or else I shall incur the imputation of cowardice. Revenge is usually esteemed a mark of a noble spirit, and is therefore to be indulged in order to maintain our reputation. Thus the Pharisees argued from an erroneous principle when they inferred that our blessed Saviour was not of God, because He kept not the sabbath day according to their traditions. The Melitans reasoned from an inaccurate judgment when they drew the erroneous conclusion, This stranger is about to be killed by a venomous serpent; therefore he is a murderer pursued by vengeance. Nor were their principles more correct when, on seeing the Apostle shake off the animal without injury, they said that he was a god. Quæ cum Sapientes animadverterent, et opportuna illis remedia excogitâssent, præcepta sua in unum compegêre; eorumque Scientiam dixêre Logicam, sive Artem Rationis. Logic, like Rhetoric, is not a mere artificial acquisition; but is natural to man: yet it is imperfect, as has been already shewn by an induction from the several faculties of the mind to which it |