fied trusts, a power is thereby created coupled with an interest, and liable to survive to one trustee upon the decease of the others.1

45. Trust Estates vest in those who Accept.-The rule that a grant or devise of an estate to two or more as joint-tenants vests the entire estate in those who may be qualified to receive the grant or devise at the time it becomes operative, applies to a cotenancy in a trust estate. If one or more of the trustees renounce or disclaim the trust, the whole of the estate vests in the trustee or trustees who are willing to accept it. The person or persons thus renouncing, thereafter stand in the same relation to the estate as though they had never been named as trustees; while those accepting are entitled to the estate in the same manner, and to the same extent, as though they only had been named in the grant or devise.2

46. Co-Executors and Co-Administrators, “as such, are regarded in law as one person; and therefore if one of them sell the goods or the securities of the testator to a bona fide purchaser, who has no reason to suspect that such executor is committing a breach of trust, such purchaser will have a right to hold the same not only against the executors but also as against creditors and legatees. "Joint-executors and administrators are possessed of the estate, each as of the entirety, and consequently the act of each is the act of

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1 Zebach v. Smith, 3 Binn. 69; S. C. 5 Am. Dec. 352; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 254; Muldrow v. Fox, 2 Dana, 79; Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 2 Mason C. C. 244; Wood v. Sparks, 1 Dev. & Bat. 389; Jackson v. Given, 16 Johns. 170; Burr v. Sim, 1 Whart. 266; S. C. 29 Am. Dec. 48; Coykendall v. Rutherford, 1 Green Ch. 360; Robinson v. Gaines, 2 Humph. 367; Warden v. Richards, 11 Gray, 278; Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 400.

2 Crewe v. Dicken, 4 Ves. 97; Granville v. McNeile, 7 Hare, 156; Smith v. Wheeler, 1 Vent. 138; Hawkins v. Kemp, 3 East, 410; Cooke v. Crawford, 13 Sim. 96; Nicholson v. Wordsworth, 2 Swanst. 369; Adams v. Taunton, 5 Mad. 435; Sands v. Nugee, 8 Sim. 130; Bonifant v. Greenfield, Cro. Eliz. 80; S. C. 1 Leon, 60; Bayley v. Cumming, 10 Irish Eq. 410; Zebach's Lessee v. Smith, 3 Binn. 69; S. C. 5 Am. Dec. 352; In the Matter of Stevenson, 3 Paige, 420; Chanet v. Villeponteaux, 3 McCord, 29; Niles v. Stevens, 4 Denio, 402; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 456; Scull v. Reeves, 2 Green Ch. 84; S. C. 29 Am. Dec. 694.

Hertell v. Bogart, 9 Paige, 57; Simpson v. Gutteridge, 1 Madd. Ch. 609; Saunders v. Saunders, 2 Litt. 815; Shaw v. Berry, 35 Me. 279; S. C. 58 Am. Dec. 702; Beccher v. Buckingham, 18 Conn. 110; S. C. 44 Am. Dec. 580; Sutherland v Brush, 7 Johns. Ch. 17; S. C. 11 Am. Dec. 383.


all." But where by the will of the testator the executors receive the legal title to an estate, then they hold it "in the same manner as if it had been given to them as trustees under an ordinary trust; and the concurrence of all the trustees is necessary to transfer the legal title."2 Where executors are charged with the execution of a power coupled with an interest, the tenure of their holding is like that of ordinary trustees having a similar power. They take and hold as joint-tenants. If some renounce, those who accept take the whole as if they only had been named; and if one of those accepting die, the survivor succeeds to the interest and executes the power with which it is coupled. If co-executors take a residue in that character, they become joint-tenants with the right of survivorship. The legal unity of two or more executors or administrators, which in the absence of statutes to the contrary, gives one the authority to act for all, exists with respect to claims against the estate, and hence the allowance or rejection of a claim by one administrator is equivalent to its allowance or rejection by all. If this fiction of the unity in law of two or more executors or administrators were maintained in all its natural and legitimate results, it would necessarily result in holding that all are answerable for the acts of each. Against the manifest injustice of making one executor or administrator responsible for the default of another, this legal fiction has not been able wholly to prevail. If all unite in any act, they are jointly answerable therefor." If the funds or property of the estate come into the possession of one and he suffers it to be wasted or misapplied by the other, he is answerable, because he cannot shift his responsibility by transferring property to his co-executor or administrator. Beyond this,



12 Redfield on Wills, 206; Bryan's Ex. v. Thompson's Adm. 6 J. J. Marsh, 586. Hertell v. Bogart, 9 Paige, 58; Smith v. Whiting, 9 Mass. 334.

Perry on Trusts, sec. 414; Bank of Utica v. Musenan, 3 Barb. Ch. 528; S. C. 49 Am. Dec. 189.

Frewen v. Relfe, 2 Bro. C. C. 220; Baldwin v. Johnson, 3 Bro. C. C. 455; Griffiths v. Hamilton, 12 Ves. 298; White v. Williams, 3 V. & B. 72; Knight v. Gould, 2 Mylne & K. 299, 303; Flanders v. Clarke, 3 Atk. 509; S. C. 1 Ves. Sr. 9. 5 Willis v. Farley, 24 Cal. 490.

• Dean v. Duffield, 8 Tex. 235; S. C. 58 Am. Dec. 108.

Johnson v. Johnson, 2 Hill Ch. 277; 29 Am. Dec. 72.

* Beall v. Hilliary, 1 Md. 186; S. C. 54 Am. Dec. 649; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, 152: 35 Am. Dec. 676; Monell v. Monell, 5 Johns. Ch. 283: S. C. 9 Am. Dec. 298.

an executor or administrator is not answerable for the devastavit of his co-executor or administrator to which he has not contributed.1

1 Cameron v. The Justices, 1 Ga. 36; S. C. 44 Am. Dec. 636; Lenoir v. Winn, 4 Des. 65; S. C. 6 Am. Dec. 597; Sutherland v. Brush, 7 Johns. Ch. 17; 8. C. 11 Am. Dec. 383; Atcheson v. Robertson, 3 Rich. Eq. 634; S. C. 55 Am. Dec. 634; Ames v. Armstrong, 106 Mass. 18; Irwin's Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 294. In some cases, however, administrators and executors seem to have been held liable for each other's acts. (Brotten v. Bateman, 2 Dev. Eq. 115; 8. C. 22 Am. Dec. 732; Clarke v. State, 6 G. & J. 288; S. C. 26 Am. Dec. 576.)

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