eral states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

"Sec. 3. Every contract, combination, in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or territories and any State or states or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or states or foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thou sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

"Sec. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this Act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.

"Sec. 5. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this Act may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpœnas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.

"Sec. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section 1 of this Act, and being in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.

"Sec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this Act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

"Sec. 8. That the word 'person' or 'persons,' wherever used in this Act, shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country."

Nor can the obligations under which the courts rest to enforce such legislation be more clearly shown than in an opinion pronounced by Judge Key in the United States Circuit Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, where suit was brought to enjoin certain coal mining companies from unlawfully combining to restrain interstate trade and commerce in coal at Nashville contrary to the provisions of the United States statute.

On September 25, 1890, a petition for injunction was filed setting forth as follows:

That the defendants, a number of whom are Kentucky mining companies, and another number are coal dealers in Nashville, Tennessee, secretly entered into an illegal contract and combination in the form of a trust, and entered into a conspiracy with one another, and engaged at Nashville in a combination and conspiracy which restrained the trade and commerce in coal at Nashville between the states of Kentucky, Alabama and Tennessee.

That the defendants combining and confederating, by articles.

of agreement more particularly set forth in the decision (see decision), under the name of the "Nashville Coal Exchange" monopolized the trade in coal which is produced in Kentucky and shipped from thence to Nashville, Tennessee, contrary to the provisions. of this Act. The prayer of the petition is that the defendants be enjoined or otherwise prohibited from violating the provisions of the said Act of Congress and that they be enjoined and restrained from further monopolizing and carrying on the coal trade in Nashville under the combination and confederation as aforesaid.

A brief abstract of the argument and citations of authorities of counsel in the case is of value. Mr. John Ruhm, U. S. Atty., for complainant insisted that the power of Congress to enact the statute which is the basis of this lawsuit is derived from U. S. Const., art. 1, § 8, subsecs. 3, 18, giving Congress power to regulate commerce among the states. This power is unlimited and paramount; it is co-extensive with the entire field of commerce.'

Interstate commerce consists of traffic and transportation between the states; and Congress may regulate the traffic, or the transportation, or both."

The

power to regulate is unlimited, so long as it is confined to interstate commerce."

Congress may confer little, or much, or all jurisdiction upon the existing inferior federal courts, or may create other courts and clothe them with jurisdiction in all matters, where the subject of legislation is within the power delegated by the Constitution.*

In the absence of a statute the United States may become a

Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 16, 6 L. ed. 23, United States v. Marigold, 50 U. S. 9 How. 560, 13 L. ed. 257; Hare, Am. Const. Law, 438. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 16, 6L. ed. 23; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Groves v. S'aughter, 40 U. S. 15 Pet. 449, 10 L. ed. 800; United States v. Bailey, 1 McLean, 234; Brig Wilson v. United States, 1 Brock. 423; United States v. Marigold, 50 U. S. 9 How. 560, 13 L. ed. 257; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 20, 32 L. ed. 350. See also State v. Welton, 55 Mo. 228; People v. Brooks, 4 Denio, 469; Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 1 L. ed. 797; State v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 30 N. J. L. 473, 31 N. J. L. 531.

Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 20, 32 L. ed. 350; Tiedeman, Pol. Powers, § 202. United States v. Union Pac. R. Co. 98 U. S. 596, 25 L. ed. 150; Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 826, 6 L. ed. 225.

party to a suit in the federal courts brought in its own name where it has a pecuniary interest.'

Or where the subject-matter arises under an Act of Congress, or where a fraud has been committed in a matter arising under an Act of Congress.'

The power of Congress to expressly authorize a suit in the federal courts in the name of the United States has never been questioned.'

At common law contracts are held void:

"1. Where their effect is in general restraint of trade.

"2. Where the restraint is partial only, either as to time or place, but where it is unreasonable, or where it injuriously affects the public, or where there is no consideration to support it.

"3. Where there is a combination to stifle competition, or to control the prices of the necessaries of life.

"4. What is an unreasonable restraint, and whether or not the contract is injurious to the public, is always a question of law for the court, to be determined from the face of the contract.*

"5. Courts will not inquire whether or not the agreement entered into has in fact caused an injury to the public or has caused an unreasonable restraint. The inquiry merely is whether the agree ment has a tendency to produce the effect."

"The present statute adopts these principles of the common law so far as they relate to interstate commerce, but goes one step further and removes the difficulty of investigating whether the

1United States v. Barker, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 559, 6 L. ed. 728.

United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. ed. 747.

& United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. ed. 747; Jessup v. United States, 106 U. S. 150, 27 L. ed. 86; United States v. Tingey, 30 U. S. 5 Pet. 115, 8 L. ed. 66; United States v. Bradley, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 343, 9 L. ed. 448; United States v. Linn, 40 U. S. 15 Pet. 290, 10 L. ed. 742; Nashville v. Cooper, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 251, 18 L. ed. 852.

41 Wharton, Cont. § 433; Bishop, Cont. § 517; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 934. 5 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, and note in 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 9th Am. ed. 712 et seq.; Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen, 211, and editorial note, 92 Am. Dec. 751; Leslie v. Lorillard, 1 L. R. A. 456, and note, 110 N. Y. 519; Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co. 68 N. Y. 558; Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 22 Am. Rep. 171; Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 743; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 Pa. 173, 8 Am. Rep. 159; Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 64, 22 L. ed. 315; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 370; Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190; Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666; West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Ohio R. P. L. Co. 22 W. Va. 617, 46 Am. Rep. 527: People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. 2 L. R. A. 33, and note, 22 Abb. N. C. 164.

restraint is partial or general-it applies the regulation ex vi termini to any part of interstate trade.”

Mr. James Trimble, Special Asst. to U. S. Atty., made the following additional points for complainant:

As courts of equity, the United States circuit courts, by their inherent jurisdiction, regardless of the Act of July 2, 1890, have jurisdiction of the subject matter to grant the relief prayed.'

Article 1, § 8, of the Constitution confers upon Congress the power "to regulate commerce" etc., and "to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying" the foregoing powers "into execution."

"The power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."

As to "interstate commerce," the United States, as a government, possesses unlimited power, and can by congressional action exercise all the rights of "a sovereign government." One of the well recognized powers of a sovereign government is to institute proceedings in its own name on behalf of the public, or to permit its name to be used by private individuals specially injured, to prevent and restrain public nuisances."

A combination, the tendency of which is to prevent general competition and to control prices, is detrimental to the public and

unlawful.*

Foster, Fed. Pr. chap. 1, § 5; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 921, 923; Morawetz, Priv. Corp. 1043; Pom. Eq. Jur. 1249; Atty Gen. v. Cleave, 18 Ves. Jr. 211; Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co. 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 91, 9 L. ed. 1012; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 54 U. S. 13 How. 518, 14 L. ed. 249; Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U. S. 2 Black, 485, 17 L. ed. 311; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 725, 18 L. ed. 99; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 31 L. ed. 629. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1-197, 6 L. ed. 23-70; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238. Also Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 725, 18 L. ed. 99; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100-108, 34 L. ed. 128-132.

Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 923, 924; Atty-Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co. 104 Mass. 244; Dist. Atty of East Dist. v. Lynn & B. R. Co. 16 Gray, 245; Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co. 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 98, 9 L. ed. 1015; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 54 U. S. 13 How. 518, 14 L. ed. 249. People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. 2 L. R. A. 33, 22 Abb. N. C. 164; Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Deuio, 349; Morris Run C. Co. v. Barclay C. Co. 68 Pa. 186; Central Ohio 8. Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 672; Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346; Richardson v. Buhl, 6 L. R. A. 457, 77 Mich. 632; De Witt Wire Cloth Co. v. New Jersey Wire Cloth Co. 9 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 314.