forgotten. The constitutional question has been simply whether Congress has the power to appropriate money for internal improvements; and the existence of such authority has generally been held to depend on the national character of the proposed improvement. The great difficulty has therefore been to decide what was national and what was local. President Jackson's rule in regard to river improvements proved valueless; and President Polk, after trying to find some satisfactory criterion, came to the conclusion that there was none, and that therefore internal improvements were not provided for under the Constitution. As a substitute for national aid he recommended that the States be allowed to lay tonnage duties. This plan was also recommended by President Buchanan, and has many things in its favor. It is in accordance with the principle of local self-government, which was wisely made fundamental in our system, and it would probably put a stop to much of the reckless extravagance in carrying out internal improvements. The consent of Congress which would still be necessary for each State act imposing tonnage duties would probably keep them uniform and just. President Pierce was more liberal than Polk, and advocated such improvements as were essential to the exercise of the well-defined powers of government

-as, for

example, the war power. But he lays down no definite rule, and he therefore leaves the discussion in the vague state against which President Polk protested so vigorously. The recent internal improvement vetoes have all been based on the local character of the bills, but no attempt has been made to define a "local provision." The Presidents have simply passed upon the items before

them.

At present the question of the constitutionality of internal improvements carried on by the national government is no longer discussed in Congress. By common consent the question of principle is disregarded, and each state and section of the country eagerly seeks to obtain as much as possible for itself, without much thought of possible consequences in centralizing the power of the government. The real justification of the internal improvement measures is that they are essential to the carrying out of some of the express powers of government. Many of the improvements are necessary incidents of the regulation of commerce; while the right to establish post roads and the military necessities of the government have been invoked as a warrant for others.

$95. Measures based on the general welfare clause. The attempt has frequently been made to justify internal improvement bills under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, a use of that clause which several of the veto messages have justly treated as unwarranted.1 In spite of executive warnings, however, Congress, becoming gradually aware of the great possibilities of this indefinite clause, has passed acts for the relief of unfortunate people. Such was the act for the benefit of the San Domingo refugecs, and the act for the relief of sufferers from flood, which could be justified only under the general welfare clause. In the internal improvement bills, the principle was put forward as a collateral reason for the constitutionality of the measures. In the bills just referred to, and in the Texas Seed bill, the general welfare clause is put forward as the sole constitutional justification for the proposed legislation. The practice is in substance an addition to the express powers of the government of the United States, and is open to grave objection. It is at this point in our system of government that the greatest watchfulness is necessary, lest a generous impulse open the door to the passage of bills attacking private rights instead of remedying private misfortunes. The danger of centralization is perhaps a distant and imaginary one, but the dangers of waste, of extravagance, of discriminations between citizens, and of accustoming the people to depend upon the government, are certainly near and real.

§ 96. Texas Seed Bill.- Against this dangerous tendency President Cleveland set himself in his veto of the bill authorizing a special distribution of seeds in the drought-stricken counties of Texas.2 The President vetoed the measure on the ground that there was no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution; that the relief of individual suffering which is not properly related to the public service and benefit is not the duty of the national government. He argued, further, that not only is such aid not justified by the Constitution, but that it would tend to weaken the sturdiness of our national character and the thoughtfulness of the people for each other. The President closed by pointing out that if Congressmen wished to aid the Texans, they could do so very easily and in an entirely constitutional way by transferring to the representatives of the drought-stricken districts their orders upon the Commissioner of Agriculture for seeds.

When the veto message came up in the House, Mr. Lapham, who introduced the bill, spoke briefly in opposition to the message.1 He referred to similar acts passed in 1875 and 1883, and said that if it was constitutional for the Department of Agriculture to distribute seeds at all, it certainly was justified in this case. This argument overlooks the fact that, by the bill, the Department of Agriculture was not to perform its regular work, but to act as the agent of the government in distributing the special appropriation made to relieve the sufferers in Texas. The veto was, however,

effective in checking the proposed legislation; and it lays down a principle which, if observed, must be of permanent value to the country. The government is too busy and too remote to examine into or to relieve cases of individual distress; and the States which leave the work of charity to the general government must expect that government also to assume powers which the States would gladly retain.

§ 97. War powers. A few bills have been vetoed which had reference to the exercise of the war power of Congress. None of these bills were general in their scope, and all of them failed of executive approval solely on the ground of their inexpediency; no constitutional questions were touched upon.

The first military bill which failed of approval was vetoed February 28, 1797. It was entitled, "An act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States." 2

The President refused his assent because the bill was drawn in a careless manner, and because the soldiers whom the bill proposed to muster out were needed by the government. When the message was read in the House, one or two speakers thought that the President's objections were not well taken. The debate was, however, short, and it is evident from the vote, that the great majority agreed with the President.

3

July 2, 1862, President Lincoln vetoed a bill entitled, "An act to provide additional medical officers of the volunteer service.1 The President refused to sign the bill because he had already approved one for the same purpose.

July 14, 1870, President Grant vetoed an act which provided

for the payment of bounties to men in the first and second regiments of Florida Cavalry and in the first Alabama Cavalry.1 The men in these regiments or their heirs had already received or were receiving their bounties. The bill altered the amount of the bounties in many cases, and also the order in which the heirs of the soldiers should inherit the bounties: it would therefore be exceedingly difficult, and in many cases unjust, to apply the act; and the President vetoed it.2

January 15, 1877, President Grant protested against a joint resolution authorizing the Secretary of War to supply the Reform School in the District of Columbia with blankets, on the ground. that the act would deprive the army of blankets which could not be spared. The protest was not sent with the resolution, as is generally the case, but was sent to Congress in the manner of a veto message, the President retaining the resolution. Later, the President signed it, and it became law.

The pension and relief vetoes are at the same time military and financial. They have been sufficiently considered in the earlier pages of this work.4

$ 98. General effect of the veto on the exercise of the powers of government. - Before concluding this part of our subject, a few vetoes must be mentioned which do not fit into any of the preceding classes, and which are not of sufficient importance to warrant separation into additional classes. The bills were all either needless or improperly drawn. The first of these vetoes was interposed by President Lincoln to prevent the passage of a bill which was not drawn in a satisfactory manner.5 July 20, 1876, President Grant vetoed a bill amending the post-office statutes on the ground that the bill as drawn would not accomplish its purpose. April 30, 1886, President Cleveland vetoed a bill which attempted to extend to the city of Omaha privileges which it already possessed under a prior act. July 30, 1886, President Cleveland vetoed a bill providing for a bridge across an arm of Lake Champlain, on the ground that a bill for the purpose had

1 Appendix A, No. 75.

2 For the text of the act, see Senate Journal, 41 Cong., 2 sess., 1080.

3 Appendix B, No. 9.

4 Ante, §§ 68, 81.

5 Appendix A, No. 52. .

7 Ibid., No. 136.

6 Ibid., No. 105.

already been approved.1 August 14, 1888, President Cleveland vetoed a joint resolution authorizing the printing of additional United States maps of the edition of 1886,2 on the ground that the map for 1887, which was a better and cheaper map than the one for 1886, was all ready for publication.

All the vetoes affecting the powers of government have now been considered. It is difficult to summarize their combined effect, because of the variety of subjects considered. In regard to the exercise of governmental authority over individuals, the President's power has usually been employed for the protection of individual rights. In territorial affairs the veto for a long time checked the policy of rapid disposition of the public lands, and attempted to check the unwise admission of unripe States. In finance the veto has been used, with the exception, perhaps, of Jackson's and Tyler's bank vetoes, and the French spoliation vetoes, to protect the funds of the government, to secure a sound currency, and to prevent extravagant expenditures. Almost the only application of the veto to commercial powers has been in internal improvement legislation; and here, though finally overcome by the continued policy of Congress, the Presidents long set themselves against this somewhat doubtful use of the powers of government. One courageous stand has been taken against the extension of the general welfare principle. The war powers had their great development, during the Civil War, with no executive interference.

In so far as these diverse effects can be summed up in a word, it may be said that the veto has been used to prevent Congress from unduly extending its authority; that in almost all cases it has been used wisely; and that it has failed only in those cases in which Congress has been supported by a strong public opinion, or in which the majority of the people took no interest.

1 Appendix A, No. 236.

2 Ibid., No. 392.