The President objected to the bill, on the ground that the use of the reservation as a park would impair or destroy its usefulness from a military point of view. In 1862 land was granted to such of the States as should establish agricultural colleges. In case a State should select lands whose value had been raised to double the minimum price in consequence of railroad grants, the act provided that the number of acres granted to the State should be diminished proportionately. The grant to Kansas had been decreased in this way. A joint resolution passed Congress in 1888, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to certify lands to Kansas for the benefit of her agricultural college, on the ground that the railroad which made the State land more valuable had been abandoned; that the land had in consequence fallen to the minimum value; and that, therefore, the State was entitled to more land. The President vetoed the resolution September 24, 1888,1 on the ground that although the original railroad had been abandoned, new ones had been located in its place, and that in consequence only about three hundred acres of the Kansas grant had fallen to the minimum. On the same day that the resolution just considered was vetoed, the President sent to the House of Representatives his objections to a bill entitled, "An act to provide for the disposal of the Fort Wallace military reservation in Kansas."2 President Cleveland objected to the measure because it had been drawn in such a careless manner that it would be likely to lead to the unjust treatment of certain private interests. February 21, 1889, President Cleveland vetoed a bill entitled, "An act to quiet the title of settlers on the Des Moines River lands, in the State of Iowa, and for other purposes.' "3 The reasons for the veto were identical with those assigned for the veto of March 11, 1886. § 49. Effect of the public land vetoes. A comparison of the vetoes affecting the public lands brings out clearly two respects in which the executive has differed from the legislative department. On questions of expediency the executive has been a conservative element, unwilling to enter on untried schemes and standing as a protector of settled and vested interests, as against the sweeping and often ill-considered action of Congress. In the end, however, a lavish disposition of the public lands has prevailed. In like 1 Appendix A, No. 386. Ibid., No. 387. 8 Ibid., No. 425. 2 manner the second principle for which several Presidents have striven, has in the end been overborne. Pierce and Buchanan were right in their assertion that public land may lawfully be used for the same purposes as public money, and for no other: but the practice of the government has since been firmly established that the lands may be used to attract settlement, in ways in which money could not be used; and the principle set forth by the vetoes may be considered as superseded by the accepted practice of the government. § 50. Admission of States. -The territorial power of Congress enables it not only to control the management of the public lands and the government of the Territories, but also to admit the Territories into the Union whenever it sees fit. In several cases, all of which occurred in President Johnson's administration, the executive has prevented the exercise of this power. The first of the bills to which the President objected was entitled, "An act for the admission of the State of Colorado into the Union." President Lincoln's administration had been distinctly favorable to the admission of new free States. Encouraged by this fact, both Colorado and Nebraska had applied for and obtained from Congress enabling acts. In 1866 both States applied for admission, and Congress passed acts admitting them. The Colorado bill was passed first, and when it reached the President, it found a man by no means so favorably disposed to the admission of Northern States as his predecessor had been; and on May 15, 1866, it was vetoed.2 The President's objections were threefold. In the first place, in his opinion the population in the territory was not sufficient to warrant its admission as a State. Secondly, he doubted whether the people in the Territory really wished to change the Territory into a State. Lastly, the President did not think it just to admit new States while eleven of the existing States were unrepresented in Congress. This last argument was borrowed from the larger controversy between Congress and the President in regard to reconstruction.3 The Nebraska bill was passed later in the session, and was quietly disposed of by a pocket veto, of which Congress never received official notice. 1 Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, II, 276. 4 Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, II, 277. 3 Ante, § 34. At the beginning of the next session of Congress1 Senator Wade again introduced bills for the admission of both Colorado and Nebraska into the Union. Both bills passed Congress, but as a preliminary to the passage of the acts both Territories were obliged expressly to guarantee the right of suffrage to the negroes. The Colorado bill reached the President first, and was promptly vetoed.2 The reasons for the veto were substantially those for the veto of the first bill with a few additions. The most important of the new objections was directed against the clause which prescribed that the State should never interfere with the right of the negroes to vote. January 29, 1867, the President vetoed the bill for the admission of Nebraska.3 The President urged that the population of Nebraska was scarcely sufficient to warrant its admission; but his main objection to the bill was that it prohibited the State from ever interfering with the right of the negroes to vote. The bill was reconsidered and passed over the veto. § 51. Criticism of the Colorado and Nebraska vetoes. The discussion of both vetoes in Congress was bitter and partisan. It was mainly carried on in the Senate. It can hardly be doubted that, in the light of the circumstances governing the admission of other States, the President was justified in his course. Florida, Oregon, Kansas, and Nevada had, it is true, been admitted into the Union with a population not sufficient justly to entitle them to one representative. But Florida had been admitted to make a slave State, and Kansas to settle a great national controversy. Without doubt, Congress had exclusive power in such cases, and could admit new States upon such terms as it chose. But the President was also a part of the legislative power, and could set his conditions. The truth was that Congress in its eagerness to increase the number of Northern States had hastened to admit unfit communities, and the President, although actuated by equally partisan motives, maintained a higher principle of public interest. The President objected in the second place to the restriction which Congress proposed to place upon the new States in regard 4 Colorado bill: Congressional Globe, 2 sess., 39 Cong., 818, 1922, 1927. Nebraska bill: Congressional Globe, 2 sess., 39 Cong., 851, 1096. to the right of suffrage. The question was only one phase of the larger one as to whether Congress may impose conditions of any kind on the admission of new States. Restrictions have not been uncommon, and some of them, as for example requiring from the new State a waiver of any claim to tax the lands of the United States, or fixing the boundary of the State, are undoubtedly binding.1 Such conditions as those imposed on Nebraska and Colorado cannot however have any force. One of the fundamental rules for the admission of new States is that each one shall be received into the Union on a footing with the States already existing, and with all their rights and privileges. One of these privileges is the power to amend the State Constitution, and the condition imposed on Nebraska and Colorado interfered with that privilege. Here, again, the President, although actuated by motives of hostility to the majority of Congress, was acting upon principles of strict constitutional justice. § 52. Financial powers. In considering the vetoes relating to the exercise of the powers of government, we have so far been concerned only with those touching either the rights of individuals or the territorial power of Congress. The class which next presents itself includes those vetoes which in one way or another affect the financial powers of the government. They are by far the most important and numerous of those to be examined. Such vetoes will be discussed in the following order: first, those which concern the raising of the revenue; next, those which concern the safe-keeping of government funds; thirdly, those which concern the circulating medium; and lastly, those which concern the spending of the revenue. § 53. The tariff. The raising of revenue seems so well recognized a prerogative of Congress, that no tax bill has ever been vetoed upon financial grounds, or even from constitutional considerations unmixed with personal animus. With a single unimportant exception, the only tariffs vetoed have been the two bills presented by the Whigs to President Tyler in the summer of 1842, when his struggle with the party which placed him in power was at its height. The reduction of duties under the Compromise Tariff of 1833 had gone so far that by 1842 the expenses of the government were 1 Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, 177. greater than its receipts. To meet this deficiency, Congress, in June, 1842, passed a temporary revenue act which raised the duties above the twenty per cent average. Tacked to this bill was a provision for the continuance of the distribution of the proceeds from the sales of public land. The addition would have been virtually a repeal of the act of 1841 for the distribution of the proceeds of the public land sales; it was therein provided that, if the duties should be raised above twenty per cent, the distribution should cease.1 To the President's mind the act of 1841 was a vital part of the Compromise of 1833, and he therefore vetoed the present bill. When the message was received by Congress, it created great excitement in that body. The Whigs were charged by their opponents with sending the bill to the President for the purpose of having it vetoed. The Whigs themselves expressed great indignation at the suggestion, and declared that the purest motives of patriotism alone had influenced them. August 5, 1842, a permanent revenue bill passed the Senate and was sent to the President. This bill, like its predecessor, contained a clause providing for the distribution of the proceeds of the public land sales. August 9, President Tyler vetoed the bill. in the case of the preceding bill, the President expressed no objection to the revenue clauses of the bill, but based his opposition on the distribution clause. 6 As When the message was received by the House, it was referred to a select committee of thirteen.5 On August 16, this committee made three reports: a majority report through Adams, the chairman, a minority report signed by Ingersoll and Roosevelt, and a report signed by Gilmer. The majority report attacked the President's whole course, and severely censured his use of the veto power. The report closed with a recommendation for a constitutional amendment, providing that a simple majority vote of all the members of both Houses of Congress should be sufficient to pass a bill over the President's veto. When this report appeared, the President sent a written protest to the House. The House 9 1 The same question came up in Tyler's veto of the act to repeal the provision. See ante, § 46; Appendix A, No. 26. Appendix A, No. 24. 2 3 Congressional Globe, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 694, 699, 708, 712, 716. |