informed the public that he could cure all disorders subject to the human frame, and that he had learnt of the Indians, c. &c. collect the toll, and to prevent persons from travelling." In this mode only have you a right, to stop and detain a traveller. The gate is the only means of detention. The person of a citizen on the road is sacred-you must not so much as touch him, or lay a finger upon him, and should he by accident or your negligence, pass through the gate, you cannot pursue and apprehend him. In such cases, however, he remains liable to the payment of the toll, which may be recovered by suit or action against him. The chief justice gave an excellent charge to the jury, and directed them, that if they considered the plaintiff's case proved, it was their duty to give liberal damages. That they should not only give sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the injury done, but also as a punishment to defendant. That the public were interested that such gross quackery and imposition should be put down. The jury gave a verdict for plaintiff for $400 damages. Henderson and Chamberlain, for plain-we have examined many, that imtiff; Wilson for defendant. PENNSYLVANIA. Commonwealth v. French-Assault and Battery, Quarter Session, Philadelphia county. This was a bill of indictment against John French, one of the gate-keepers of a turnpike company, for an assault and battery on Hugh Ferguson. On a verdict of "guilty" found by the jury, the following sentence was passed by the court: Rush, president. John French, you have been convicted of an assault and battery upon the person of Hugh Ferguson, under the mistaken notion of a right in the turnpike company and its agents, to arrest the person of a citizen for the payment of toll. The company have an undoubt ed right to be paid for travelling, over the whole road, and every part of it: for which purpose and to secure their toll, they are vested with power "to erect as many gates or turnpikes upon and across the road, as may be sufficient to There is not a single turnpike act that we have examined, and poses a penalty on any person getting through the gate without paying a toll. But they uniformly impose a penalty in case of evading the toll, "by passing through the adjacent land," an infallible proof that the gate is the security for the payment of the toll; for the collection of which the company may put up as many as they please. It is by means of the gates, and an action for the toll only, that you are authorised to recover payment for travelling the road. The citizens must be protected from similar outrages, and were not the court of opinion that you acted under a mistaken idea of the company's rights, they would impose an heavy fine. Believing this however to be the case, they content themselves with ordering you to pay a fine of ten dollars to the Commonwealth, together with the costs of prosecution, and to stand committed till both are paid. county of Washington, adjourned | cided is certainly correct. Justice approves the decision, and public safety renders it expedient. " Morals come in the cold abstract from pulpits, but men smart under them practically when lawyers are the preachers." on Saturday last, after a laborious term of two weeks. Several very important causes were decided. But we feel constrained particularly to mention one case, from a conviction that it teaches a very instructive lesson, on a subject neither as well understood, nor as generally regarded as its importance requires. It may serve as a very timely warning to all overseers of highways. It shows clearly, that the law holds them responsible for all losses accruing from their negligence in the performance of official duties. If path masters generally knew this, the traveller would not find, as now, in every part of the state, so many crazy bridges, which are not crossed but at the hazard of life or limb, both to man and beast. In the case we refer to, William Crozier brought an action against Moses Bartlett, an overseer of highways of the town of Salem, to recover the value of a horse, that in February 1814, broke his leg, and died, in consequence of falling through a bridge, in the district of which the defendant was overseer. It was proved, on the trial, that the bridge had been out of repair and dangerous for several weeks; that the defendant had notice of its condition, and had himself crossed it a few days before the accident; that its repair was practicable, for it was actually well repaired directly after the accident; that the accident was to be ascribed solely to the condition of the bridge, and not to any carelessness of the driver; and that the horse died in consequence of the accident. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, sixtyfour dollars, the full value of the horse. To many, doubtless, this will seem a hard case. But the principle upon which it was de CAUTION TO LOVERS. A verdict of three hundred dollars was last week obtained in the court of common pleas of this county, by a young woman against her lover, for a breach of promise of marriage. Mr. Walter Beattie, also recovered, in the same court, during the same term, 225 dollars, on an action of slander brought by him against Mr. John Beattie, jun. for words spoken by the wife of the said defendant. The State of Maryland v. Lanman.-On Saturday last Jane alias Jenny Lanman, spinster, was tried in the court of Oyer and Terminer for Baltimore county, upon an indictment for being "Communis Rixatrix,”—a common scold and turbulent brawler. The attorney general opened the prosecution with a brief statement of the facts he expected to prove against the traverser, and observed, that the gentlemen of the jury must be perfectly aware that the public peace might be more noisily disturbed and the dignity of the good people of the state of Maryland more loudly insulted by the shrill clamour of a woman's tongue than by the boisterous quarrels of men-that assaults and batteries were quickly over, and the mischief usually confined to the parties; but the rattle of a common scold was incessant | and annoyed the whole neighbourhood-that although this offence was strictly of the feminine gender, and to the honour of our sex the law had no term to fix this reproach upon men-yet inasmuch as we were the principal sufferers, the policy of the law had vested men with the sole prerogative of trial and punishment. That he trusted he need not remind them on this occasion that the tranquillity of society mainly depended upon a salutary restraint of its restless and ungovernable membera. The first witness called was the clerk of the market, who testified that he had known the traverser about four years, during which the witness had charge of the market. That on market days she was particularly noisy and troublesome, bellowing and screaming at all the market people within the reach of her tongue that excepting her tongue, he knew no harm of her —she was at times industrious and submissive.-Indeed he must confess he had now become so used to her tongue, it did not annoy him a great deal, though he could not tell how her scolding sat upon other people's ears-that he believed, however, she was afraid of no man or woman upon earth except himself. whipped the louder she had screamed, so that he absolutely despaired of a cure. Here the jury begged to have the traverser produced that they might see her, and upon this, without leaving the box they found her "guilty." We understand the punishment is not yet fixed, though the law still authorizes the court to inflict the ancient and appropriate punishment of Ducking till the of fender will hold her tongue. SUPREME COURT, PHILADELPHIA, The facts in this case are few and undisputed. The mother of Eliza was a slave, the property of James Cone, of Maryland. She absconded from her master and came to this state, in which, after a residence of about two years, her child Eliza, was born. The ques· tion therefore is, whether birth in Pennsylvania gives freedom to the child of a slave, who had absconded from another state before she became pregnant. This question depends on the law of Pennsylva nia, and the constitution of the United States. On the first of March, 1780, the state of Penn Two constables were then called, one of whom declared that he considered Jenny the traverser, one of the most turbulentest crea-sylvania passed an act "for the tures he had ever saw in the whole course of his life-that she was miserably abusive to every body, black and white, gentle and simple-that witness had flogged her over and over again, with a very good cow-hide, to see if he could not quiet her tongue, but all to no purpose, for the more he had gradual abolition of slavery," by the third section of which it is enacted, "that all servitude for life, or slavery of children, in con sequence of the slavery of their mother, in the case of all children born within this state, from and after the passing of this act, shall be utterly taken away, extinguish. ed, and forever abolished." The fifth section directs the manner in which the owners of slaves should enter them in a public register; and the tenth section declares, ❝that no man or woman of any nation, except the negroes or mulattoes who shall be registered as aforesaid, shall at any time hereafter, be deemed, adjudged, or holden within the territories of this commonwealth, as slaves or servants for life, but as free men and free women, except the domestic slaves attending upon delegates in congress from the other American states, foreign ministers and consuls," and with certain other exceptions, not affecting the present case. Thus far, the act is too clear and too positive to admit of a doubt; nor can it be denied that the state of Pennsylvania had a right to give freedom to every person within her territory, however unjust or impolitic the extreme exercise of that right might have been, considering the situation of some of her sister states. But the situation of those states was neither unthought of nor neglected. Accordingly, we find it provided by the eleventh section, "that the said act, or any thing contained in it, should not give any relief or shelter, to any absconding or runaway negro or mulatto slave, or servant, who had absented himself or should absent himself from his or her owner, master or mistress, residing in any other state or country; but such owner, master or mistress, should have like right and aid, to demand, claim and take away his slave or servant, as he might have had in case the said act had not been made." The terms of this proviso do not extend to the issue of the absconding slave, nor is there any necessary implication by which it must be extended to the issue begotten and born in PennVOL. II. sylvania. It appears to me therefore, that, under the act of assembly, this child is entitled to freedom. I desire it, however, to be understood, that it is not intended to intimate any opinion on the case, if children of domestic slaves, attending upon members of congress, foreign ministers or consuls; nor in the case of a child, with which a slave absconding from another state, should be pregnant, at the time when she came into this state. All that need be said at present, is, that those cases are distinguishable from the one now decided, and may perhaps be found to turn on different principles. But the constitution of the United States has been acted on in opposition to the act of assembly; and if there be a repugnancy, there is no doubt but the act of assembly must give way. The constitution was formed upwards of seven years after the passing of the act of assembly. By that time the operation of the act had been fully experienced by the slave holding states. It was a subject on which their feelings had been excited, and therefore we must presume, that their representatives in the general convention of 1787, regarded this important object with vigilant attention. Neither can it be supposed, that Pennsylvania and the eastern states were inattentive to what had always been deemed by them a matter of importance. So that it is a case in which there are peculiar reasons for adhering to the words of the constitution. The subject is introduced, in the second section of the fourth article, which is expressed as follows, "No person held to service or labour, in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation thereof, be discharged from such 2 T service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to which such service or labour may be due." This is in conformity with the law of Pennsylvania. The case of the absconding slave is provided for, without mention of the issue. I see not upon what ground the constitution can be extended beyond the act of assembly, nor does it appear that in the opinion of congress, it can be extended further. For in the "act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters," (passed 12th February, 1793,) there is no provision, except in case of persons held to labour in one of the United States, who shall escape into another of the said states. I am, therefore, of opinion, that, under the act of assembly of this state, and the constitution of the United States, the child Eliza was born free. Opinion of Yeates, Judge. The words of the 3d section of the act of 1st March, 1780, are general and comprehensive, and include the cases of all children of slaves who should be born within the state after that day: "They shall not be deemed and considered as servants for life or slaves." The expressions are strong and imperative, and cannot be got over. Where the meaning of the terms used by the legislature is plain, we are bound to adhere to it, and not to transpose their words, or insert others, unless the result would involve us in palpable absurdity, or gross injustice. Whatever may be our ideas of the rights of slave holders in our sister states, we cannot deny that it was competent to the legislature, to enact a law ascertaining the freedom of the issue of slaves, born after the passage of the act within this state. The only question left to be considered, is-Whether there is any thing in the constitution of the United States, or in any act of congress, passed in pursuance there. of, which controls or abridges the operations of our state law, in its plain and literal sense. The convention who formed the federal compact, had the whole subject of slavery before them; and we well know the prejudices and jealousies of the southern parts of the union, as to their property in slaves. It was no easy task to reconcile the local interests, and discordant prepossessions of the different sec tions of the United States-but the business was accomplished by acts of concession and mutual condescension. The constitution of the United States, in art. 4, sect. 2, goes no further than to provide, that persons held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another state, shall not be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up. And the act of congress of the 12th of February, 1793, points out the mode by which fugitive slaves shall be restored to their former masters, in another state. It cannot be suppo sed, for a moment, that the child in question, who was not in exist ence when her mother ran away, had escaped, or was a fugitive. Her case, therefore, is not embraced, either by the constitution of the United States, or by the act of congress. It irresistibly follows, that negro Eliza is not a slave. At the same time, it is to be fully understood, that my opinion goes no further than the case now before us. The children of the female slaves of foreign ministers, or of the members of congress of other states, which may be born amongst us, are not included therein. It |