ADDENDA.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.-P. 37 (u), Shuttleworth v. Cocker, add 2 Scott, N. R. 47.

ASSUMPSIT.-P. 51 (r), 3 P. & D. 276, add 11 A. & E. 438.

P. 55. The opinion expressed by Lord Kenyon in Jackson v. Attrill, and by Lord Abinger in Procter v. Nicholson, on the construction of the 12th section of 24 Geo. II. c. 40, must now be considered as overruled; the Court of Queen's Bench having determined in Hughes v. Doane, H. 1841, that this section contains an unqualified prohibition of the sales of spirituous liquors to a smaller amount than 20s. at a time; and that the price of spirits sold in quantities less than to the required amount, by a spirit merchant to a publican, to be consumed, not by the publican himself, but by his customers, cannot be recovered in an action. The statute is not confined to cases of a sale to the consumer himself, nor to cases where the spirits have been sold alone. In this decision the authorities of Gilpin v. Rendle, and Burnyeat v. Hutchinson, stated in the text of p. 55, were recognized.

P. 58, Mortimer v. Mc. Callan, add 7 M. & W. 20.

P. 62, after Thomas v. Courtnay, add as follows:- Where, however, the debt is actually released by the composition deed, the creditor has no right to hold any collateral security which may have been deposited with him, neither can he make the giving up of such security a consideration for a promise by the debtor to pay the residue of his debt, Cowper v. Green, 7 M. & W. 633.

P. 66 n. Ferguson v. Mahon, add 11 A. & E. 179.

P. 114 (t), and p. 503, after Jones v. Barkley, Doug. 684, add, recognized in Laird v. Pim, 7 M. & W. 474.

P. 117, add Fenwick v. Laycock, 1 G. & D. 27. A defendant cannot take advantage of an illegality to avoid a contract, without an appropriate special plea, though the illegality becomes apparent in the course of the plaintiff's case, without any evidence being offered by the defendant.

and

P. 129. Particulars of demand, R. G. T. T. 1 Vict. See
Morris v. Jones, 1 G. & D. 13.

P. 140, (ƒ), after Maghee v. O'Neil, add 7 M. & W. 531.

ATTORNEY.-P. 165 (r), Windsor v. Herbert, add 7 M. & W. 375. BANKRUPT.-P. 216. An order made by the chancellor under this s. 18,

must show on the face of it, whatever is necessary to give jurisdiction; e. g. that the creditor applying to have his debt substituted for that of the petitioning creditor, had proved a sufficient debt before making the application; Christie v. Unwin, 11 A. & E. 373.

P. 234, 1. 34, add, but the statute 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29, does not
apply to a case where the assignees were appointed before
its passing, Moore v. Phillipps, 7 M. & W. 536.

P. 234 (g), after Luckin v. Simpson, 8 Scott, add 676; 6 Bingh.
N. C. 353.

P. 234 (h), Hall v. Wallace, add 7 M. & W. 353.

P. 236, Wright v. Fearnley, add, affirmed in Exchequer Chamber, 6 Bingh. N. C. 446.

P. 248 (s), Benjamin v. Belcher, add 11 A. & E. 350.

P. 263, add Porter v. Walker, 1 M. & Gr. 686. In assumpsit by assignees for money had and received to their use after the bankruptcy, the defendant pleaded non-assumpsit, and that the plaintiffs were not assignees, and gave notice to dispute the act of bankruptcy, upon which the party was declared a bankrupt. The plaintiffs proved the act of bankruptcy and the receipt of money belonging to the estate, between the act of bankruptcy and the fiat; it was holden, that in the absence of proof of any other act of bankruptcy, the defendant, by giving notice to dispute the act of bankruptcy only, must be taken to have admitted a trading and a petitioning creditor's debt, co-existent with the act of bankruptcy proved.

P. 263 (0), after Norman v. Booth, add Littledale, J., seems since this case to have altered his opinion. Per Coltman, J., in Porter v. Walker, 1 M. & Gr. 694.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.-P. 308. Spiritual person, refer to stat. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 14, post, p. 1127.

P. 324, add, by stat. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 54, the stat. 3 & 4 Vict. c.
83, has been continued till the 1st of January, 1844.

P. 327 (e), after Davis v. Holding, add See 11 A. & E. 710.
P. 343. Where a bill, actually made in England, is drawn on
a firm in France, and accepted by them, it must be taken, as
between drawer and payce, to have been made in France,
according to the principle embodied in the civil law maxim,
contraxisse unusquisque in eo loco intelligitur in quo ut
solverit se obligaverit. This being so between the drawer and
payee, it is equally so between indorser and indorsee. In this
case, the notice of dishonour must be governed by the French
law (a).

(a) Rothschild v. Currie, B. R. H. 1841.

BILLS OF EXChange.-P. 352. There are not any days of grace in France. Rothschild v. Currie, B. R. H. 1841.

P. 381 (p), Robins v. May, add 11 A. & E. 213. COVENANT.-P. 484, (y), after Hornidge v. Wilson, add 11 A. & E. 645.

DEBT.-P. 530 (m), after Hatch v. Trayes, add 11 A. & E. 702.

P. 530 (n), Watkins v. Wake, add 7 M. & W. 488.

P. 532, refer to Fenwick v. Laycock, 1 G. & D. 27, and ante, p. 117.

DECEIT.-P. 643 (e), Dickinson v. Follett has been recognized in Brown v. Elkington, 8 M. & W. 132.

Distress.-P. 665 (a), Joule v. Jackson, add 7 M. & W. 450.

INNKEEPER.-P.

An innkeeper shall be charged, if there be a default in him or his servants, in the well and safe keeping of his guest's goods and chattels within his common inn; for the innkeeper is bound in law to keep them safe without any stealing; and it is not any excuse for him to say that he delivered to the guest the key of the chamber in which he is lodged, and that he left the chamber door open. And although the guest doth not deliver his goods to the innkeeper to keep, nor acquaints him with them, yet if they be carried away or stolen, the innkeeper shall be charged; and so, though they who stole the goods be unknown. But if the guest's servants, or he who comes with him, or he whom he desires to be lodged with him, steals or carries away his goods, the innkeeper shall not be charged for here the fault is in the guest to have such companions or servants. Calye's case, 8 Rep. 33, a. So an innkeeper is not answerable for the goods of his guest which are lost through the negligence of the guest out of a private room in the inn, chosen by the guest for the purpose of exhibiting to his customers his goods for sale, the use of which was granted by the innkeeper, who at the same time told the guest that there was a key, and that he might lock the door, which he neglected to do. Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. and S. 306. But where a traveller having several packages went to an inn, one of which packages, at his desire, was taken into the commercial room, into which he was shown, and the others into his bed-room, which, according to the usual practice at that inn, was the place to which goods were taken, unless orders were given to the contrary; the package taken into the commercial room was stolen; it was holden, that the innkeeper was responsible. Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9. There is no distinction between money and goods as far as respects the liability of innkeepers. Kent v. Shuckard, 2 B. & Ad. 803. So where an innkeeper on a fair day, upon being asked by a traveller in a gig whether he had room for his horse, put the horse into the stable of the inn, received the traveller with some goods into the inn, and placed the gig in the

open street without the inn-yard, where he was accustomed to place carriages of his guests on fair days. The gig having been stolen, it was holden (b), that the innkeeper was liable. MASTER AND SERVANT.-P. 1093 (p), after Hartley v. Harman, add 11 A. & E. 798.

NUSANCE.-P. 1110, under stat. 2 & 3,Will. IV. c. 71, ss. 3 and 4, a party is prescriptively entitled to the access and use of light, if his enjoyment commenced twenty years next before the bringing of an action in which the right is contested, provided such enjoyment has not any time been interrupted, and the interruption acquiesced in, for a whole year.

The clause of sect. 4, requiring that the interruption to bar a prescriptive title, shall have been acquiesced in for more than a year, is not limited to obstructions preceded and followed by portions of the twenty years, but applies also to an obstruction ending with that period; therefore, a prescriptive title to the access and use of light may be gained by an enjoyment for three hundred and thirty days, followed by an obstruction (not acquiesced in,) for thirty-five days. Flight v. Thomas, 11 A. & E. 688, in Exchequer Chamber; judgment affirmed in House of Lords, June 14th, 1841. P. 1113 (c), after Parker v. Mitchell, add 11 A. & E. 788.

(b) Jones v. Tyler, 1 A. & E. 522.

AN ABRIDGMENT

OF

THE LAW OF NISI PRIUS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE ACTION OF ACCOUNT.

I. In what Cases the Action of Account may be maintained. p.1. II. Of the Pleadings and Evidence. p. 4.

III. Of the Judgment. p. 4.

1. To Account. p. 4.

2. Final. p. 6.-Execution. p. 6.

I. In what Cases an Action of Account may be maintained. A PREFERENCE, of late years, having been given to the mode of proceeding by bill in a court of equity (where a discovery by the defendant's answer upon oath may be obtained), and having the account taken before a master in the Court of Chancery, or in the Court of Exchequer, the action of account has in a great measure fallen into disuse. It will not, therefore, be necessary to enter fully into the nature of this action, but briefly to apprise the reader in what cases it may be maintained, what pleas may be pleaded to it, and in what form judgment may be entered. To maintain an action of account (a), there must be either a privity in deed, by the consent of the party (for an action of account does not lie against a disseisor or other wrong-doer), or a privity in law, as in the case of a guardian, &c. By the common law, an action of account for the rents and profits may be maintained by the heir, after he has attained

(a) 1 Inst. 172, a.

VOL. I.

B