XIV. 1726. "themselves think him too great a Papist!"* CHAP. But ere long he came to perceive the great abilities and rising influence of that statesman, and cultivated his friendship with the most assiduous care. On the day when Fleury retired from Court, Horace Walpole judiciously went to call upon him at Issy, and this well-timed visit produced an inconceivable effect upon the Cardinal. He ever after looked upon the Walpoles as his intimate and personal friends. “ Once," says St. Simon, "when "I ventured to remonstrate with him on his blind "confidence in these two brothers, Fleury imme diately alleged this visit, as an heroic act of "attachment which must for ever remove all "doubts and scruples." + Thus, then, the accession of Fleury to power, far from shaking, rather confirmed the Hanover alliance; nor did the ministers of George relax in their exertions to extend it. After some struggle their party gained the ascendency in the Swedish councils. The Dutch also, as before in the Triple and Quadruple Alliances, adopted the policy of England, though from the slowness of their forms they always came lagging in the rear. "Their distinguishing talent," once said Chesterfield, "is to wrangle tenaciously upon trifles." ‡ A British squadron, under Admiral Hosier, was sent to the West Indies, and blockaded Porto *See Coxe's Life, p. 54. + St. Simon, Mem. vol. xvi. p. 405. ed. 1829. XIV. CHAP. Bello. Admiral Wager, with another squadron, sailed for the Baltic, to pursue the same system 1726. which, in 1719, Stanhope had formed and Norris executed, and which had been defined" to drive "the Muscovites as far off as is possible.”* In the latter case, however, as in the former, a strong resolution rendered unnecessary strong measures. The very appearance of Wager's fleet off Revel brought round the Russians to a more pacific temper, and the death of the Czarina, soon afterwards, altogether dissipated for the time their warlike schemes. In Spain, as in France, the fall of the Prime Minister had produced little alteration in foreign policy, and Philip still firmly clung to his alliance with the Emperor. The latter sovereign, also was unshaken in his purpose, and had just succeeded in drawing the King of Prussia from the Hanover alliance. But his main hope was founded on intrigues in England, through the means of Palm, his resident at London. It was easy for Palm to gain, as partisans, all the Hanoverian favourites. The Duchess of Kendal had no insurmountable objection to either Spanish or Austrian gold. To Bothmar, and to the other ministers, the Treaty of Hanover had always appeared a measure far too English, and the defection of Prussia made them tremble lest the Electorate should be over-run with * Lord Stair to Secretary Craggs, June 4. 1719. Hardwicke State Papers, vol. ii. 66 XIV. 1726. Imperial troops. The King himself had a strong CHAP. leaning to the same views; Hanover was always his paramount object; and it is probable that another ambassador was not far mistaken in saying that "His Majesty rather considers England as a temporary possession to be made the most of "while it lasts, than as a perpetual inheritance.” * But, besides his countrymen, Palm also paid court to the English statesmen in opposition, especially to Pulteney and Bolingbroke, and expected by this joint cabal to effect a change of ministry, and a consequent change of measures. In this state of things, Parliament meeting in January, the King's Speech contained this remarkable passage: "I have received information on "which I can entirely depend, that the placing "the Pretender upon the throne of this kingdom " is one of the articles of the secret engagements "at Vienna; and if time shall evince that the giving up the trade of this nation to one power, "and Gibraltar and Port Mahon to another, is "made the price and reward of imposing upon "this Kingdom a Popish Pretender, what an indignation must this raise in the breast of every “Protestant Briton!" Such an indignation was, in fact, raised in the Commons; an address of thanks was voted by an immense majority (251 against 81): it was unanimously resolved to raise the army to 26,000 men, being an increase of • Count de Broglie to the King of France, July 20. 1724. 1727. CHAP. 8000, and to vote 20,000 seamen; and the supplies XIV. granted for such objects fell little short of 1727. 3,000,000l. Seeing this general ferment, Palm wrote to the Emperor advising him to disavow any such secret agreement at Vienna, and to declare publicly that the assertions in the Speech were false. Accordingly, Charles, quite ignorant of the workings of the English Constitution, sent over a most indiscreet memorial, which, by his order, Palm presented to the King and published to the country. It denied the secret articles; it used very intemperate language; and, above all, it proceeded to appeal from the throne to the people. Such an insult to the Royal authority and national honour, could not be defended by any party or any person in Parliament; even Shippen, Wyndham, and Pulteney, were loud against it; and readily supported an address, moved by Walpole, "to express "the highest resentment at the affront and indignity offered to His Most Sacred Majesty by "the Memorial delivered by M. de Palm, the Emperor's resident, and at his insolence in printing and dispersing the same throughout the kingdom." Nay more, Palm was commanded immediately to depart from England. 66 66 66 66 With Spain also the breach had been widening. William Stanhope had left Madrid, and orders had been sent from thence to seize the Prince Frederick, a ship belonging to the South Sea Company, at Vera Cruz, while in Europe an army of 20,000 men was XIV. assembling for the siege of Gibraltar. The com- CHAP. mand was offered by Philip to the best and bravest of his generals, the Marquis de Villadarias. That 1727. veteran had headed the first attempt to recover Gibraltar in 1704; and though not successful, he had there displayed the same spirit and capacity, which had formerly saved Ceuta from the Moors, and Cadiz from the English.* His failure had convinced him, of what farther trials have since made clear to the world, that, difficult as the siege of Gibraltar must be under any circumstances, it is absolutely hopeless when the besiegers are not masters of the sea. Villadarias, therefore, positively refused the command, unless his master would provide a fleet as well as army; he was ready to resist attacks under any disadvantages, but would not flatter his sovereign, or hold out expectations which he was unable to fulfil; still less would he consent to sacrifice brave men for an impracticable object. Philip still persisting in his offer, Villadarias rather chose to resign all his employments, and to retire from the army. He withdrew accordingly from his long services, with a glorious poverty and an unblemished reputation; and his memory deserves to be ever revered by Spain, as one of the noblest of her sons; by England, as one of her most chivalrous opponents. He defended Ceuta in 1698, and Cadiz in 1702, and attacked Gibraltar with Marshal Tessé in 1704. (Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 275.) † Ortiz, Compendio, vol. vii p. 404. |