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TABLE D.—Estimated State unemployment contribution rates in high-cost States

necessary to maintain reserves of 3 or 5 percent of taxable wages at the end of a 10-year cycle using a $40 maximum benefit formula and assuming 2 to 5 million unemployed'

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1 Pt. II of this appendix describes these benefit assumptions in detail.

Under Council recommendations 1.2 would be the minimum rate so that no rates below this figure have been included.

The reserves of 8 States would not only increase over the 10-year cycle but would be more than 10 percent of taxable wages at the end of the cycle. In 4 (Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina, and South Carolina) of these 8 States, the benefit costs are estimated at 1.1 percent of taxable wages. In Mississippi, with costs of 1.3 percent, reserves would also increase because of the interest on the fund. According to their past benefit experience, these States would be able to charge the minimum rate and provide benefits somewhat more liberal than those assumed in our estimates. In 3 jurisdictions (District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Wisconsin), the increase in reserves would be substantial under our assumptions, since the estimated cost of benefits for each is only 0.8 percent.

For the country as a whole reserves under these assumptions would be reduced over the next 10-year cycle from the present average level of 8.3 percent of taxable wages to 4.4 percent.

Using the same benefit assumptions and applying the past benefit experience of the States, but assuming 2 to 10 million unemployed and a contribution rate of 1.2 percent, reserves in 21 States would be reduced below 3 percent of taxable wages at the end of the 10-year period. In 9 States (Alabama, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington) reserves would be completely exhausted and the cycle would end with deficits. There would be 12 additional States (Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia) that would either have to raise contribution rates or pay somewhat lower benefits than assumed in order to end the cycle with reserves of 3 percent or more of taxable wages under these assumptions (see table E, p. 200); but of this group of 12 States, only Illinois, Oklahoma, and West Virginia would have to increase their contribution rates by as much as 0.2 percentage point.

If, after weathering a depression of this magnitude, it still seemed desirable to start a new cycle, 10 years from now, with a reserve as high as 5 percent of taxable wages, all 27 States listed in table E would have to charge a contribution rate above the minimum or provide some

TABLE C.-Estimated average annual benefit costs and State unemployment

reserves as a percent of taxable wages' at the end of a 10-year cycle with a uniform contribution rate of 1.2 percent and a $40 maximum benefit formula:

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Average, 51 States..
Alabama.
Alaska.
Arizona.
Arkansas.
California.
Colorado..
Connecticut
Delaware..
District of Columbia.
Florida..
Georgia..
Hawaii.
Idaho.
Illinois.
Indiana.
Iowa.
Kansas
Kentucky.
Louisiana
Maine.
Maryland.
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota.
Mississippi.
Missouri.
Montana.
Nebraska..
Nevada.
New Hampshire.
New Jersey.
New Mexico.
New York
North Carolina.
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma.
Oregon.
Pennsylvania.
Rhode Island.
South Carolina.
South Dakota.
Tennessee.
Texas.
Utah.
Vermont.
Virginia.
Washington.
West Virginia.
Wisconsin.
Wyoming

-.3
9.1
6.8
6.6

.6
8.1
9.7
6.8
14,6

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8.2 11.8

2.4 11.1

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6.0 9.7

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7.7
7.5
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3.1
1.9
8.6

1.8
1.3

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1.6
1.9
1.8
1.6
2.0
1.8
2.0
2.5
2.0
2.2
2.2
1,6
1.5
2.2
1.8
1.3
1.8
1.9
2.3
1.3
2.5
1,3
1.5
1.5
1.8
1.9
1.9
2.9
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1.3
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1 "Taxable wages" have been increased to take account of the Council's recommendations for extension of coverage and for an increase in the maximum tax base to $4,200 a year,

* Pt. II of this appendix describes these benefit assumptions in detail.

TABLE D.--Estimated State unemployment contribution rates in high-cost States

necessary to maintain reserves of 3 or 5 percent of taxable wages at the end of a 10-year cycle using a $40 maximum benefit formula and assuming 2 to 5 million unemployed

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Pt. II of this appendix describes these benefit assumptions in detail. ? Under Council recommendations 1.2 would be the minimum rate so that no rates below this figure have been included.

The reserves of 8 States would not only increase over the 10-year cycle but would be more than 10 percent of taxable wages at the end of the cycle. In 4 (Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina, and South Carolina) of these 8 States, the benefit costs are estimated at 1.1 percent of taxable wages. In Mississippi, with costs of 1.3 percent, reserves would also increase because of the interest on the fund. According to their past benefit experience, these States would be able to charge the minimum rate and provide benefits somewhat more liberal than those assumed in our estimates. In 3 jurisdictions (District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Wisconsin), the increase in reserves would be substantial under our assumptions, since the estimated cost of benefits for each is only 0.8 percent.

For the country as a whole reserves under these assumptions would be reduced over the next 10-year cycle from the present average level of 8.3 percent of taxable wages to 4.4 percent.

Using the same benefit assumptions and applying the past benefit experience of the States, but assuming 2 to 10 million unemployed and a contribution rate of 1.2 percent, reserves in 21 States would be reduced below 3 percent of taxable wages at the end of the 10-year period. In 9 States (Alabama, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington) reserves would be completely exhausted and the cycle would end with deficits. There would be 12 additional States (Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia) that would either have to raise contribution rates or pay somewhat lower benefits than assumed in order to end the cycle with reserves of 3 percent or more of taxable wages under these assumptions (see table E, p. 200); but of this group of 12 States, only Illinois

, Oklahoma, and West Virginia would have to increase their contribution rates by as much as 0.2 percentage point.

If, after weathering a depression of this magnitude, it still seemed desirable to start a new cycle, 10 years from now, with a reserve as high as 5 percent of taxable wages, all 27 States listed in table E would have to charge a contribution rate above the minimum or provide some

TABLE C.-Estimated average annual benefit costs and State unemployment

reserves as a percent of taxable wages' at the end of a 10-year cycle with a uniform contribution rate of 1.2 percent and a $40 maximum benefit formula:

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25

2.6

Average, 51 States.
Alabama.
Alaska.
Arizona.
Arkansas.
California.
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia.
Florida
Georgia.
Hawaii.
Idaho.
Illinois.
Indiana.
Iowa.
Kansas.
Kentucky
Louisiana.
Maine.
Maryland.
Massachusetts.
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi.
Missouri
Montana.
Nebraska.
Nevada..
New Hampshire.
New Jersey.
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina.
North Dakota.
Ohio.
Oklahoma.
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island.
South Carolina.
South Dakota.
Tennessee
Texas.
Utah.
Vermont.
Virginia.
Washington.
West Virginia.
Wisconsin..
Wyoming..

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1.6
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1.8
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1.3
1.3
1.5
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1 “Taxable wages" have been increased to take account of the Council's recommendations for extension of
coverage and for an increase in the maximum tax base to $4,200 8 year.
* Pt. II of this appendix describes these benefit assumptions in detail.

Tato

ter

TABLE D.--Estimated State unemployment contribution rates in high-cost States

necessary to maintain reserves of 3 or 5 percent of tarable wages at the end of a 10-year cycle using a $40 maximum benefit formula and assuming 2 to 5 million unemployed'

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Pt. II of this appendix describes these benefit assumptions in detail. : Under Council recommendations 1.2 would be the minimum rate so that no rates below this figure have been included.

The reserves of 8 States would not only increase over the 10-year cycle but would be more than 10 percent of taxable wages at the end of the cycle. In 4 (Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina, and South Carolina) of these 8 States, the benefit costs are estimated at 1.1 percent of taxable wages. In Mississippi, with costs of 1.3 percent, reserves would also increase because of the interest on the fund. According to their past benefit experience, these States would be able to charge the minimum rate and provide benefits somewhat more liberal than those assumed in our estimates. In 3 jurisdictions (District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Wisconsin), the increase in reserves would be substantial under our assumptions, since the estimated cost of benefits for each is only 0.8 percent.

For the country as a whole reserves under these assumptions would be reduced over the next 10-year cycle from the present average level of 8.3 percent of taxable wages to 4.4 percent.

Using the same benefit assumptions and applying the past benefit experience of the States, but assuming 2 to 10 million unemployed and a contribution rate of 1.2 percent, reserves in 21 States would be reduced below 3 percent of taxable wages at the end of the 10-year period. In 9 States (Alabama, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington) reserves would be completely exhausted and the cycle would end with deficits. There would be 12 additional States (Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia) that would either have to raise contribution rates or pay somewhat lower benefits than assumed in order to end the cycle with reserves of 3 percent or more of taxable wages under these assumptions (see table E, p. 200); but of this group of 12 States, only Illinois, Oklahoma, and West Virginia would have to increase their contribution rates by as much as 0.2

percentage point.

If, after weathering a depression of this magnitude, it still seemed desirable to start a new cycle, 10 years from now, with a reserve as high as 5 percent of taxable wages, áll 27 States listed in table E would have to charge a contribution rate above the minimum or provide some

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