77). This claim was accordingly confirmed for six hundred and forty acres by the first section of the act of May 24, 1828 (6 Stat., 382); and by the second section of this act it was to be located under the direction of the register and receiver in conformity with the legal subdivisions of the public surveys, so far as practicable, including the improvements of the claimant.

A number of these third-class claims for six hundred and forty acres each, having been confirmed to actual settlers, all of whom were residing upon the same legal subdivision, it became impossible to locate all of them under the act of 1828; and, as no further provision had then been made by Congress for such cases, this claim of Alrio, along with some others, remains yet unlocated.

June 2, 1858, Congress passed an act (11 Stat., 294), the third section of which concludes as follows:

"That in all cases of confirmation by this act, or where any private land claim has been confirmed by Congress, and the same, in whole or in part, has not been located or satisfied, either for want of a specific location prior to such confirmation, or for any reason whatsoever, other than a discovery of fraud in such claim subsequent to such confirmation, it shall be the duty of the surveyor-general of the district in which such claim was situated, upon satisfactory proof that such claim has been so confirmed, and that the same, in whole or in part, remains unsatisfied, to issue to the claimant, or his legal representatives, a certificate of location for a quantity of land equal to that so confirmed and unsatisfied; which certificate may be located upon any of the public lands of the United States, subject to sale at a private entry at a price not exceeding one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, Provided, That such location shall conform to legal divisions and subdivisions."

Under the provisions of this act the surveyor-general of Louisiana, on the 2d of November, 1876, issued certificates of location in this and other Rio Hondo claims, and transmitted the same to your office for authentication. The Alrio certificates were numbered 321 A to 321 H, inclusive, for eighty acres each-six hundred and forty acres-and were issued upon the application of Widow H. W. Reynolds, who asserted title thereto through a chain of conveyances commencing back in 1837, when it is alleged Alrio, through his attorney in fact, one William P. Jones, sold and conveyed his claim, with warranty, to Caleb Richardson Parker and Charles Gustavus Oehmichen.

This scrip being prepared upon the old printed form was returned to the surveyor-general, February 26, 1881, to be by him canceled; and by the same letter your office decided 1st, That the claim in question had never been located; and second, That the real owner thereof was enti tled to indemnity scrip under the said act of 1858. In accordance with further instructions contained in this letter, the surveyor-general on the 9th of March, 1881, issued new certificates upon the engraved form; endorsing them in favor of Mrs. Reynolds, numbering them as before, and transmitted them for approval.

It appears by the proces verbal transmitted with the surveyor-general's letter of December 23, 1882, that the succession of Lettrieus Alrio was opened in the district court for the Eleventh Judicial District of Louisiana, sitting as a court of probate in and for the parish of Natchitoches, on the 10th of August, 1882; that G. L. Trichel was appointed administrator thereof; that the usual proceedings in such matters as provided by the Civil Code of Louisiana were gone through with; and that on the 14th of September, 1882, at a public sale of the effects of this succession, the inchoate claim of Alrio was purchased for $40 by A. E. Sompayrac, he being the last and highest bidder, etc., in whose favor the sheriff on the 16th of September executed and delivered the usual act of sale. Sompayrac thus became an applicant for the scrip already issued, and accordingly on February 24, 1883, by his attorney wrote your office, urging a decision as to whom the scrip belonged, and calling attention to certain defects in the chain of title by and through which Mrs. Reynolds claimed.

After considerable correspondence between Sompayrac and your office relative to the ownership of the scrip in question, the case was finally taken up, and on July 25, 1884, the decision was rendered from which the appeal of Sompayrac, now here for consideration, was taken (3 L. D., 44). This decision, after reciting a brief history of the case, denied the right of both Mrs. Reynolds and Sompayrac to receive the scrip theretofore issued. Mrs. Reynolds's application was denied, because from the evidence submitted it appeared that the power of attorney to Jones in 1837 had been executed by a female, Letrius Alrio, and not by the old settler, Lettrieus Alrio, whose claim had been confirmed as aforesaid. It was further held in said decision that the presumptions of law favored the validity of said power of attorney; and that for that reason, and also because of the departmental ruling in the "Garrett" case (7 C. L. O., 55), in reference to succession sales in Louisi ana, the claim of Sompayrac could not be recognized. This decision was understood to be final as to Sompayrac, but not as to Mrs. Reynolds, and she has not appealed from it.

The appeal of Sompayrac now before me and the argument in support of it are based upon two propositions, viz:

"I. The judgment of the court of the eleventh judicial district for the parish of Natchitoches, La., ordering a sale of the property of Let trieus Alrio, deceased, (it being a probate court and one of original general jurisdiction,) and the sale made in pursuance thereto, are binding upon the United States, unless impeached for fraud or annulled in some of the modes provided by law.

"II. The Commissioner of the General Land Office having adjudged that indemnity lands under the act of June 3, 1858, are due to Lettrieus Alrio, or his legal representatives, it is his duty to deliver the same to A. E. Sompayrac as such legal representative, by virtue of the judg ment and sale aforesaid, unless the right of Widow Henry W. Reynolds is superior in law or in equity."

These propositions will be considered in their order. And first as to the conclusiveness and binding force of the judgment of the district court of the parish of Natchitoches, in the matter of the succession of Lettrieus Alrio.

The constitution of the United States provides that, "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such records may be proved, and the effect thereof." (Art. IV, Sec. I). In execution of this express power conferred by the constitution, Congress passed the act of May 26, 1790 (1 Stat., 122), which provides in effect, That the judicial records in one State shall be proved in the tribunals of another, by the attestation of the clerk, under the seal of the court, with the certificate of the judge that the attestation is in due form. 2. That such records so authenticated shall have such faith and credit given to them in every other court of the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records were or shall be taken." In the construction of this act the Supreme Court of the United States has laid down the rule, That where the State court which rendered the judgment had jurisdiction, both of the cause and of the parties, such judgment is binding and conclusive everywhere in the courts of the United States, unless impeached for fraud. Thompson v. Whitman (18) Wall., 457), and cited cases. Upon principle, therefore, the same rule as to the conclusiveness of judgments should obtain in the executive departments of the United States as in the courts of the several States, or of the United States.

There has been no suggestion of fraud either on the part of Sompayrac or of the court which rendered the judgment; hence our inquiry must be restricted to the question of the jurisdiction of the district court. for Natchitoches parish, in the State of Louisiana. The general rule in relation to this subject is: That where the court is one of general and unlimited jurisdiction its jurisdiction of the causes tried therein is always presumed, unless the contrary be shown. Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy (5 Cranch, 173); Dred Scott v. Sandford (19 How., 401). In considering this question therefore, the constitution and powers of the court, in which this judgment was rendered must be inspected, in order that an intelligent conclusion may be arrived at.

As before stated, the proceedings in the matter of the Alrio succession were had in August and September, 1882. They were therefore under the State constitution of 1879.

Article 80 provides: "The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, in courts of appeal, in district courts, and in justices of the peace. Article 107. "The State shall be divided into not less than twenty, nor more than thirty judicial districts, the parish of Orleans excepted." Article 108: . . "The parishes of Natchitoches and Sabine shall compose the eleventh district.

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Article 109: "District courts shall have original jurisdiction in all civil matters when the amount in dispute shall exceed fifty dollars, exclusive of interest. They shall have unlimited original jurisdiction in all criminal, probate and succession matters, and when a succession is a party defendant."

Article 872, Louisiana Civil Code declares: "Succession signifies also the estates, right and charges which a person leaves after his death, whether the property exceeds the charges or the charges exceed the property, or whether he has only left charges without any prop erty."

It is thus seen from the above quoted provisions of Louisiana law that the district court of the eleventh judicial district of Louisiana, sitting as a court of probates in and for Natchitoches parish, has original unlimited jurisdiction in probate and succession matters. Having assumed and exercised jurisdiction in the Alrio succession, the law will therefore presume that it did so rightfully. Having jurisdiction, it had a right to decide all questions arising in the cause, and its judgment not having been appealed from, and having not been annulled by direct action, is binding and conclusive in the courts of the United States, and also in its executive departments, unless want of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be affirmatively shown. Harvey v. Tyler (2 Wall., 328); Florentine v. Burton (ib., 210); and Grignon v. Aster (2 How., 319).

I pass to the second question raised by the appeal of Sompayrac.

It is conceded that the claim of Lettrieus Alrio has been confirmed, that it is yet unlocated, and that certificates of location under the act of 1858 are due to his legal representative. It thus becomes necessary, as a preliminary question, to determine which of the two applicants herein, if either of them, is such representative. This question must be determined by the laws of Louisiana. That is to say, the legal representative of the confirmee Lettrieus Alrio is he, who, under the laws of Louisiana, would be considered the owner of the claim. Sims v. Irvine (3 Dallas, 425, 457); Waring v. Jackson (1 Peters, 570); Davis v. Mason (ib., 503); Miles v. Caldwell (2 Wall., 35); and many other reported cases.

Now, what are the laws of Louisiana, and what are the rules as expounded by her courts, which are applicable to this question?

The record of the succession proceedings in the matter of this claim represents "that Lettrieus Alrio died intestate in the parish of Natchi toches, about the year 1850." His succession was then legally open, and the place for disposing of his effects and settling up his estate was Natchitoches parish. Civil Code of Louisiana, Arts. 934 and 935.

It has been shown above that the court, a copy of whose record is here produced and relied upon, had "unlimited original jurisdiction in all criminal and probate and succession matters" in the parish of Natchitoches. It is further shown by the record that the Alrio succession had never

before been opened, either in the parish of Natchitoches or Sabine; that it was an unclaimed succession for over thirty years, and that the heirs were unknown and absent. This state of facts renders it what in the State of Louisiana is termed "a vacant succession." Civil Code, Arts. 1095 and 1097.

The record further shows that the aforesaid administrator G. L. Trichel, appointed by the court to manage this succession, complied with the law as to notice, bond, oath, inventory, and appraisement of effects, and final sale of the property. Civil Code, Arts. 1114 and 1115. Under Art. 1162, it is the duty of the court to sell the perishable movable property, even before the appointment of a curator. Art. 1163: "The curator is bound, in ten days affer his appointment, to demand that all the remaining movable effects found in the succession intrusted to his administration be sold."

If there are debts against the estate, it is the duty of the curator to sell first the movables for their payment, if they be insufficient, he then sells enough immovables to pay them. Arts. 1164 to 1168. But under Arts. 1169 to 1189, he must, at the end of the year, convert all property into money, and pay the net proceeds to the Treasurer of the State.

The provisions of the Civil Code of Louisiana, relating to successions, have been for many years essentially as they exist, to day. And for many years it has been considered a fundamental principle of law in that State that the purchaser of real estate at a succession sale is bound to look to the jurisdiction of the court and its order directing the sale, and if they are sufficient he is protected. This claim for scrip is in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament and is therefore descendible as realty. In the case of Lalanne's Heirs v. Moreau (13 La., 431), the heirs brought an action of ejectment against the purchasers at a succession sale of the real estate of their ancestor, relying upon several alleged nullities in the proceedings by which the property was sold, and had judgment in their favor below. The supreme court of Louisiana, on appeal, reversed the judgment below, and held, citing numerous authorities:

"Sales directed by the court of probates are judicial sales to all intents and purposes, and the purchaser is protected by the decree order ing them. A purchaser under a decree of the orphans court is bound to look to the jurisdiction, but the truth of the record concerning matters within that jurisdiction can not be disputed. The decree of the court is to be received as conclusive evidence, not to be impeached from within, and like all other acts of the higest judicial authority, impeachable only from without; and a judgment, decree, sentence, or order, passed by a competent jurisdiction, which creates or changes a title, or any interest in an estate, is not only final as to the parties themselves, and all claiming under them, but furnishes conclusive evidence to all mankind, that the right or interest belongs to the party to whom the court adjudged it."

This doctrine was afterwards affirmed in Beale et al. v. Walden (11 Robinson, 67); again in McCullough v. Minor (2 La. An., 466); and in