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each of the several notices," is a limitation for the protection of the owners of property advertised for taxes and not an authority to the treasurer to subject the property advertised to expenses for advertising beyond the sum fixed by the act of 1869. The two acts are not inconsistent and are to be construed together. The action is brought against the defendant in his official character, and the plaintiff disclaimed on the trial any right to charge him personally on the contract alleged. The contract was beyond the scope of his authority as treasurer and was not binding upon him in his official character or upon the county of Ulster. Boots v. Washburn, 79 N. Y. 207. Crouch v. Hayes. Opinion per Curiam. [Decided Feb. 10, 1885.]

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT ABSTRACT.*

CARRIER-SEPARATION OF PASSENGERS ON ACCOUNT OF RACE OR COLOR-ACCOMMODATIONS MUST BE EQUAL. -On a night steamboat plying on the Chesapeake bay colored female passengers may be assigned a different sleeping cabin from white female passengers. The right to make such separation can only be upheld when the carrier in good faith furnishes accommodations equal in quality and convenience to both alike. Citing U. S. v. Buntin, 10 Fed. Rep. 739; Gray v. Cincinnati S. R. Co., 11 id. 683. The Sue. Opinion by Morris, C. J. Dist. Ct., Dist. Md., Feb. 1885. [See 8 Am. Rep. 641; 41 Am. Dec. 482.]

VENDOR AND VENDEE-RECORD OF AGREEMENT-ENTRIES IN INDEX-NOTICE.-C. and the American Emigrant Company owned certain interests in swamp lands, under the Iowa Swamp Land Act, and C. entered into a written agreement with the company, which was in effect a conveyance of his interest. The agreement was duly recorded, and in the index C.'s name was written in the grantor column, the company's name in the grantee column, in the column headed "character of instrument" was written

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agreement," and in the description column was the entry, "with regard to swamp and overflowed lands." Subsequently S. purchased a portion of the lands. Held, that the entries upon the index were sufficient to put him on inquiry, and that he was bound thereby. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa on this question are clear and decisive. In Calvin v. Bowman, 10 Iowa, 529, and White v. Hampton, 13 id. 260, it was held that the index was sufficient to charge notice, although no description of the property was entered on the index, but simply the words, "See record." In Bostwick v. Powers, 12 Iowa, 456, the entry upon the index was "Certain lots of land," and it was held that this was sufficient. In Barney v. Little, 15 Iowa, 535, it is said to be the settled law of the State that "it is not necessarily and essentially a prerequisite to a valid registration that the index should contain a description of the lands conveyed; it is sufficient if it points to the record with reasonable certainty." In Jones v. Berkshire, 15 Iowa, 248, the rule is stated to be that "if the index discloses enough to put a careful and prudent examiner on inquiry, and if on such inquiry the adverse title would have been ascertained, the party will be held to notice." American Emigrant Co. v. Call. Opinion by Shiras, J. Cir. Ct. S. D. Iowa, Jan. 1885. [See 45 Am. Rep. 189; 29 Alb. L. J. 65.-ED.]

PATENTS-PUBLIC USE--SALE TO TEST MACHINEPRESUMPTION.-A single sale by an inventor of a machine embodying his completed invention more than *Appearing in 22 Federal Reporter.

two years before his application for a patent, will not render the patent void, where such sale is made for less than the value of the machine, without profit to the inventor, for the sole purpose of testing it, and with the understanding that it will be taken back if it does not work satisfactorily. Upon the whole evidence it is plain that the transaction was altogether experimental; therefore the invention was not "in public use or on sale" within the meaning of the statute. Birdsall v. McDonald, 1 Ban. & A. 165; Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 126; Campbell v. Mayor, etc., 9 Fed. Rep. 503; Graham v. Geneva Lake Manufacturing Co., 11 id. 138; Graham v. McCormick, id. 859. (2) It being once shown that the use is experimental, then upon the question of its reasonableness in point of duration, every presumption should be made in favor of the inventor. Innis v. Oil City Boiler Works. Opimion by Acheson, J. Cir. Ct., W. D. Penn., Jan. 1885. [See 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 1.-ED.]

PROCESS-SERVICE ON COMPLAINANT OR NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT ATTENDING ON TRIAL.-A non-resident defendant in attendance upon the trial of his case, at which his presence is necessary both as a witness and for the purpose of instructing his counsel, is protected while in such attendance from service by summons of a new writ or complaint against him. The authorities upon the general question of the protection of nonresident parties and witnesses from the service of process, while they are in attendance upon the trial of cases in which they are concerned, are very numerous. It is sufficient to cite only those which bear upon the precise point in this case, and which are: Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N. Y. 568; Parker v. Hotchkiss, 1 Wall. Jr. 269; Lyell v. Goodwin, 4 McL. 29; Halsey v. Stewart, 4 N. J. L. 366; Miles v. McCullough, 1 Binn. 77. The decision is confined to the case of a non-resident defendant; because the Supreme Court of Connecticut held, in Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1, that a non-resident plaintiff was not protected, while in attendance upon the trial of his case in this State, from the service of a new writ by summons. There is perhaps a reason why a plaintiff who has voluntarily sought the aid and the protection of our courts, should not shrink from being subjected to their control, which does not apply to the condition of a defendant whose attendance is compulsory; and therefore I do not intend to express dissent from the doctrine of the Connecticut case, but to limit this decision to the facts which are before me. Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v. Wilson. Opinion by Shipman, J. Cir. Ct.. Dist. Conn., Jan. 1885. [See 30 Alb. L. J. 117; 38 Am. Rep. 717.- ED.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER TO LICENSE-TAXREGULATING WASH HOUSES.-The council of Portland was authorized "to regulate" wash houses, and thereupon ordained that the proprietor of such a house should take out a license quarterly and pay therefor the sum of $5, or $20 a year, and in default thereof should be liable to fine and imprisonment. Held, that while the council had power to require the license as a means of regulating the business, the sum charged therefor was manifestly so far in excess of what was necessary or proper for that purpose that it must be considered a tax, and the ordinance imposing it is therefore so far void. In support of the proposition that the power to regulate a wash house does not include the power "to license," counsel for the petitioner cites Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa, 673; Com. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248; Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. 139; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 464; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 314; Dill. Mun. Corp., § 361. While counsel for the respondent cites to the contrary Burlington v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 681; Chicago P. & P. Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221;

the fees charged by her counsel for prosecuting a suit against him for a divorce a mensa et thoro, pending which suit he died. But if it be made to appear affirmatively that the suit was reasonably and justifiably instituted, counsel are entitled to recover from the husband's administrator reasonable fees for services rendered therein. It has long ago been held that where a wife has been turned out of doors and threatened by her husband, and she employed an attorney to exhibit articles of the peace against him, the husband was liable to the attorney for the payment of his charges; for, as was said by the court, whenever the husband by his conduct compels the wife to appeal to the law for protection, she may charge him for the necessary expenses of the proceeding as much as for necessary food or raiment; and her solicitor may sue for his propes charges. Shepherd v. Mackoul, 3 Camp. 326; Turner v. Rookes, 10 Ad. & Ell. 47. And so it has been held that the husband's estate was liable for preliminary expenses incidental to a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights, instituted by the wife, but before the suit came to a hearing the husband died, and no decree therefore was ever pronounced. Wilson v. Ford, L. R., 3 Exch. 63. In this last case last cited, Channell, B., said: "I think that where a suit was instituted, as it was here, for restitution of

State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Welch v. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. 140; Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257; Dill. Mun. Corp., § 91. Some of these authorities are flatly contradictory of others on this point, but the difference in the conclusion reached in most of the cases is largely attributable to a difference in the circumstances. The words "to control" and "to regulate," ex vi termini, imply to restrain, to check, to rule and direct. And in my judgment the power to do either of these implies the right to license, as a convenient and proper means to that end. A license is merely a permission to do what is unlawful at common law, or is made so by some statute or ordinance, including the one authorizing or requiring the license. By this means the persons or occupations to be regulated are located and identified, and brought within the observation of the municipal authorities, so that whatever regulations are made concerning them may be the more easily and certainly enforced, including the giving of security for their observance even before the license is issued. The authority of the National government, like that of a municipal corporation, is limited to the powers expressly granted in the Constitution, and such implied powers as may be necessary and convenient to the due execution of the former. And yet under the power "to regulate" commerce Congress may and does provide for licensing the in-conjugal rights, and for alimony pendente lite, the exstrumentalities thereof, as vessels, pilots, engineers, Indian traders and the like. License Tax cases, 5 Wall. 470. In Ash v. People, 7 Cooley, 347, it was held that the council of Detroit, under the power to license and regulate the sale of meats, might charge a fee of $5 for such license for, as I infer, the period of one year. And the fee in this case should certainly be no more than in that. In Duckwall v. New Albany, 25 Ind. 283, it was held that the defendant, under the power "to regulate" ferries having a landing within its limits, could not charge a fee of $300 for a licence therefor. Now $300 per annum for a licence to run a ferry on the Ohio river at New Albany, in 1865, was probably a smaller compensation relatively than $20 a year for keeping a wash house in Portland. There are other cases, as for instance Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 419, and Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102, in which comparatively high fees have been sustained; but there the power to licence was backed by the further provision that the municipal council in question might impose such terms or charge such sum for such license as to it might seem just and reasonable, or expedient. And this is in effect, if not in form, a power to tax the licensed occupation. But here there is not even an express power to license, let alone tax. The power to license is only implied from the power to regulate, and can only be used for that purpose. All things considered, it is apparent that the sum required to be paid the city for this license is far beyond any special expense that it may incur on account of the regulation to which it pertains; and it is quite clear from this fact, as well as the time and manner of its payment, that this sum is in effect a tax, and was so intended. This being so, the ordinance is so far void, and the petitioner is restrained of his liberty without due process of law, contrary to the Constitution of the United States. Dist. Ct. Dist. Oreg. The Laundry License Case. Opinion by Deady, J.

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.*

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR-COUNSEL FEE-DIVORCE CASE-WIDOW CANNOT SUE FOR--COUNSEL MAY. -A widow cannot maintain an action against the administrator of her deceased husband for the amount of *Appearing in 62 Maryland Reports.

penses in relation to it were necessary to her as wife, and such as she was justified in incurring." And for costs and expenses necessarily incurred by the wife in filing a petition for judicial separation, although the petition was not proceeded with, it was held the busband was liable. Rice v. Shepherd, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 332. In the case of Brown v. Ackroyd, 5 El. & B. 819, it was held that the proctor was not entitled to recover his costs for instituting proceedings for a divorce a mensa et thoro, because it did not appear that there was reasonable ground for the proceeding, that being necessary to entitle the wife to pledge her husband's credit for the costs of such proceeding; but it was fully conceded and held by the court that if that fact had appeared the husband would have been liable. And in the case of Stocken v. Patrick, 29 L. T. Ex. (N. S.) 507, where it appeared that the wife had good ground for instituting a suit for separation, because of the cruelty of her husband, and her attorney having brought suit for a divorce on the ground of adultery and cruelty, which was compromised by an agreement for a deed of separation, the solicitor was held entitled to sue and recover of the husband for his costs as between attorney and client, including the costs as between attorney and client in the divorce suit. And so in the recent case of Ottaway v. Hamilton, 3 C. P. Div. 393, on appeal, it was held that a solicitor, employed by the wife to take proceedings against her husband to obtain a divorce on the ground of cruelty and adultery, was entitled to sue and recover of the husband for extra costs, that is, costs reasonably incurred by him beyond the costs taxed and allowed as between party and party. In that case Lord Justice Bramwell, in the course of his judgment, put the case we are now considering. "Suppose," said he, "a husband were to die after the petition was filed, but before the decree could be pronounced against him, would not the common-law liability of his estate for the costs incurred by his wife continue in full force? I there fore think that the power of the wife to pledge her husband's credit remains unimpaired." And in conclusion he said: "Subject to the question whether they (the costs) have been justifiably incurred, the defendant is bound to pay them, just as if he had retained the plaintiff to act as his solicitor." But it is a condition of the right to recover that it be made to appear affirmatively that the suit of the wife against the

husband was reasonably and justifiably instituted. Hooper, in re, 2 DeG., J. & S. 91; Brown v. Ackroyd, 5 L. &. B. 819. In this State it has never been otherwise than that the husband has been required to pay the reasonable counsel fees for services rendered the wife in suits for divorce. The amount allowed has always depended largely upon the circumstances of the case and the pecuniary resources of the parties. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 4 Gill, 105. The law upon this subject as settled in several of the American States is at variance with that of England, and according to the decisions of the courts of those States, this action could not be maintained. But the principle of the English decisions would seem to be more in consonance with our own practice, and we shall therefore follow them. McCurly v. Stockbridge. Opinion by Alvey, C. J.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. PARTNERSHIP—SHARE IN PROFITS AND LOSSES.-By an agreement signed by W. and H. and Co. it was agreed that for the part taken by W. in the business then carried on by H. and Co., they should pay him a fixed salary of 180. per annum, and in addition he was to receive one-eighth share of the net profits and bear one-eighth share of the losses, as shown by the books when balanced. W. agreed to leave with the business 1,500l., which was not to be withdrawn by him during the continuance of the agreement, and in the meantime interest thereon at 5 per cent per annum was to be paid to him. The agreement was to continue in force until the expiration of four months' notice in writing on either side, at the expiration of which the sum of 1,500l., with any arrears of interest, salary and profits, was to be paid to W., but H. and Co. were to be at liberty to pay 1,500l. to W. on giving one month's notice in writing. Held (affirming the decision of Pearson, J.), that no partnership inter se was created by the agreement, which was only an agreement by a servant to give his services at a fixed salary, with a share of profits in addition, and a similar liability for losses. Pooley v. Driver, 5 Ch. Div. 458; 22 Eng. Rep. 214, distinguished; Pawsey v. Armstrong, 18 Ch. Div. 698, questioned. Ct. of App. Walker v. Hirsch. Opinions by Baggallay, Cotton and Lindley, L. JJ. (51 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 481). [27 Eng. Rep. 512; 32 Am. Rep. 267.-ED.]

LICENSE IRREVOCABLE-MAKING IMPROVEMENTS ON LAND.-The equity to arise from expenditure on land need not fail merely on the ground that the ininterest to be secured has been expressly indicated. P. erected a jetty on the foreshore of the harbor of W. under a revocable license from the Crown to use it for the purposes of a wharfinger; afterward, at the instance of the colonial government, he extended the jetty, and made other additions to it, and it was for some time used by the government for emigrants. Held, that the license had become irrevocable, and that the equitable right so acquired by P. was an es. tate or interest in land" which could be the subject of compensation under local statutes. The law relating to cases of this kind may be taken as stated by Lord Kingsdown in the case of Ramsden v. Dyson, L. R., 1 H. of L. 129. The passage is at page 170: "If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or what amounts to the same thing, under an expectation created or encouraged by the landlord that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord and without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect

to such promise or expectation. This was the principle of the decision in Gregory v. Mighell, 18 Ves. 328. * * * If on the other hand a tenant being in possession of land, and knowing the nature and extent of his interest, lays out money upon it in the hope or expectation of an extended term or an allowance for expenditure, then, if such hope or expectation has not been created or encouraged by the landlord, the tenant has no claim which any court of law or equity can enforce. This was the principle of the decision in Pilling v. Armitage, 12 Ves. 78, and like the decision in Gregory v. Mighell, seems founded on plain rules of reason and justice." In such a case as Ramsden v. Dyson the evidence, according to Lord Kingdown's view, showed that the tenant expected a particular kind of lease, which Stuart, V. C., decreed to him, though it does not appear what form of relief Lord Kingsdown himself would have given. In such a case as the Duke of Beaufort v. Patrick, 17 Beav. 60, nothing but perpetual retention of the land would satisfy the equity raised in favor of those who spent their money on it, and it was secured to them at a valuation. In such a case as Dillwyn v. Llewelyn, 4 De G. F. & J. 517, nothing but a grant of the fee simple would satisfy the equity which the lord chancellor held to have been raised by the son's expenditure on his father's laud. In such a case as the Unity Bank v. King, 25 Beav. 72, the master of the rolls, holding that the father did not intend to part with his land to his sons who built npon it, considered that their equity would be satisfied by recouping their expenditure to them. In fact the court must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied. Jud. Com. Priv. Coun. Plimner v. Mayor of Wellington. Opinion per Curiam. [51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 475.]

FINANCIAL LAW.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-COUPON BONDS-NEGOTIABILITY-SEAL.-. -A coupon bond of a private corporation, payable to bearer, and secured together with other bonds of the same character by a mortgage on the works of the company, is a negotiable instrument, and the mere addition of the seal of the corporation does not destroy its negotiability. When such bond is delivered by a person having possession of the same to another party who gives value for it and takes it without notice of any defect in the title, the title passes to the transferee irrespective of any defect in the title of the transferrer. It is held by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by the courts of our sister States, that the bond of a corporation is negotiable, and that the mere addition of the seal of the corporation which issued it does not destroy its negotiability. So where the name of the payee is left blank the holder may fill in his own name, and bring suit on the instrument. Chapin v. Vermont & Mass. R. Co., 8 Gray, 575; White v. Same, 21 How. 575. The bond of a railroad company to secure payment of money, although under seal, when made payable to bearer or to order, is regarded as invested with all the attributes of negotiable paper. Zabriskie v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co., 23 id. 381; Winfield v. Hudson, 28 N. J. L. 255; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 120; Morris Canal Co. v. Lewis, 12 N. J. Eq. 323. So municipal bonds, made payable to bearer, are held to be negotiable. They are transferable by delivery, and the holder may sue in his own name. Taylor on Priv Corp., $326; Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 id. 51; Ottawa v. National Bank, 105 id. 342; Thompson v. Perrine, 106 id. 589. The early decisions of our own State do not recognize this rule to its full extent. The later cases however have been gradually approaching a conclusion in har

mony with the decisions elsewhere. We will refer to a few cases showing the conflict which has been going on and the final conclusion reached. It was held in Frevall v. Fitch, 5 Whar. 325, and in Hopkins v. R. Co., 3 W. & S. 410, that an instrument in the form of a promissory note, if attested by the seal of the corporation, was not negotiable. In Carr v. Lefevre, 3 Casey, 413, it was held that a bond issued by a corporation, payable to bearer, will pass by delivery, and the holder may sue on it in his own name. In the opinion of the court, by Mr Chief Justice Lewis, it is said: "We do not desire to have any doubt on the question whether the holder of bonds issued by a corporation, payable to bearer, may maintain an action on them in his own name. Such bonds are not strictly negotiable under the law merchant, as are promissory notes and bills of exchange. They are however instruments of a peculiar character, and being expressly designed to be passed from hand to hand, and by common usage so transferred, are capable of passing by delivery so as to enable the holder to maintain an action on them in his own name." This rule is recognized to be correct in Phila. & Sunbury R. Co. v. Lewis, 9 Casey 33. It was ruled in Diamond v. Lawrence County, 1 Wright, 353, that a coupon boud of the county, under seal, should not be treated as negotiable paper, although it was there conceded that all the courts, American and English, held otherwise. County of Beaver v. Armstrong, 8 Wright, 63, contains a very full reference to the authorities, showing that corporation bonds under seal payable to bearer in money were negotiable. See also Bunting Admr. v. Camden, etc., R. Co., 31 P. F. Smith, 254; Gibson v. Lenhart, 5 Out. 522; Phelan v. Moss, 17 P. F. Smith, 59; McSparran v. Neeley, 10 Norris, 17. Sup. Ct. Penn., Oct. 6, 1884. Mason v. Frick. Opinion by Mercur, J. (15 W. Note Cas. 369.)

MINISTER PHELPS FIRST AFTER-DINNER SPEECH IN ENGLAND.

AT

[From the London Daily Standard, June 5.]

T the Mansion house last night the lord mayor entertained her majesty's judges at a banquet, and not only the bench but the bar and law generally were largely represented. An additional interest attached to the occasion from the presence of the American minister, who is a distinguished member of the legal profession in the United States, and who made his first appearance in public. There were some 300 ladies and gentlemen present, the legal notabilities being Lord Justice Lindley, Lord Chief Justice Morris, Lord Justice Fry, Lord Watson, Lord Justice Bowen, Justices Denman, Kay, Manistry, Mathew, Cave, Day, Lopes and North, Baron Pollock and a strong muster of Q. C.'s and of other guests.

At the banquet the loving cup was circulated and the royal toasts were duly drunk.

The lord mayor proposed the health of the minister of the United States. While cordially welcoming his excellency in the name of the whole country, he would express a hope that the existing relations between the two countries might be maintained, so that no great diplomatic activity on his part would be necessary.

predecessor; but I own it is more gratifying to me than any personal compliment which could be paid to me, for I see in this another proof, in addition to the many which have been pressed upon me during the short time since I landed on these shores, of the cordial and hearty feeling of sympathy which exists between the English people and the people of the country which I have the great honor to represent. An American representative coming here finds that it is no foreign mission on which he has been sent. On both sides of the Atlantic he finds that he is equally at home. He has changed his sky, but not the hearts by which he is surrounded. [Applause.] He comes as a stranger, but he is soon made to perceive that he is welcomed and established at once as a friend. [Hear, hear.] It is an undeniable fact, and in my judgment a most significant and gratifying fact, that the relations between the people of the two great countries are growing more cordial every day. I believe they never were so cordial as they are at this moment. [Applause.] International prejudices are usually the offspring of international misunderstanding; and these rapidly disappear under the influence of a large and liberal international intercourse. [Hear, hear.] That is the means, under providence, that is bringing these people nearer and nearer, all the time, to each other. [Hear, hear.] Steam and electricity have bridged the Atlantic, and both countries are full of the citizens of each other. Many Americans live here, and many English reside in the United States. Every summer this country is overspread with visitors from the other side of the Atlantic. How cordially on our side of the Atlantic the feeling I have referred to as existing here is reciprocated, those who have traveled in the United States will know [hear, hear], while those who have not been there I cordially invite in the name of my country to go. [Cheers.] It is such intercourse that has brought the two people together in the manner to which I have alluded. The nature of the relations between governments, and especially of great nations, is most important undoubtedly, and we are to be felicitated, that as the lord mayor has said, the relations between the governments of England and of the United States are now on so satisfactory a footing that nothing has to be said of them on any occasion. But after all the real sympathy and fraternity which should exist between nations depend not upon the governments, and are not to be brought about by diplomacy; they depend upon the personal sympathy of the feelings of the people for each other. [Hear, hear.] If I may be permitted to allude to recent events, I can assure you that when it was perceived in America that the clouds of war which appeared to be settling down began to dissipate, and there was a hope-in which I pray God we may not be disappointed-that the sunshine, if continued, was likely to fall unobstructed on the multiplied industries of England, there was no people within the range of humanity by whom that conclusion was received with more sincere and complete satisfaction and gratitude than by the people of the United States. [Cheers.] Especially, sir, as it seems to me, should the fraternal feeling between these great nations find expression in this place, and on such an occasion, where you, my lord mayor, preside in the capacity of chief magistrate of this greatest city in the world, whose commerce has more than put a girdle round about the earth, and whose great industry and business have made its commerce. It is there that you touch us most nearly. America is emphatically a country of industry and business, and in no other country in the world do business men have so large a 'share of influence in the affairs of government. Amer ica is pre-eminently a country for the worker and not for the idler, and therefore here more than anywhere

Mr. Phelps, whose rising was the signal for continued applause, said: I am very much indebted to you, my lord mayor, for the very kind words in which my name has been presented, and to you, my lords, ladies and gentlemen, for the more than kind and generous manner in which you have received it. I do not presume to take to myself in any degree the honor of this reception I am as yet a comparative stranger within the gates of England, and have no such claim upon your personal consideration as had my distinguished

else is it appropriate that expression should be given to the true relations which exist between the two countries. [Hear, hear.] But there is another reason why an American representative who, as you have said, my lord mayor, is an American lawyer, should be glad to come here on this occasion, and that is the common share we claim with you and the common admiration which we feel with you for those distinguished men who are the judges of England. [Hear, hear.] We claim them also as our brethren, for in hundreds of American courts, and to thousands of lawyers as well as judges who never saw and never will see the faces of English judges, their names are household words, and their judgments are the subjects of constant study and instruction. Of American judges, it may be said that they administer laws over the wide area between the Atlantic and Pacific largely founded on your judgments here, so greatly are they esteemed and valued. We have lately had among us one of the most distinguished members of the English bench-Lord Chief Justice Coleridge. He came as the guest of the American bar, but he remained as the guest of the American people. [Cheers.] He delighted them, and I believe he came away not altogether displeased with us. [Hear, hear.] I hope many of his distinguished brethren will follow his example and travel through what I may call the second jurisdiction of the British bench. I think in no one thing are the British people more largely to be congratulated than upon their judiciary; for it is British justice which has built up British liberty. The freedom of England has been fought for in many a field, and contended for in many a parliament, and many a great light has been thrown upon it from the judicial bench, and the freedom we enjoy we inherited from you. Your poet laureate has condensed the whole thing in his lines:

It was

''Where freedom broadens slowly down From precedent to precedent." [Cheers]. The London Times of June 5th says: Mr. Phelps, the new United States minister, appeared for the first time on Wednesday evening in his official character, before a large assemblage of Englishmen. He gave on that occasion abundant reason for the British public to desire that he may let it see much of him, and enable it to become intimately acquainted with his merits. In his answer to the Lord Mayor's proposal of his health, he chose his topics with the utmost judgment, and treated them with perfect taste. something of an ordeal at once for his audience and for himself, and both emerged from it with mutual satisfaction. The succession to Mr. Lowell could not but be a trying inheritance. An infusion of a little literary crossgrainedness into his predecessor's diplomatic behaviour would have smoothed Mr. Phelps' entrance on his ministerial career. Mr. Lowell has supplied him with no opportunities of solacing contrast between men of genius and men of affairs. No legation could have been conducted more efficiently than that of the United States during the past few years. Its chief showed himself to be as capable in interviews at the foreign office as he was brilliant in the Abbey Chapter House. His successor is known for excellent business qualities. He spoke on Wednesday with a grace of diction and an elevation of tone which prove him fitted to fill Mr. Lowell's place as well socially as in office. The two countries want at the United States legation in London one who will live with Englishmen while be negotiates. The lord mayor expressed a natural hope that very little might be heard of Mr. Phelps' discharge of his diplomatic duties. As Mr. Phelps said in his reply, it is indeed matter for congratulation when, as now, they require nothing to be said about them. Because they excite no public anxiety it is not to be supposed they either are super

fluous or are not being performed. Between leading States like the Union and Great Britain causes of friction are ever liable to arise. They may be rubbed into sores, or soothed into subsidence, much at the discretion of diplomacy. A sympathetic American representative will understand that for Englishmen to wish to provoke American ill-will is inconceivable. He will comprehend their general disposition to friendliness, and something warmer. He will put to the true account the accidents of local manner and expression. He will feel himself accredited to the British people no less than to the secretary for foreign affairs. To Englishmen it is at least as important as to an American minister that he should accept his functions in that spirit. Mr. Phelps' sample of himself at the Mansion House is testimony that his interpretation of his obligations agrees with theirs.

A special connection with one of the great divisions of English life and thought tends to facilitate a general appreciation of the nationality it is an American envoy's province to study. A member of an American profession which is also an English profession begins by not being a stranger. Mr. Lowell from the moment he occupied the legation was at home. As a member of the vocation of letters, he had a key to the citadel of English hearts. Mr. Phelps is among the most eminent of American lawyers, and has stepped on shore in the midst of a confraternity which is scarcely other than his own. An American minister who has spent, as Mr. Phelps worthily boasts, his best years in the practice of the law, is provided with a wedge warranted to open the hardest knots of insular reserve. He speaks the dialect in vogue wherever lawyers are met; and where are they not? Armed with the professional shibboleths, he has of his personal right as unchallenged admittance into the inmost recesses of English habits as the author whose heart both sides of the Atlantic are equally empowered to read. Not in literature itself, common as it is to the two lands, is the National inheritance of Great Britain and the United States more genuinely undivided and joint than in law. There are American text books which have educated two generations of English jurists. Judgments of English courts are cited at Washington with hardly less technical and almost more moral authority than the decisions of American judges. On particular points, sometimes grave, oftener trivial, the courts of the two countries differ. In guiding principles and in spirit they obey the same motives, and would esteem it a serious discredit to be convicted of unexplained divergence. For both the advantage is manifest and extraordinary. The absence of direct authority in the expositions from across the water, to which Mr. Phelps referred, increases rather than lessens their utility. A lawyer adopts more or less mechanically when in his favor, or struggles against as tyrannical when adverse, precedents from his native tribunals. Without any sense of constraint he consults conclusions arrived at by minds which, though foreign, are trained like his own and acknowledge identical principles, in order to inform his own intelligence, and to assist his reason in its voluntary operations. American lawyers are in this impersonal way very familiar already to Englishmen, and have long been highly regarded by them. Individually they are less well known abroad than the liberality of the English legal vacation has enabled the professors of this country to be. Mr. Phelps will do much toward repairing the omission. He will be a medium toward bringing the English and American bars and benches together in other modes than by their partnership in law books and axioms. Lord Coleridge investigated minutely during his American tour the American legal procedure, and is believed to have persuaded himself of its adaptibility in several respects to English needs. Mr. Phelps can

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