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expose him to the debasing seduction of bribery, or the humiliating influence of intimidation, the possession of the privilege would be fertile in pernicious consequences to his own character: but if recourse were had to the simple expedients which the case admits, in order to shelter him from such abuses, the exercise of his little share of political power would tend to enlighten his understanding and elevate his self-respect. He would be naturally led into a consideration of the merits of different political questions and characters, and induced to seek information on subjects respecting which he would otherwise have felt no curiosity: his importance in society wonld be raised, his attention to the discreet direction of his own conduct enlivened, and his good-will and respect for laws, emanating from an authority in the appointment of which he felt that he had enjoyed a participation, would be enhanced.

Another consideration, too, is to fix the qualification at a point to which every individual might have the opportunity of rising in the course of his life. The wish to gain the franchise, would operate as a salutary stimulus to his exertions, and tend to engender that early economy, by which every man who chooses may raise himself into a respectable condition.

SECTION III.

On the Division of the Electoral Body into separate Constituencies.

It is necessary not only to determine what portion of the community are to form the electoral body, but, for the more convenient exercise of the elective franchise, to divide that body into a number of distinct parts.

There are divers ways in which this might be done. The several professions or ranks of society might be set apart to form separate constituencies, or constituencies might be formed from persons connected by nothing but local proximity. The latter is the method which most obviously suggests itself; nor has the most comprehensive view of the subject, which experience and reflection have been able to take, yet presented any better plan.

It has already been incidentally explained, that the really valid reason why the election of each member ought to be assigned to a separate constituency is not, that he may urge and advocate the particular interest of that constituency, but that by such a regulation the business of selection

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is better done, as in other instances where recourse is had to the distribution of work amongst a number of hands.

By forming these constituencies on the principle of local proximity this object is promoted; there are two advantages in fact gained by it. In the first place, the votes can be collected more readily; and in the second place, as the electors in each constituency will belong to various trades, ranks, and professions, there will be less of a peculiar and exclusive spirit amongst them—the choice will be made on more general grounds.

It is needless to enter into any further argument on this point, for it has probably never been disputed, in this country at least, that district constituencies are better than class constituencies, in the sense here intended by those terms.

We may therefore proceed to inquire, whether there are any particular principles to guide us in preferring districts of one size to those of another, understanding by the size of a district, not its geographical or territorial extent, but the number of its population.

There are many reasons why a constituency should not be small in number. When this happens to be the case, the electors are in proportion easily bribed and intimidated. The votes are

of greater value, and are more likely to be the objects of intrigue and traffic, while there is a higher probability that they will be influenced by local and personal prejudices, as well as by narrow and exclusive views. In addition to all which it may be stated, that the plan of secret voting, which is the only independent voting, could scarcely be carried into successful operation amongst a constituency comprising an inconsiderable number of voters.

For these reasons, if in a small state the proper number of deputies to form the representative assembly could not be obtained without making the electoral districts too contracted, it would be advisable to increase the size of the districts, and augment the number of representatives to be elected by each. Suppose, for the sake of illustrating the subject, that on the plan of single representation, the division of the country into such a number of districts as would furnish a sufficiently numerous legislative assembly, should yield a constituency of no more than three hundred electors in each district, it would in that case be the best course of proceeding to throw four of these small districts into one, with the privilege of sending conjointly four representatives. This would have the good effect, not only of interposing

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difficulties in the way of bribery and intimidation, and of facilitating the preservation of secrecy, but of rendering the representatives less dependent on mere local and partial interests.

It must be owned, that on the other hand it would diminish the sense of responsibility in some cases, by dividing the business to be done amongst four agents; but if general interests alone had to be attended to, this effect could not be of material, or at least paramount importance. Each member would be an independent legislator for the whole country, and would be judged by his own personal acts, without being implicated in the defects and merits of his colleagues.

This hypothetical case is however, as the reader will see, introduced merely by way of illustration, and not as a probable incident. In a country of any considerable geographical extent and population, in any country indeed of sufficient size to form an independent state, there would be no need to have recourse to such an expedient. The way of proceeding would be simply to fix on the number of deputies proper to form the legislative assembly, and divide the country into a corresponding number of districts, which in all but extraordinary cases would yield constituencies sufficiently large.

On the simple principle that no political in

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