CHAPTER II.

ON THE GROUNDS OF PREFERENCE FOR A

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

THE object of government being admitted to be the happiness of the community, and the province of government to promote that happiness, by such measures as individuals or subordinate associations are incompetent to carry into effect, it must also be admitted, that amongst the various forms of government, that form is to be preferred by which the object is best attained. If every act of the supreme authority ought to be tried by the test of conduciveness to the public good, the mode in which that supreme authority is conferred, and the conditions under which it is to be exercised, must be subjected to the same criterion.

Could it be shown that irresponsible power, lodged in the hands of a single individual, is productive of greater good to the community than any other description of authority, every wise man

would be its supporter and advocate. On the same principle, could it be proved that such an arrangement, as placed power in the hands of an inconsiderable number of persons, who were not to be accountable for the use which they made of it,-is recommended by a superiority in beneficial results over every other political system, a wise nation would not hesitate to adopt it. It would be no valid objection that it is unjust to give one man irresponsible power over his fellows, or a number of men uncontrolled authority over the rest. On the supposition (improbable perhaps) that the welfare of the whole community could be promoted, by conferring on half of the people greater privileges than on the other half, it would be wise to do so; for to act differently, would be to sacrifice the common happiness to an empty regard for equality.

This then is to be the universal criterion in matters of public concern, the test of forms of government, as well as of particular plans of representation, and of laws emanating from the constituted authorities. We are not to be decided in our choice by the circumstance of a political system conferring equal privileges, or by that of its bestowing them on some descriptions of people, and withholding them from others. What

F

ever is the arrangement submitted to our option, it is to be preferred, on proof being adduced, that notwithstanding all its inequalities and partialities, it is, on the whole, the best for the community.

This view of the subject relieves us from all the vague declamation about natural and inalienable rights, which has become the conventional language of almost all people struggling against the encroachments of power. It is a natural right (says one) that every man of mature age and sound mind shall have a voice in the government of the country, and not be subjected to arbitrary rule. It is an inalienable right belonging to all men (exclaims another) that they shall not be taxed without being represented.

Now a natural and inalienable right, whatever these terms may imply in the minds of those who use them, is one, the exercise of which, if it is not of a neutral character (that is to say, of no importance), is either beneficial or injurious to the community. If the enjoyment of it is beneficial, the right will be left undisturbed, should it be already existing, and will be conferred, if not existing, on the principle of utility here maintained. If, on the other hand, the privilege or mode of action is injurious to the community, of what consequence is it that it can be dignified by the name of natu

ral right? For a nation to insist on the privilege of acting in some particular manner, inconsistent with its own welfare, or in other words, on the right of doing itself harm, would be folly. Whether, therefore, a country should have a representative government,-whether every man of sound mind and mature age should have a voice in the election of the legislature,-whether no one should be taxed without being represented; and on the other hand,-whether supreme and irresponsible power should be lodged in the hands of a monarch, to govern and tax his subjects at his own discretion;—are points to be determined by the effects of these several arrangements on the public welfare, and not by a vague affirmation that certain specified privileges, modes of action, or forms of government, are natural and inalienable rights; language which, when it is closely examined, will prove destitute of any precise meaning*.

According to the doctrine here advocated, if a representative government is to be preferred to all other kinds, it must be on the ground that it conduces to the good of the community more effectually than any other. That it is fully entitled to a

* See the Supplementary Essay on Rights, at the end of the

present treatise.

preference for this reason, will not require any long

deduction to prove.

It is a principle of human nature, that men will, in the majority of cases, prefer their own interests to that of others, when the two are placed in competition. An individual who possesses uncontrolled authority over his fellow-men will, in the long run, or in the general tenor of his conduct, make his own pleasure and advantage his first object, whatever may be the consequences to his subjects. The happiness of those who are below him will be a secondary consideration, and will be compelled to give way to his own, whenever one interferes with the other. It will be the same with a body of men, however small or however numerous. All will use the uncontrolled power which they may possess for their own advantage, where there is a competition of interests *. It is vain to bring instances of disinterested men; of despotic rulers who have conscientiously wielded their power for the good of their subjects; of oligarchies that have had no other end in view than the happiness of the community over which they

*All men (says Burke) possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power, leading to the aggrandizement and profit of their own body, have always abused it."-Thoughts on the present Discontents.