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attempt, which must be fatal if it were not successful. On their side, the Romans acknowledged the loss of only seventy-five men; while they affirmed, that the barbarians had left on the field of battle two thousand five hundred, or even six thousand, of their bravest soldiers. The spoil was such as might be expected from the riches and luxury of an Oriental camp; large quantities of silver and gold, splendid arms and trappings, and beds and tables of massy silver. The victorious emperor distributed, as the rewards of valour, some honourable gifts, civic, and mural, and naval crowns; which he, and perhaps he alone, esteemed more precious than the wealth of Asia. A solemn sacrifice was offered to the god of war, but the appearances of the victims threatened the most inauspicious events; and Julian soon discovered, by less ambiguous signs, that he had now reached the term of his prosperity.*

On the second day after the battle, the domestic guards, the Jovians and Herculians, and the remaining troops, which composed near two-thirds of the whole army, were securely wafted over the Tigris.† While the Persians beheld from the walls of Ctesiphon the desolation of the adjacent country, Julian cast many an anxious look towards the north, in full expectation that, as he himself had victoriously penetrated to the capital of Sapor, the march and junction of his lieutenants, Sebastian and Procopius, would be executed with the same courage and diligence. His expectations were disappointed by the treachery of the Armenian king, who permitted, and most probably directed, the desertion of his auxiliary troops from the camp of the Romans; and by the dissensions of the two generals, who were incapable of forming or executterrore subito miscuerunt, versisque agminibus totius gentis apertas Ctesiphontis portas victor miles intrâsset, ni major prædarum occasio fuisset, quam cura victoriæ. (Sextus Rufus de Provinciis, c. 28.) Their avarice might dispose them to hear the advice of Victor.

* The labour of the canal, the passage of the Tigris, and the victory, are described by Ammianus (24, 5, 6), Libanius (Orat. Parent. c. 124128, p. 347-353), Greg. Nazianzen (Orat. 4, p. 115), Zosimus (lib. 3, p. 181-183), and Sextus Rufus (de Provinciis, c. 28). + The fleet and army were formed in three divisions, of which the first only had passed during the night. (Ammian. 24, 6.) The Tãon dopvpópia, whom Zosimus transports on the third day (lib. 3, p. 183), might consist of the Protectors, among whom the historian Ammianus, and the future emperor Jovian, actually served; some schools of the domestics, and perhaps the Jovians and Herculians, who often did duty as guards.

Moses of Chorene (Hist. Armen. lib. 3, c. 15, p. 246).

32

DILATORINESS OF THE SATRAPS.

[CH. XXIV. ing any plan for the public service. When the emperor had relinquished the hope of this important reinforcement, he condescended to hold a council of war, and approved, after a full debate, the sentiment of those generals, who dissuaded the siege of Ctesiphon, as a fruitless and pernicious undertaking. It is not easy for us to conceive, by what arts of fortification, a city thrice besieged and taken by the predecessors of Julian, could be rendered impregnable against an army of sixty thousand Romans, commanded by a brave and experienced general, and abundantly supplied with ships, provisions, battering engines, and military stores. But we may rest assured, from the love of glory, and contempt of danger, which formed the character of Julian, that he was not discouraged by any trivial or imaginary obsta cles.* At the very time when he declined the siege of Ctesiphon, he rejected, with obstinacy and disdain, the most flattering offers of a negotiation of peace. Sapor, who had been so long accustomed to the tardy ostentation of Constantius, was surprised by the intrepid diligence of his successor. As far as the confines of India and Scythia, the satraps of the distant provinces were ordered to assemble their troops, and to march, without delay, to the assistance of their monarch. But their preparations were dilatory, their motions slow; and before Sapor could lead an army into the field, he received the melancholy intelligence of the devastation of Assyria, the ruin of his palaces, and the slaughter of his bravest troops, who defended the passage of the Tigris. The pride of royalty was humbled in the dust; he took his repasts on the ground; and the disorder of his hair expressed the grief and anxiety of his mind. Perhaps he would not have refused to purchase, with onehalf of his kingdom, the safety of the remainder; and he would have gladly subscribed himself, in a treaty of peace, the faithful and dependent ally of the Roman conqueror. Under the pretence of private business, a minister of rank and confidence was secretely dispatched to embrace the knees of Hormisdas, and to request, in the language of a suppliant, that he might be introduced into the presence of the emperor. The Sassanian prince, whether he listened to the supplies us with a national tradition, and a spurious letter. I have borrowed only the leading circumstance, which is consistent with truth, probability, and Libanius. (Orat. Parent. c. 131, p. 355).

* Civitas inexpugnabilis, facinus audax et importunum. Ammianus,

voice of pride or humanity, whether he consulted the sentiments of his birth, or the duties of his situation, was equally inclined to promote a salutary measure, which would terminate the calamities of Persia, and secure the triumph of Rome. He was astonished by the inflexible firmness of a hero, who remembered, most unfortunately for himself, and for his country, that Alexander had uniformly rejected the propositions of Darius. But as Julian was sensible, that the hope of a safe and honourable peace might cool the ardour of his troops, he earnestly requested that Hormisdas would privately dismiss the minister of Sapor, and conceal this dangerous temptation from the knowledge of the camp.*

The honour, as well as interest, of Julian, forbade him to consume his time under the impregnable walls of Ctesiphon; and as often as he defied the barbarians who defended the city, to meet him on the open plain, they prudently replied, that if he desired to exercise his valour, he might seek the army of the great king. He felt the insult, and he accepted the advice. Instead of confining his servile march to the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris, he resolved to imitate the adventurous spirit of Alexander, and boldly to advance into the inland provinces, till he forced his rival to contend with him, perhaps in the plains of Arbela, for the empire of Asia. The magnanimity of Julian was applauded and betrayed, by the arts of a noble Persian, who, in the cause of his country, had generously submitted to act a part full of danger, of falsehood, and of shame. With a train of faithful followers, he deserted to the imperial camp, exposed, in a specious tale, the injuries which he had sustained; exaggerated the cruelty of Sapor, the discontent of the people, and the weakness of the monarchy; and confidently offered 24, 7. His fellow-soldier, Eutropius, turns aside from the difficulty, Assyriamque populatus, castra apud Ctesiphontem stativa aliquandiu habuit: remeansque victor, &c. 10. 16. Zosimus is artful or ignorant, and Socrates inaccurate. * Libanius, Orat. Parent. c. 130, p. 354; c. 139, p. 361. Socrates, lib. 3, c. 21. The ecclesiastical historian imputes the refusal of peace to the advice of Maximus. Such advice was unworthy of a philosopher; but the philosopher was likewise a magician, who flattered the hopes and passions of his master.

The arts of this new Zopyrus (Greg. Nazianzen, Orat. 4, p. 115, 116,) may derive some credit from the testimony of two abbreviators (Sextus Rufus and Victor) and the casual hints of Libanius (Orat. Parent. c. 134, p. 357), and Ammianus (24. 7). The course of genuine VOL. III.

D

34

JULIAN BURNS HIS FLEET.

[CH. XXIV himself as the hostage and guide of the Roman march. The most rational grounds of suspicion were urged, without effect, by the wisdom and experience of Hormisdas; and the credulous Julian, receiving the traitor into his bosom, was persuaded to issue a hasty order, which, in the opinion of mankind, appeared to arraign his prudence, and to endanger his safety. He destroyed in a single hour the whole navy, which had been transported above five hundred miles, at so great an expense of toil, of treasure, and of blood. Twelve, or at the most, twenty-two small vessels were saved,

to accompany, on carriages, the march of the army, and to form occasional bridges for the passage of the rivers. A supply of twenty days' provisions was reserved for the use of the soldiers; and the rest of the magazines, with a fleet of eleven hundred vessels, which rode at anchor in the Tigris, were abandoned to the flames, by the absolute command of the emperor. The Christian bishops, Gregory and Augustine, insult the madness of the apostate, who executed, with his own hands, the sentence of divine justice. Their authority, of less weight, perhaps, in a military question, is confirmed by the cool judgment of an experienced soldier, who was himself spectator of the conflagration, and who could not disapprove the reluctant murmurs of the troops.* Yet there are not wanting some specious, and perhaps solid reasons, which might justify the resolution of Julian. The navigation of the Euphrates never ascended above Babylon, nor that of the Tigris above Opis.† The distance of the last-mentioned city from the Roman camp was not very considerable; and Julian must soon have renounced the vain and impracticable attempt of forcing upwards a great

history is interrupted by a most unseasonable chasm in the text of Ammianus. * See Ammianus, (24, 7) Libanius, (Orat. Parentalis, c. 132, 133, p. 356, 357), Zosimus, (lib. 3, p. 183), Zonaras, (tom. ii, lib. 13, p. 26), Gregory, (Orat. 4, p. 116,) and Augustin (de Civitate Dei, lib. 4, c. 29; lib. 5, c. 21). Of these, Libanius alone attempts a faint apology for his hero; who, according to Ammianus, pronounced his own condemnation, by a tardy and ineffectual attempt to extinguish the flames. Consult Herodotus (lib. 1, c. 194), Strabo (lib. 16, p. 1074), and Tavernier, (p. 1, lib. 2, p. 152). [The Euphrates and the Tigris have been recently explored by British steamers. The former, "in its present condition, is not navigable, even in the lower part of its course.' The latter will admit vessels, drawing from three to four feet water, from the Persian Gulph, almost as far as Tekrit, which is several miles above the ancient site of Opis. Layard, N. and B.,

fleet against the stream of a rapid river,* which in several places was embarrassed by natural or artificial cataracts.† The power of sails and oars was insufficient; it became necessary to tow the ships against the current of the river; the strength of twenty thousand soldiers was exhausted in this tedious and servile labour; and if the Romans continued to march along the banks of the Tigris, they could only expect to return home without achieving any enterprise worthy of the genius or fortune of their leader. If, on the contrary, it was advisable to advance into the inland country, the destruction of the fleet and magazines was the only measure which could save that valuable prize from the hands of the numerous and active troops which might suddenly be poured from the gates of Ctesiphon. Had the arms of Julian been victorious, we should now admire the conduct as well as the courage of a hero, who, by depriving his soldiers of the hopes of a retreat, left them only the alternative of death or conquest.‡

The cumbersome train of artillery and wagons, which retards the operations of a modern army, was in a great measure unknown in the camps of the Romans.§ Yet, in every age, the subsistence of sixty thousand men must have been one of the most important cares of a prudent general; and that subsistence could only be drawn from his own or from the enemy's country. Had it been possible for Julian to maintain a bridge of communication on the Tigris, and to preserve the conquered places of Assyria, a desolated province could not afford any large or regular supplies, in a season of the year when the lands were covered by the inundation of the Euphrates,¶ and the unwholesome air p. 472-475.-ED.]

appellant Medi sagittam.

* A celeritate Tigris incipit vocari, ita Plin. Hist. Natur. 6. 31.

One of these dikes, which produces an artificial cascade or cataract, is described by Tavernier (part 1, lib. 2, p. 226), and Thevenot (part 2, lib. 1, p. 193). The Persians, or Assyrians, laboured to interrupt the navigation of the river. (Strabo, lib. 15, p. 1075. D'Anville, L'Euphrate et le Tigre, p. 98, 99.) Recollect the successful and applauded rashness of Agathocles and Cortez, who burnt their ships on the coasts of Africa and Mexico. § See the judicious re

flections of the author of the Essai sur la Tactique, tom. ii, p. 287-353, and the learned remarks of M. Guichardt, Nouveaux Mémoires Militaires, tom. i, p. 351-382, on the baggage and subsistence of the Roman armies. The Tigris rises to the south, the Euphrates to the north, of the Armenian mountains. The former overflows in March, the latter in July. These circumstances are well explained in

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