are real existences or substances collected in the cells of the brain or deposited in the mind, waiting our summons to call them forth, and arrange them into proper order. It would not be easy to form a more correct resemblance of Epicurus's atoms dancing about in infinite space, than would be displayed by such a motly assemblage of ideas, of such various hues and physiognomies.

I shall state, in few words, what are the points which I shall undertake to establish on this subject. I do not go as far as Dr. Priestley, and positively assert this whole doctrine of ideas to be a chimæra of Dr. Reid's own creation, or the progeny of his own brain; as I am willing to admit that he had some aid in the procreation and delivery of it from that bright fraternity the schoolmen, whose heads appear to have been wonderfully prolific in the production of metaphysical monsters, and who displayed as man midwives, extraordinary adroitness in ushering them into light. I assert, then, this doctrine was not that of Aristotle, but of the schoolmen, who misunderstood him; nor of Des Cartes, and Locke; that we see some remains of it in Father Mallebranche, though he rejected the greater part of it, and in the language of many philosophers, as of Newton and Clarke, who fell into the phraseology of the schools, without probably having studied. this subject. I maintain, finally, that it is not upon this ground, but upon a much deeper one, is built the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume. I intend to enter upon the explanation of the opinions of all the philosophers, but shall commence with that of Mr. Locke, as most English readers are familiar with his works, and all can more easily estimate the force of the arguments which are contained in their own language.

I say, then, that Mr. Locke maintains no such opinion as that ascribed to him by Dr. Reid; that our ideas of outward objects are images or representatives of them in the mind, which alone are perceived by the mind. I commence with

my presumptions against this objection, and then shall proceed to my demonstrative proofs of its falsehood. In the first place, there are strong presumptions, that whatever may be the occasional language of Mr. Locke, and he must have had a mind more than human, if his language had not received its tincture, in some degree, from the schools; he never did intend to inculcate the doctrine that our ideas are real images in the mind, and the only immediate objects of perception.

The first presumption.-If he maintained that ideas are images in the mind, why does he not, instead of commencing his treatise with informing us, that " every man is conscious to himself that he thinks, and that what his mind is applied about whilst thinking, are the ideas that are there," rather enter upon his task with proving the existence of these images? With that discernment, which he undoubtedly possessed, could he think, that every person is conscious of the existence of such things within them as these images? Could mankind so readily perceive that they had within them images of whiteness, hardness, sweetness, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, all of which he enumerates in the very entrance upon the account he gives of the original of our ideas? If he considered the term ideas as equivalent to thoughts, this was a very natural mode of procedure; but if he considered it as expressive of a certain something in the mind, of which the vulgar never heard, it would seem natural to have undertaken the proof of their existence, and made that proof a prominent part of his treatise.

Presumption second.-If Mr. Locke really inculcated the doctrine that ideas are images in the mind, and immediate objects of perception, could it be possible that he would not have discerned, that the phenomenon of perception is no better explained by the intervention of these images than without them? If the mind perceives the image only as the representative of the outward object, does not the act of per

ception remain still as much unexplained as before? If it be said that this image is present to the mind, and, therefore, that the mind can act upon it, and perceive it on account of its immediate contiguity and connection, while it cannot act upon objects more remote, since it cannot act where it is not; still it is as difficult to be explained by the human understanding, and in fact insoluble to it, how the mind can perceive any thing, however nearly connected with it. A moments reflection must have convinced such men as Locke and Des Cartes, whatever might be the jargon of the schools, that it would be as incomprehensible to us, in what manner the mind can hold converse with the representatives of outward objects, as with those objects themselves,

Presumption third.-It is strange and unaccountable, if Mr. Locke held this doctrine, that in no part of his long works he has any where expressed himself in such unequivocal terms about it, that a question may still be made of his opinion. Instead of doing this, we find him, when the Bishop of Worcester, the admirable Stillingfleet, objected to his use of the word ideas, and his doctrine concerning them, telling him, in his reply, that he was entirely indifferent as to the word which was used, whether it were notion, or any other, provided it was considered as expressive of whatever was in the mind when a man thinks. Now what could Mr. Locke, who was an advocate of the soul's immateriality, suppose to be in the mind, but the thoughts?

Last Presumption.-I shall not multiply presumptive proofs, as I feel confident that my demonstrative ones will be satisfactory. Besides, that we do not find in the works of Mr. Locke, the doctrine of images occupying a principal place, as we should have reason to expect, if he believed it; why do we never find him answering objections, that would so naturally present themselves against it? Would he not have perceived that it went to the rejection of an external world, and should we not have found him combatting such

T

an objection? We find him, indeed, engaged in one part of his work in stating the evidence upon which we believe the existence of an external world, as this naturally fell in with his plan; but it is to be observed, that it is upon principles entirely discrepant from those which would have been assumed by a man, who believed that ideas are only the images of outward objects; and, of course, who had to show the reason, why, when we perceive only the aerial delegates, we should conclude that their constituents really exist. Dr. Reid, however, asserts, that Mr. Locke and others, did undertake to prove by argument, and rest upon that proof, the existence of an external world. "It was this theory of ideas that led Des Cartes, and those that followed him, to think it necessary to prove, by philosophical arguments, the existence of material objects. And who does not see that philosophy must make a very ridiculous figure in the eyes of sensible men, while it is employed in mustering up metaphy. sical arguments, to prove that there is a Sun and Moon, an Earth and a Sea. Yet we find these truly great men, Des Cartes, Mallebranche, Arnauld and Locke, seriously employing themselves in this argument. Surely their principles led them to think, that all men, from the beginning of the world, believed the existence of those things upon insufficient grounds; and to think that they would be able to place upon a more rational foundation this universal belief of mankind. But the misfortune is, that all the laboured arguments they have advanced, to prove the existence of those things we see and feel, are mere sophisms. Not one of them will bear examination." This same sentiment is often repeated in the works of this author, as if he evidently plumes himself on having discovered an error in those philosophers, and could lay claim to the merit of having first perceived the true ground, on which rests the existence of an exterior world. Passing by the other philosophers implicated in this charge, let us attend to Mr. Locke alone; and I think, we shall see

that the Dr. is capable of great disingenuousness and inaccuracy in stating the sentiments of others; and evinces no degree of backwardness in urging his own pretensions to merit, even when those pretensions are by no means unquestionable. "It is therefore," says Mr. Locke, "the actual receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, that something doth exist at that time, without us, which causes that idea in us, though, perhaps, we neither know, nor consider how it does it. For it takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced, viz. whilst I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind, which, whatever object causes it, I call white; by which, I know that that quality or accident (i. e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on as so certain, that I can no more doubt whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that something really exists, that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certainty as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of any thing, but of a man's self alone, and of God." Again. "For I think nobody can, in earnest be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, whatever he may have with his own thoughts, will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say any thing contrary to his opinion." After these assertions, to use the language of Warburton, he must calculate largely on the advantage of favourable hearers, who would presume to indulge in such a statement as the following. "It is remarkable, that Liebnitz's system,