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the mind, no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us."

Again. "Let us suppose at present, that the different motions and figures, bulk and number of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations, which we have from the colours and smells of bodies, viz. that a violet, by the impulse of insensible/ particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the idea of a blue colour, and sweet scent of that flower, to be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive, that God should annex such idea to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain, to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance."

Again. "From whence I think it easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all." The primary qualities of body are solidity, extension, figure, motion, rest or number; the secondary, colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat, cold, &c. We see here, that Mr. Locke denies, of the larger portion of our ideas of external objects, that they can be the resemblances of those objects. How could Dr. Reid, if he possessed the candour and ingenuousness of a true inquirer into nature, in spite of such explicit avowals of Mr. Locke, persist in declaring, that all the philosophers were unanimous in the opinion, that our ideas of outward objects were the images or resemblances of them? Mr. Locke in this place, was evidently combatting the doc. trine of the schools, which supposed sensible species, in case of the secondary, as well as primary qualities of body, to

pass from the object through the senses, and our ideas, in both cases, resemblances or images of them. Here we discern in Mr. Locke, the effort of a penetrating mind, prone to investigation, and having the deepest insight into nature, to relieve itself from the shackles of the school philosophy, but unable completely to accomplish it. He rejects the doctrine, that our ideas are resemblances of the qualities of bodies, except in the case of the primary qualities. He was betrayed into this slight error, perhaps, from considering, how much clearer our ideas are of figure, extension, motion, and rest, than those of taste, sound, &c. and on that account imagined a remote similitude, between the thought in the mind, and the quality of the body. And after all in this doctrine, do we find any thing more objectionable, than those analogies between mind and matter, so frequently traced in writing and discourse, in all languages; and from which analogies, in fact, are derived most of those terms, we make use of in designating the properties and operations of the mind? Admitting, however, that there cannot possibly be the most distant analogy or similitude, between a thought or idea of the mind, and any quality in an outward object, and of consequence, that Mr. Locke's theory is in this minute particular, liable to objection (which by the by, no one has ever shown or ever can show); yet, even in stating this part of his system, he has furnished us with an unanswerable argument, against those who have ascribed to him the ideal theory. He positively denies, that there is any resemblance between our ideas, and the secondary qualities of body; he admits a resemblance only in case of the primary; and in neither case does he maintain the doctrine, that ideas are images or shadows in the mind. To show that Dr. Reid is, to say the least, in the habit of assuming as much credit to himself, as he merits, for what would appear from his statements to be his discoveries, take the following exampleSpeaking on this subject, he says: “It is farther to be ob

served, that with regard to some objects of sense, we may understand, what is meant by an image of them imprinted on the brain; but with regard to most objects of sense, the phrase is absolutely unintelligible, and conveys no meaning at all. As to objects of sight, I understand what is meant by an image of their figure in the brain; but how shall we conceive an image of their colour, where there is absolute, darkness? And as to all other objects of sense, except figure and colour, I am unable to conceive what is meant by an image of them. Let any man say, what he means by an image of heat and cold, an image of hardness or softness, an image of sound, or smell, or taste. The word image, when applied to these objects of sense, has absolutely no meaning. Upon how weak a foundation, then, does this hypothesis stand, when it supposes that images of all the objects of sense are imprinted on the brain, being conveyed thither by the conduits of the organs and nerves." The hypothesis here mentioned, is attributed to Mr. Locke, as well as others, let us hear what he has to say upon the same subject. "From whence I think it is easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us; and what is sweet, blue or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion, of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves which we call so." When these two passages are brought together, no comment can be necessary. We shall have occasion afterwards to remark, how often, as well as in this instance, when Dr. Reid supposes himself controverting the opinions, and detecting the errors of the English metaphysician, he is

only fighting with phantoms of his own creation, and really maintaining the doctrines of that great man.

The next and last argument, which proves that Mr. Locke did not maintain the ideal theory, is, that in tracing the origin of human knowledge, he calls by the common name of ideas, those which are conveyed into the mind by sensation, and those conveyed in by reflection. Now, it is barely conceivable, that he could have been either so entirely devested of understanding, or so wedded to the systems of the schools, as to have believed that the images of external objects are transmitted to the mind, to become immediate objects of perception; but how could he suppose that there are in the mind images of thinking, hoping, doubting, believing, conceiving? That he supposed there were images of these, has never been asserted. Why, then, if he believed there were images in the one case and not in the other, not draw the line of discrimination between them, by changing his term or giving warning of the difference of meaning? Mallebranche tells us when he thinks the intervention of ideas, as representatives of objects, necessary to perception, and why should not Mr. Locke have done the same? We find him in his answer to that Father, discovering a thorough insight into all the difficulties and embarrassments, which clogged his doctrine of ideas. "According to his hypothesis," says Mr. Locke," of seeing all things in God, how can he know that there is any such real being in the world as the sun? Did he ever see the sun? No, but on occasion of the presence of the sun to his eyes, he has seen the idea of the sun in God, which God has exhibited to him; but the sun, because it can. not be united to his soul, he cannot see. How, then, does he know that there is a sun, which he never saw? And since God does all things by the most compendious ways, what need is there that God should make a sun, that we might see its idea in him, when he pleased to exhibit it, when this might as well be done without any real sun at all." And yet after

all this conclusive reasoning and profound reflection by Mr. Locke, we still hear it repeated, that he embraced an ideal theory, that paved the way to the exclusion of an exterior world by Berkeley, and of an immaterial one afterwards by Mr. Hume. Would not a writer, who could speak in this way, have seen, that if ideas of outward objects were images in the mind, and the only immediate objects of perception, this would lead to the exclusion of an external world, as well as the doctrine of Mallebranche? Here it is, however, in the doctrine of Mallebranche and the schoolmen, that we descry the trunk from which germinated the scepticism of Berkeley, and the atheism of Hume; while Mr. Locke, Aristotle, and Des Cartes, are entirely free from such errors and absurdities. Had Mr. Locke lived a few years longer, I doubt not he would have given as satisfactory an answer to Berkeley, as he had previously done to Mallebranche and Norris; and have shown to the entire satisfaction of the learned world, that their theories had no connection with his. To consummate our argument on this point, if any consummation be considered necessary, hear Mr. Locke speak in his answer to Mallebranche. "One who thinks ideas are nothing but perceptions of the mind, annexed to certain motions of the body by the will of God, who hath ordered such perceptions always to accompany such motions, does, in effect, conceive those ideas or perceptions to be only passions of the mind, (not images of things, but passions or affections of the mind) when produced in it by external objects." In a piece entitled some thoughts concerning reading and study, he says, "perspicuity consists in the using of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts, which he would have pass from his own mind into that of another man." In his answer to Norris, we find the following passage. "I am complained of, for not having given an account of, or defined the nature of our ideas." We see, therefore, that this was a subject of complaint against him. He proceeds-" By the nature of ideas

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