these ideas; as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical causes of all things here below; as for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude, are the causes of the likeness and unlikeness of all things to one another, by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers, very well understood, that these ideas were all of them really nothing else, but the noemata or conceptions of that one perfect intellect, who was their second hypostasis; and therefore, they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances, existing severally and apart by themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions, concerning them." Others differ in opiniɔn from Dr. Cudworth in this respect; and Brucker asserts, that Plato appears to have meant by his term ideas, something much more mysterious, viz. patterns or archetypes, subsisting by themselves as real beings in the divine reason; as in their original and eternal region, issuing thence to give form to sensible things, and become the objects of contemplation and science to rational beings. Conformably to this notion, Diogenes is said, when once dining at the table of Plato, who was descanting upon the favourite topic of his eternal models, which alone are the objects of science, to have exclaimed with his usual cynical asperity, I see that table, and that goblet, Plato, but I do not see tableity or gobleity; to whom Plato rejoined, that is, because you look at them with the eyes of your body, and not with those of the mind. The question, then, if it were of any importance, as it undoubtedly is not, is likely to remain forever undecided. If notwithstanding the proofs to the contrary, we could believe with Dr. Cudworth and the Platonists of the Alexandrian school, that Plato meant nothing else by his ideas, exemplars or models, but the conceptions of the divine mind, or the plans by which the Creator formed every part of the

universe, the doctrine would not only be rendered intelligible, but perfectly just and philosophical. What is the object of all philosophy, but to investigate the plans, upon which the Creator hath constructed the various parts of nature? What did Newton, when he revealed to us the structure and laws of the solar system; or Locke, when he disclosed and solved the phenomena of the human mind; or Harvey, when he discovered the circulation of the blood, but unfold new views of the secret counsels of the Supreme Being, in the construction of these several departments of the world? Philosophy, which has been denominated the science of causes, might with equal propriety, without involving any of the fancies and sublime visions of Plato, be defined to be an attempt, as far as the human mind is competent to the task, to disclose the secret plans of the Creator, in his adjustment of the several departments, both of the physical and moral world.

In reference to perception, I find nothing satisfactory in Plato. Sense, he defined to be, the passive perception of the soul, through the medium of the body. Visible things, were regarded by him as fleeting shades, and ideas the only permanent substances. These last, he conceived to be the great objects of science, to a mind raised by divine contemplations, above the perpetually varying scenes of the material world. Dr. Reid imagines, however, that he has found a passage in Plato, the only one to which he refers, in confirmation of his doctrines concerning ideas. "Plato," says he, "illustrates our manner of perceiving objects of sense, in this manner. He supposes a dark subterranean cave, in which men lie bound in such a manner, that they can direct their eyes only to one part of the cave. Far behind there is a light, some rays of which come over a wall to that part of the cave, which is before the eyes of our prisonersa number of persons variously employed, pass between them and the light, whose shadows are seen by the prisoners, but

Z

not the persons themselves. In this manner, that philosopher conceived, that by our senses we perceive the shadows of things only, and not things themselves." The Dr. must have been at extreme difficulty to find his theory of ideas in the doctrine of Plato, before he would have pressed this passage into his service, which is to be found in his seventh book of a republic, and which has certainly no more relation to the subject of perception, than, according to the account given by Le Sage, the cave into which Gil Blas was transported by the robbers. It is strange, that this passage should have been so greatly perverted from its evident import; and it could have been so misconstrued only from inattention to the spirit of Plato's philosophy, and the strain of doctrine on such points, which he keeps up throughout all his works. Dr. Spens, the intelligent translator of his treatise concerning a republic, much more consistently with its drift, considers it as having a correspondence with the doctrine of christianity, about the original blindness and depravity of mankind, and their need of supernatural instruction. "Our author's subterranean cave," says he, "so elegantly described, and so universally known, may be considered as another instance of a conformity in his sentiments, with those contained in revelation. It gives us a lively representation of the ignorance and degeneracy of mankind, in the present state, where numbers are busied in pursuing shadows, as the only real and substantial goods; while they neglect the culture of the mind, and never raise their ideas, to the beauty and perfection of that supreme intelligence, which is the origin, and the end of all." This is a just observation, and the passage of Plato is susceptible of such a turn, and may be naturally improved to the purpose this author contemplated; but I apprehend the immediate intent of Plato, in this portion of his work, may be easily ascertained, by taking into view his peculiar opinions, and the whole strain of his doctrine throughout this particular treatise. He had been

maintaining the propositions, that states would be happy, when they should have philosophers for their rulers, who instead of desiring public employments, would rather fly from them; and these philosophers were men, who instead of being misled by the mere shadows of things, presented from without, by objects which are in a perpetual flux, and from which no real knowledge could be derived, devoted themselves to the contemplation of Supreme Intelligence, and those eternal forms or models which are permanent, as of justice, truth, beauty, &c. He himself furnishes us in the very first sentence, with a key that unlocks the mysteries contained in this allegory; and in allegorical representations, from the natural fertility of his fancy, he seems to take great delight. It begins thus-" After these things now," said I, compare, with reference to instruction, and the want of instruction, our nature to such a condition as follows." It is evident, that they are those in the cave, and who can see only the shadows of things, who are said to want instruction; and those who are instructed, are they, who ascending to the regions of intelligence, can contemplate things, as they are in their real substantial models. He proceeds-" Consider men as in a subterranean habitation, resembling a cave, with its entrance opening to the light, and answering to the whole extent of the cave. Suppose them to have been in it from their childhood, with chains both on their legs and necks, so as to remain there, and only be able to look before them, but by the chain, incapable to turn their heads around; suppose them to have light of a fire, burning far above and behind them; and that between the fire and chained men, there is a road above them. Along which, observe a low wall, built like that which hedges in the stage of mountebanks, on which they show to men their wonderful tricks. Observe now along this wall, men bearing all sorts of utensils, raised above the wall, and human statues, and other animals in wood, and stone, and all sorts of furniture. Do

you imagine, that such as these see any thing of themselves, or of one another, but the shadows formed by the fire, falling on the opposite part of the cave?" Not to be prolix in my quotations. He continues-After exhibiting them as passing and repassing from the cave to the light above, he gives us the moral meaning, couched in the allegory, as intelligible as language can make it. "The whole of this comparison now," said I, friend Glauco, "is to be applied to our preceding discourse. For if you compare this region, which is seen by the sight, to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it, to the power of the sun, and the ascent above, and the sight of things above, to the soul's ascent into the region of intelligence, you will apprehend my meaning, since you want to hear it. But God knows whether it be true. Appearances then to me appear in this manner. In the intellectual world, the idea of the good is most remote, and scarcely to be seen; but if it be seen, it is to be deemed, as indeed the cause to all of all things, right and beautiful, generating in the visible world,light and its principle the sun, and in the intellectual world, it is itself the principle, producing truth and intelligence, and that this must be beheld by him, who is to act wisely either privately, or in public." He concludes the application thus-" But what? Do you imagine this any thing wonderful, that when one comes from divine contemplations to human evils, he should behave awkwardly, and appear extremely ridiculous, whilst yet the light is in his eyes, and he is obliged, before he is sufficiently accustomed to the present darkness, to contend in courts of justice or elsewhere, about the shadows of justice, or those statues, which occasion the shadows; and to dispute about this point, how these things are conceived of, by those who have never at any time beheld justice itself?"

These passages are deemed sufficient, unequivocally to explain the meaning of Plato in this celebrated allegory;