accountable for his conduct. It soon discovers, that in order that he should be justly accountable to his Creator, he must be possessed of reason to enable him to know good and evil, or to distinguish what is virtuous and vicious in human conduct: and also of freedom of choice, to adhere to the one and avoid the other. Perceiving, then, that there enter into the idea of accountableness, both reason and liberty, and at the same time, that these are privileges that belong to mankind, he at once concludes, that men are accountable for their actions. Now let this subject be resumed by the syllogistic art, and it immediately hastens to a general proposition, and then applying that proposition to the race of men, finds that it agrees with them and thence, from this comparison and perception of agreement, deduces its inference in due form and figure.

Every creature possessed of reason and liberty is accountable fur his actions:

Man is a creature possessed of reason and liberty,
Therefore man is accountable for his actions.

Such is the form and substance of a syllogism. Now it may here be asked, of what advantage in this case, is the syllogism? It certainly did not contribute in any degree towards furnishing us with the intermediate ideas, reason and liberty, by the intervention of which, we have been able to trace the connection between man and accountableness. It as certainly did not enable us to perceive, that these properties belonged to mankind. All this preparatory process towards our conclusion was gone through by our reasoning powers, which by an energy with which they are endowed, enable us to trace the agreement, or disagreement of our ideas. After we had arrived at our conclusion, by the interposition of our medius terminus, or intermediate ideas, the syllogism siniply reduces the whole process to a regular form. Could any thing be more shallow and nugatory than such an art? But it may

be remarked, that our syllogism is not merely useless, as contributing nothing towards the result, but is positively injurious, as it rushes to a general proposition, to obtain its major; every creature possessed of reason and liberty, is accountable for his actions. Hence the justness and force of the observation of Bacon, assensum constringit non res. It waits not for the slow' progress of reason and experience before it leaps to its conclusions, than which propensity nothing can be more incompatible with the true spirit of philosophy. Hence the syllogistic art will ever be found to minister as successfully to the maintenance of error, as the support of truth. All a rhetorician's rules, says the poet, with the lawless license of his profession, teach nothing but to name his tools. What is thus said of rhetoric, without any aptness of similitude, or justness of application, may be justly applied to logic, except so far as it consists in tracing the progress of the human mind, in the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge. The sum of the whole matter is, that if we wish to become good reasoners, we need not expect to do so by studying the rules of logic, or becoming skilful in the management of syllogisms, but by replenishing our minds with a plentiful stock of intermediate ideas, from observation and reflection; by studying the authors most remarkable for profound thought, and close and accurate investigation; and lastly, by cultivating the habits of reasoning from frequent practice, so as to strengthen and invigorate our natural parts. It seems that Aristotle devoted so much labour to the reducing of syllogistic reasoning to a regular art, in order to refute the sophisms of those philosophers in his time, who were not ashamed to deny any thing; and Mr. Locke, while he decries this method in every other respect, admits that to stop the mouths and silence the objections of sceptics, it may be of some service. And yet it may be asked, of what possible use can the reducing of our thoughts to syllogisms be in convincing an adversary, since if he does not allow the,

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force of those intermediate ideas or proofs, which we adduce to demonstrate any proposition, he will not be more inclined to it, when we have modelled them into syllogistic form. In the example alleged above, if he did not agree, that every being possessed of reason and liberty is account: able for his actions, would you convince him of man's accountability, by putting it into a syllogism? Surely not. Under every aspect of this matter, therefore, I cannot but conclude with lord Kaims, that “Aristotle's artificial mode of reasoning, is no less superficial than intricate. The propositions he attempts to prove by syllogism, are all self-evident. Take for example, the following proposition, “ that man has the

power of self-motion. To prove this he assumes the following maxim, upon which, indeed, every one of his syllogisms is founded, that whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together, holds true of every one separately." Dr. Gillies in animadverting upon this passage of his lordship’s works, speaks in the following terms—“ It would have been charitable in this acute author, to have pointed out the passage in which Aristotle maintains, that because it is true of a number of particulars joined together, that they are an hundred or a thousand, the same holds true of every one of them separately. It is impossible to restrain indignation at such unmeaning jargon, poured out against the most accurate of all writers.” Dr. Gillies here rather ungenerously avails himself of an ambiguous expression of lord Kaims, to detect a fallacy in his reasoning, when the slightest reflection must have convinced him that his sentiment, when rightly interpreted, is just. He means nothing more in this passage, than what Mr. Locke had before asserted, that in every syllogism there must enter one general proposition, in which something is severally affirmed or denied, of all the particulars that compose a genus, species, or collection of objects, and must of consequence be true of each of those particulars, when separately taken. This is the very founda

tion, upon which all syllogistic argument rests, and it is not to be denied, that it is as shallow, as the divisions of syllogisms into such a complication of modes and figures, is intricate and obscure. The world is much indebted to Dr. Gillies, for the pains he has taken, and the ability he has discovered, in throwing light upon the writings, and reproducing in an English translation, some of the works of the most obscure of all authors. He has given us access with much less trouble than formerly, to some of the most useful and profound speculations of the Stagyrite; but at the same time the observation cannot be withheld, that from his translation, we can form no conception of the style and peculiar manner of the Greek author. His translation is characteriz. ed by a splendour of imagery and parade of expression, altogether unlike his original, and exhibits to our view nothing less than the Hercules of antiquity, decorated with the costume, and assuming the air and graces of modern fashion.

The Dr.'s bold and confident mode of expressing himself, is not a little remarkable.. In one place we find him asserting, “it is worthy of remark, that Aristotle did precisely that which he is blamed by Bacon, Hobbes and Mallebranche, for not doing; and declared it impossible to do that which he is blamed for having attempted.” In another, Rapin, and the French philosophers, generally treat the Stagyrite with great unfairness, and speak of his opinions with the greatest ignorance, their accounts of him being disgraced by great inaccuracies.” Again.“ In one place,” says he," had Mr. Locke known what Aristotle meant by motion, his candour would not have allowed him to speak of this definition as he does.” In another, “ The intrepid ignorance of Voltaire, znight maintain, that Aristotle considered light as a quality merely; and that luminous and coloured bodies, ad qualities exactly such as they excited the ideas of in us. But how could the learned Warburton assent to this erroneous account of the Peripatetick philosophy!” It is not to be doubted, that Aristotle's Joctrines have been too generally taken from the schoolmen, his false interpreters; yet we are inclined to think, that if it does not indicate intrepid ignorance, it at any rate requires intrepid pretensions to learning, to speak so confidently in disparagement of the opinions of so many able and illustrious men, and more especially in reference to the works of an author, the most intricate and ob. scure of all others. And with respect to the last point, in which the learned Warburton is said to have countenanced the opinion of the French philosopher, that Aristotle considers light as a property of bodies, while we really do be. lieve, that the sentiment ascribed to him by Dr. Gillies is correct, viz. that it is a medium by which objects are rendered visible; yet we cannot help remarking, that such is the obscurity of his language, when treating of this subject, that two men, who had embraced opposite views of it, might dispute about the doctrine of the Stagyrite, until doomsday, with all the dexterity of the schoolmen, and at last be unable to decide the controversy.

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