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admirable effort of genius for the great historian of England! “ When we speak of a chain of causes and effects, we are informed by Mr. Hume,” says the Professor, “who seems to have attained to such deep knowledge without any aid from supernatural light, as he never laid claim to any, that there is no real chain in the case, but that the expression is merely figurative, or, if you prefer the term, analogical. For instance, the vessel moves in the stream by the force of the tide; the tide rises and falls from the approach and recess of the waters of the ocean; the ocean is influenced in its mass of fluid by the attraction of the sun and moon; attraction is occasioned by some unknown cause; this unknown cause derives its power from the hand of the Almighty. Here, we are in the habit of speaking of a chain of causes and effects, the first link of which, is, as usual, traced to the throne of the Almighty. But Mr. Hume has discovered, by mere dint of natural penetration, that there is in reality no material chain, connecting the vessel with the throne of the Almighty. If any persons ever thought so, in all good will and charity, we leave them to be corrected by Mr. Hume; but, for ourselves, although we would make it a matter of conscience not to withhold his due praise even from an atheist and sceptic; yet we cannot conceive how any one in his senses, could be so simple as to imagine that he was using, in such modes of expression, any other than a metaphorical language.

We have already displayed in the works of Mr. Hume a much more daring and gigantic effort, than that which is ascribed to him by the Professor. Not contented with discovering (if he has done so) that our language about cause and effect, is merely analogical, we find him endeavouring by one great exertion to break the chain that binds his race and all created nature to the throne of the Almighty. Like the Titans of old, he wages impious war against the throne and government of God, and essays to obliterate from the minds of men a belief in his existence, and all trust in his providence. Let us see, however, with what cool indifference and philosophick sang-froid, a modern philosopher can allude to this serious and atrocious attempt of Mr. Hume. “This language," says our Professor, “ has even been adopted by philosophers, and by atheists as well as theists. The latter have represented natural events as parts of a great chain, the highest link of which is supported by the Deity; the former have pretended that there is no absurdity in supposing the number of links to be infinite.” This it must be confessed is a very polite and complacent allusion to the doctrine of a perpetual succession of causes, upon which all the best philosophers, both of ancient and modern times, have agreed in setting the seal of their reprobation, and the absurdity of which Dr. Clarke, in his demonstration of the being and attributes of God, has so completely exposed. For our part, we cannot but regret to say, that professor Stewart, popular a writer as he has rendered himself in some circles, and favourable as has been the reception with which his works have generally met; in our estimation as the advocate of virtue and religion, assumes a very questionable shape. If he be the real friend of virtue and religion, and have at heart the great interests of truth and mankind, could he refer with the same apparent approbation and satisfaction to the works of the enemies of truth and its abettors, of atheists and theists? How gently does he touch the abominable doctrines of Mr. Hume; sometimes even endeavouring to palliate them and appropriate them to himself! No matter whether men approve themselves the true interpreters of nature, or its corruptors and falsifiers; the supporters of morals and religion, or their subverters; sound politicians, or anarchists and disorganizers; the propagators of the most just and sublime lessons of philosophy, or the retailers of a miserable jargon; they all have equally respectful and honourable mention in his pages. Newton, Locke, Bacon, Clarke, Aristotle, Des Cartes, Mallebranche, Butler, successively appear upon the stage, in company with Rousseau, D'Alembert, Helvetius, Condorcet, Diderot, Godwin, and a host of worthies of a similar description, while they are all received with the most obsequious homage and courtesy, crowned with undistinguished honours, and dismissed with a like philosophick suavity and grace. This may all be regarded as appertaining to the office, and comporting with the pretensions of the modern philosopher; but we cannot withhold the observation, that it appears to us to be neither consistent with the spirit, nor indicative of those moral feel. ings, which should characterize the faithful friend and zealous advocate of truth and righteousness.

To proceed from this short digression in stating the opinions of the Professor. “ It seems now,” says he, “ to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to perceive a necessary connection between two successive events, or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the other as a cause. From experience we learn that there are many events which are constantly conjoined, so that the one invariably follows the other; but it is possible, for any thing that we know to the contrary, that this connexion, though a constant one, may not be a necessary connexion; nay, it is possible, that there may be no necessary connexions among any of the phenomena which we see; and if there be any such connections existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them.” Again—“ the word cause is used, both by philosophers and the vulgar, in two senses, which are widely different: when it is said that every change in nature indicates the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change, and without which it could not have happened. This may be called the metaphysical meaning of the word, and such causes may be called metaphysical or efficient causes, In natural hilosophy, however, when we speak of one thing being the cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are constantly conjoined, so that when we see the one we may expect the other. The causes which are the objects of our investigation in natural philosophy, may, for the sake of distinction, be called physical causes.”

Such is the doctrine held upon this subject, and such the ground upon which it is defended. “It seems now," says the professor, " to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to perceive a necessary connection between two successive events, or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the other as a cause.” As to the last part of this proposition, which relates to the possibility of our comprehending the manner in which one event proceeds from the other as its cause; if he considers this a part of the new system, he is entirely mistaken, since no philosopher, who understood the limited nature of the human faculties, ever supposed himself able to discover the mode in which any one cause gives rise to its effect. The water which we drink quenches our thirst, and the food which we eat relieves us from hunger and sustains our bodies, and we know that there must be a power or virtue in water and food to produce these effects, or they would not have taken place; but as to the manner in which they operate upon our budies to accomplish these purposes, philosophy acknowledges that to be unknown to her. Many passages to this purport might be adduced from Mr. Locke, but it cannot be necessary, as it is regarded in science, as an established and incontrovertible truth.

The peculiarity in the Professor's doctrine, may, therefore, be considered as contained in the first part of the proposition. “ It is now pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to perceive a necessary connexion between two successive events.” And again, he explains.“ From experience, indeed, we learn that there are many events which are constantly conjoined, so that the one invariably follows the other; but it is possible, for any thing we know to the contrary, that this connexion, though a constant one, as far as our observation has reached, may not be a necessary connexion, Nay, it is possible, that there may be no necessary connexions among any of the phenomena which we see; and if there be any such connexions existing, we may be assured we shall never be able to discover them.” This is the argument, or one of the argun.ents, by which Mr, Hume endeavours to overturn the doctrine of causality or efficiency in objects to produce their effects; and which the professor admits to be unanswerable, as far as it relates to the natural world. The professor has evidently allowed himself to be entrapped in the snare, which Mr. Hume has laid for his victims. The whole force of the reasoning is sapped, and the subtilty of Mr. Hume revealed, by adverting to the ambiguity with which he chooses to employ the terms necessary connexion between causes and effects, which he would consider as equivalent to the expressions, efficiency in causes to produce their effects. We find the Professor imbibing his notions from Mr. Hume, and accordingly giving this as the usual acceptation of the term cause. When it is said that every change in nature indicates the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something necessarily connected with the change, and without which it could not have happened.” Here we find an entirely new definition of the term cause, embracing a wider latitude of meaning than any before annexed to it. Now, is it possible for the narrow mind of man to decide, that there are any two events in the whole compass of the moral and physical world, which are so necessarily connected together that the one could not have existed without the other? The only single object which we are able to conceive, that could not possibly have existed without another, is the universe with-, out a God to create it; for we are sure that God might exist without the universe, as it was not an act of necessity that he formed it, but of choice. So then, if it be true, that a

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