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Kingsbury. 515 551 The Ownership, Tenure and Taxation of Land. Valuation of Public Service Corporations POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE THE HE end of armed conflict is conceivable as the result of either of two achievements. Permanent peace may come either upon the establishment of successful means for the settlement of disputes or upon the elimination of the causes which produce disputes. This paper is limited to discussion of the second of these alternatives. Specifically, the inquiry here undertaken deals with three subjects. The first is a statement of theories concerning the conditions which must be present in order to produce and to maintain relatively harmonious organization among men. The second is a brief inquiry as to the extent to which such conditions now exist among the peoples of the world. The third is the suggestion of a certain principle of action and of certain practical policies which, if adopted, would tend toward the ultimate establishment of relatively harmonious relations among the various divisions of mankind. I From a very early time two rival theories have been put forward concerning the conditions which must be present if harmonious organization is to exist. These two theories had even become crystallized into proverbs as early as Aristotle's time. Aristotle himself pointed out how some men lay down the proposition that "men who are like one another are friends: whence come the common sayings, 'like will to like,' 'birds of a feather,' and so on. Others on the contrary say that all such come under the maxim, 'two of a trade never agree.' Again Aristotle quotes the philosopher Heraclitus that "contrariety is expedient" and that "the best agreement arises from things differing." Empedocles, however, is quoted in direct opposition as affirming that "like aims at like." In modern theory the same rivalry between essentially the same notions appears; but the forms are modified. The modern economist, pointing to the successful operation of great business organizations, emphasizes the fact that differences among men permit division of labor and economy of production. He contends that when men perceive the utility of division of labor and the advantages of organization necessitated by division of labor, intelligent self-interest inevitably produces relatively harmonious organization-sometimes on an international scale. On the other hand, the sociologist sees that harmonious organization is a fact among organisms that cannot possibly realize the utility of organization. Birds, cattle and various varieties of fish are gregarious. Bees and ants have elaborate organizations which exhibit variety of function and division. of labor. In these examples, something which McDougall calls gregarious instinct is evidently sufficient to produce harmonious organization. The gregarious impulse of any animal receives satisfaction only through the presence of animals similar to itself, and the closer the similarity, the greater is the satisfaction. . . . Just so in any human being the instinct operates most powerfully in relation to, and receives the highest degree of satisfaction from, the presence of human beings who most closely resemble that individual, those who behave in like manner and respond to the same situations with similar emotions. The sociologist, however, observes an additional fact. He sees that men deliberately choose to associate with individuals that are like themselves. He notes, for example, that Roman Catholics tend to admit to an organization that transcends national limits, only such persons as are alike in the holding of certain beliefs and in the observance of certain customs. He is impressed by the fact that resemblances in language, race, religion, habits and customs, when discovered to exist, produce |